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We overview the use of field experiments in labor economics. We showcase studies that highlight
the central advantages of this methodology, which include: (i) using economic theory to design the
null and alternative hypotheses; (ii) engineering exogenous variation in real world economic environments
to establish causal relations and learning about the underlying mechanisms; and (iii) engaging in primary
data collection and often working closely with practitioners. To highlight the potential for field experiments
to inform issues in labor economics, we organize our discussion around the individual life cycle. We
therefore consider field experiments related to the accumulation of human capital, the demand and
supply of labor, behavior within firms, and close with a brief discussion of the nascent literature of
















This chapter overviews the burgeoning literature in ﬁeld experiments in labor economics. The
essence of this research method involves researchers engineering carefully crafted exogenous vari-
ation into real world economic environments, with the ultimate aim of identifying causal rela-
tionships and mechanisms underlying them. This chapter describes this approach and documents
how ﬁeld experiments have begun to yield new insights for research questions that have long been
studied by labor economists.
Given our focus on such long-standing questions, in no way do we attempt to do justice to
the enormous literature on which ﬁeld experiments are beginning to add. Our aim is rather to
showcase speciﬁc ﬁeld experiments that highlight what we view to be the central advantages of
this methodology: (i) using economic theory to design the null and alternative hypotheses; (ii)
engineering exogenous variation in real world economic environments to establish causal relations
and learn the mechanisms behind them; and (iii) engaging in primary data collection and often
working closely with practitioners.
As with any research methodology in economics, of course not every question will be amenable
to ﬁeld experiments. Throughout our discussion, we will bring to the fore areas in labor economics
that remain relatively untouched by ﬁeld experiments. In each case, we try to distinguish whether
this is simply because researchers have not had opportunities to design ﬁeld experiments related
to such areas, or whether the nature of the research question implies that ﬁeld experiments are
not the best approach to tackle the problem at hand. Finally, even among those questions where
ﬁeld experiments can and have provided recent insights, we will argue that such insights are most
enhanced when we are able to combine them with, or take inspiration from, other approaches to
empirical work in economics. For example, a number of studies we describe take insights from
laboratory environments to show the importance of non-standard preferences or behaviors in real
world settings. A second class of papers combine ﬁeld experimentation with structural estimation
to measure potential behavioral responses in alternative economic environments, and ultimately
to help design optimal policies to achieve any given objective.
The bulk of the chapter is dedicated to documenting the use and insights from ﬁeld experiments
in labor economics. To emphasize the relevance of ﬁeld experiments to labor economics, we
organize this discussion by following an individual over their life cycle. More speciﬁcally, we begin
by considering ﬁeld experiments related to early childhood interventions and the accumulation of
human capital in the form of education and skills. We then consider research questions related to
the demand and supply of labor, and labor market discrimination. We then move on to consider
research questions related to behavior within ﬁrms: how individuals are incentivized within ﬁrms,
and other aspects of the employment relationship. Finally, we conclude with a brief discussion of
the nascent literature on ﬁeld experiments related to household decision making.
We have chosen these topics selectively on the basis of where carefully designed ﬁeld experi-
ments have already been conducted. Within each ﬁeld, we have decided to discuss a small number
of papers using ﬁeld experiments that, in our opinion, showcase the best of what ﬁeld experiments
2can achieve. In no way is our discussion meant to be an exhaustive survey of the literature on
ﬁeld experiments in labor economics. The literature arising just in the past decade has grown too
voluminous for even a tome to do it justice
In each stage of the life cycle considered, wherever appropriate, we try to discuss: (i) the
link between the design of ﬁeld experiments and economic theory; (ii) the beneﬁts of primary data
collection that is inherent in ﬁeld experimentation to further probe theory and distinguish between
alternative hypotheses; and (iii) how reduced form eﬀects identiﬁed from a ﬁeld experiment can
be combined with theory and structural modelling to make out of sample predictions and inform
policy design.
In the remainder of this section, we place our later discussion into historical context by describ-
ing the experimental approach in science, and arguing how among economists, labor economists
have for decades been at the forefront of exploiting and advancing experimental approaches to
identify causal relationships. We then lay the groundwork for the discussion in later sections.
We deﬁne the common elements at the heart of all ﬁeld experiments, and then present a more
detailed typology to highlight the subtle distinctions between various sub-types of ﬁeld experi-
ments. This approach allows us to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of ﬁeld experiments
over other forms of experimentation, such as large scale social experiments and laboratory based
experiments.1
Our ﬁnal piece of groundwork is to identify key trends in published research in labor economics
over the past decade. This allows us to organize our later discussion more clearly along two
dimensions. First, we think of nearly all research questions in labor economics as mapping to
particular stages of an individual’s life cycle. We therefore roughly organize research questions
in labor economics into those relating to the accumulation of human capital, labor market entry
and labor supply choices, behavior within ﬁrms, and household decision making. Second, we are
able to focus in on those sub-ﬁelds in labor economics where extant ﬁeld experiments have already
begun to make inroads and provide new insights. In turn, this helps us make precise the types of
research question ﬁeld experiments are most amenable to, areas in which ﬁeld experiments have
been relatively under supplied, and those research questions that are better suited to alternative
empirical methods.
1.1 The Experimental Approach in Science
The experimental approach in scientiﬁc inquiry is commonly traced to Galileo Galilei, who pio-
neered the use of quantitative experiments to test his theories of falling bodies. Extrapolating his
experimental results to the heavenly bodies, he pronounced that the services of angels were not
necessary to keep the planets moving, enraging the Church and disciples of Aristotle alike. For
his eﬀorts, Galileo is now viewed as the Father of Modern Science. Since the Renaissance, funda-
mental advances making use of the experimental method in the physical and biological sciences
1In this Handbook, Charness and Kuhn (2010) provide a useful discussion of extant laboratory studies in the
area of labor economics.
3have been fast and furious.2
Taking the baton from Galileo, in 1672 Sir Isaac Newton used experimentation to show that
white light is equal to purity, again challenging the preachings of Aristotle. The experimental
method has produced a steady stream of insights. Watson and Crick used data from Rosalind
Franklin’s X-ray diﬀraction experiment to construct a theory of the chemical structure of DNA;
Rutherford’s experiments shooting charged particles at a piece of gold foil led him to theorize that
atoms have massive, positively charged nuclei; Pasteur rejected the theory of spontaneous gener-
ation with an experiment that showed that micro-organisms grow in boiled nutrient broth when
exposed to the air, but not when exposed to carefully ﬁltered air. Even though the experimental
method produced a steady ﬂow of important facts for roughly 400 years, the proper construction
of a counterfactual control group was not given foundations until the early twentieth century.
1.1.1 An Experimental Cornerstone
In 1919, Ronald Fisher was hired at Rothamsted Manor to bring modern statistical methods to the
vast experimental data collected by Lawes and Gilbert (Levitt and List 2009). The data collection
methods at Rothamsted Manor were implemented in the standard way to provide practical under-
pinnings for the ultimate purpose of agricultural research: to provide management guidelines. For
example, one of the oldest questions in the area of agricultural economics relates to agricultural
yields: what is the optimal application rate of fertilizer, seed, and herbicides?
In an attempt to modernize the experimental approach at Rothamsted, Fisher introduced
the concept of randomization and highlighted the experimental tripod: the concepts of replica-
tion, blocking, and randomization were the foundation on which the analysis of the experiment
was based (Street 1990). Of course, randomization was the linchpin, as the validity of tests of
signiﬁcance stems from randomization theory.
Fisher understood that the goal of any evaluation method is to construct the proper counterfac-
tual. Without loss of generality, deﬁne yi1 as the outcome for observational unit i with treatment,
yi0 as the outcome for unit i without treatment. The treatment eﬀect for plot i can then be
measured as τi = yi1 −yi0. The major problem, however, is one of a missing counterfactual–plot
i is not observed in both states. Fisher understood that methods to create the missing counter-
factual to achieve identiﬁcation of the treatment eﬀect were invaluable, and his idea was to use
randomization.
As Levitt and List (2009) discuss, Fisher’s fundamental contributions were showcased in agri-
cultural ﬁeld experiments, culminating with the landmark 1935 book, The Design of Experiments,
which was a catalyst for the actual use of randomization in controlled experiments. At the same
time, Jerzy Neyman’s work on agricultural experimentation showcased the critical relationship be-
tween experiments and survey design and the pivotal role that randomization plays in both (Splawa
and Neyman 1923a, 1923b). Neyman’s work continued in the area of sampling and culminated
in his seminal paper, published in 1934. As Rubin (1990) notes, it is clear that randomization
2For a more complete discussion see List and Reiley (2008).
4was “in the air” in the early nineteen twenties, and the major inﬂuences of the day were by schol-
ars doing empirical research on agricultural related issues. Clearly, such work revolutionized the
experimental approach and weighs on experimental designs in all sciences today.
As emphasized throughout, we view ﬁeld experimenters as being engaged in data generation,
primary data collection, and data evaluation. Labor economists in particular have been at the
forefront of the use of experimental designs, as highlighted by the following two historic examples.
1.1.2 Early Labor Market Field Experiments at the Hawthorne Plant
In the 1920s the Western Electric Company was the monopoly supplier of telephone equipment
to AT&T. Western opted to have its main factory, the Hawthorne plant located in the suburbs of
Chicago, be the main supplier for this important contract. The Hawthorne plant was considered to
be one of the most advanced manufacturing facilities in America at the time, and employed roughly
35,000 people, mainly ﬁrst- and second-generation immigrants (Gale 2004). Always open to new
techniques to improve eﬃciency and proﬁtability, oﬃcials of Western were intrigued when the
National Academy of Sciences expressed interest in a hypothesis put forth by electrical suppliers,
who claimed that better lighting improved productivity.
The experimental exercises that resulted have few parallels within social science. The indelible
footprint of these experiments laid the groundwork for a proper understanding of social dynamics
of groups and employee relations in the workplace. Indeed, the data drawn from this research
became the thrust of the human relations movement of the twentieth century, and represent the
underpinnings of contemporary eﬀorts of industry to motivate and deal with workers. In academia,
the Hawthorne data spawned the development of a new ﬁeld of study–Industrial Psychology–and
remains an important inﬂuence on the manner in which scientists conduct experimental research
today. Many of the issues raised in these studies are considered part of mainstream personnel
economics, as discussed in the Chapter in this Handbook on Human Resource Management prac-
tices by Bloom and Van Reenen (2010). In a later section of this Chapter we review how a new
generation of ﬁeld experiments have provided new insights into these age old questions of behavior
within ﬁrms.3
The ﬁrst experiments executed at the Hawthorne plant have been famously denoted the “illu-
mination experiments” because they varied the amount of light in the workplace. More speciﬁcally,
between 1924 and 1927 the level of lighting was systematically changed for experimental groups in
diﬀerent departments (Mayo 1933, pp. 55-56, Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939, pp. 14-18, provide
a more complete account). Workers in these departments were women who assembled relays and
wound coils of wire, and their output was measured as units completed per unit of time.4
Discussions of these data have been widespread and have been an important inﬂuence on
3Frederick Taylor’s seminal book, The Principles of Scientiﬁc Management, published in 1911, which creatively
considered techniques to shorten task time, was also an important stimulus for the Industrial Psychology ﬁeld.
4A relay was a switching device activated in the telephone exchange as each number was dialed, and was a fairly
mind-numbing task: assemble a coil, armature, contact springs, and insulators by fastening them to a ﬁxture with
four screws. On average, it was roughly one minute’s worth of work.
5building the urban legend. For instance, Franke and Kaul (1978, p. 624) note that “Inexplicably
worker output...generally increased regardless of increase or decrease in illumination.” Yet, the
only account of these experiments published at the time is Snow (1927), published in an engineering
newsletter, and he argues that “The corresponding production eﬃciencies by no means followed
the magnitude or trend of the lighting intensities. The output bobbed up and down without direct
relation to the amount of illumination.” Unfortunately, the article does not present data or any
statistical analysis. Ever since, the literature has remained at a state of question since people
think that the data are lost. Indeed, an authoritative voice on this issue, Rice (1982) notes that
“the original research data somehow disappeared.” Gale (2004, p. 439) expresses similar thoughts
concerning the illumination experiments: “these particular experiments were never written up,
the original study reports were lost, and the only contemporary account of them derives from a
few paragraphs in a trade journal” (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939, Gillespie, 1991).5
Using data preserved in two library archives Levitt and List (2008) dug up the original data
from the illumination experiment, long thought to be destroyed. Their analysis of the newly
found data reveals little evidence to support the existence of a Hawthorne eﬀect as commonly
described. Namely, there is no systematic evidence that productivity jumped whenever changes in
lighting occurred. Alternatively, they do uncover some weak evidence consistent with more subtle
manifestations of Hawthorne eﬀects in the data. In particular, output tends to be higher when
experimental manipulations are ongoing relative to when there is no experimentation. Also consis-
tent with a Hawthorne eﬀect is that productivity is more responsive to experimenter manipulations
of light than naturally-occurring ﬂuctuations.
As mysterious and legendary as the illumination experiments have become, it is fair to say
that the second set of experiments conducted at the plant–the relay assembly experiments–
have kept academics busy for years. Using an experimental area constructed for the illumination
experiments, beginning in April 1927, researchers began an experiment meant to examine the
eﬀect of workplace changes upon productivity. In this case, the task was relay assembly.
The researchers began by secretly observing the women in their natural environment for two
weeks, and then used various treatments, including manipulating the environment in such a way to
increase and decrease rest periods, over diﬀerent temporal intervals. While their design certainly
did not allow easy assessment of clean treatment eﬀects, the experimenters were puzzled by the
observed pattern: output seemingly rose regardless of the change implemented. When output
remained high after the researchers returned conditions to the baseline–output had risen from
2400 relays per week to nearly 3000 relays per week–management became interested in identifying
the underlying mechanisms at work.
Western Electric subsequently brought in academic consultants, including Elton Mayo, in 1928.
With Mayo’s assistance, the experiments continued and by February of 1929, when productivity
was at a startling rate of a new relay dropped down the chute every 40-50 seconds, the company
5There are many other evaluations as well. For example, a controversial article written by Bramel and Friend
(1981), heavily laced with Marxist ideology, takes a conspiratorial view of industrial psychologists and argues that
the Hawthorne eﬀect is simply the result of “capitalist bias among modern industrial psychologists.”
6besieged the ﬁve women with attention, besides “a new test room supervisor, an oﬃce boy, and
a lady who helped with the statistics” others could be added: “an intermittent stream of other
visitors or consultants: industrialists, industrial relations experts , industrial psychologists, and
university professors.” (Gale, 2004, p. 443). The experiment lasted until June 1932, when the
women in the test room received their notices (except the exceptional worker, Jennie Sirchio, who
worked in the oﬃce for a few months before being let go) after the stock market crash of October
24, 1932. The crash induced one in ten US phones to be disconnected in 1932, leading to a decrease
in Western Electric’s monopoly rents of more than 80%.
The ﬁve year experiment provided a wealth of data, and much of the Hawthorne Eﬀect’s
statistical underpinnings are a direct result of the relay assembly experiment. Mayo’s (1933)
results concluded that individuals would be more productive when they knew they were being
studied.6 For this insight, Mayo came to be known as the “father of the Hawthorne eﬀect”, and
his work lead to the understanding that the workplace was, importantly, a system that was ﬁrst
and foremost social, and composed of several interdependent parts. When we present a detailed
typology of ﬁeld experiments later in this section, we make precise a distinction between those
ﬁeld experiments in which agents are aware of their participation in an experiment, and those in
which they are unaware of the exogenous manipulation of their economic environment.
Mayo stressed that workers are not merely at work to earn an honest wage for an honest day’s
eﬀort, rather they are more prominently inﬂuenced by social demands, their need for attention,
input to decision making, and by the psychological factors of the environment. The notion that
workers eﬀort and behavior are driven by more than the monetary rewards of work, is an idea
that has received close scrutiny among the most recent generation of ﬁeld experiments in ﬁrms,
as reviewed later.
Clearly, Mayo argued, being the object of attention with the study induced a sense of satis-
faction among workers that made them feel proud and part of a cohesive unit, generating greater
productivity levels than could ever be imagined. Mayo’s disciples, Frist Roethlisberger and William
Dickson, another engineer at Western Electric, produced a detailed assessment that focused mainly
on the relay experimental data (Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939) and generated similar conclu-
sions. Industrial psychology would soon ﬁnd an important place in undergraduate and graduate
curricula. Again in later sections, we provide examples of where ﬁeld experiments have taken
insights from psychology and laboratory environments to check for the existence and quantitative
importance of such behaviors that are not encompassed within neoclassical economic models.
It is diﬃcult to understate the importance of these ﬁndings, as they have served as the par-
adigmatic foundation of the social science of work (Franke and Kaul 1978), providing a basis for
6Derivative of this path-breaking experiment were two experiments run alongside the relay experiment. Both
were started in August of 1928; one was a second relay experiment, the other a mica splitting experiment. In the
second relay experiment, ﬁve women workers were subjected to variations in a small group incentive program from
August 1928 to March 1929. In the mica splitting experiment, the researchers began by secretly monitoring the
output of ﬁve women at their regular department workstations. Their job was to split, measure, and trim mica
chips that were to be used for insulation. After observing the workers secretly, they moved the women to a special
test room where, unlike their cohorts, they received 10-minute rest breaks at 9:30 a.m. and 2:30 p.m.
7an understanding of the economics of the workplace, and dramatically inﬂuenced studies in or-
ganizational development and behavior, leadership, human relations, and workplace design. The
results also provide an important foundation for experimental work within the social sciences,
including economics, where one must constantly be aware of the eﬀects argued to be important in
the Hawthorne relay experiment.7
1.1.3 Large-Scale Social Experiments
A second period of interest directly related to ﬁeld experiments in labor economics is the latter half
of the twentieth century, during which government agencies conducted a series of large-scale social
experiments.8 In the U.S., social experiments can be traced to Heather Ross, an MIT economics
doctoral candidate working at the Brookings Institution. As Levitt and List (2009) discuss, Ross
wrote a piece titled “A Proposal for Demonstration of New Techniques in Income Maintenance”,
in which she suggested a randomly assigned social experiment to lend insights into the policy
debate.
The experiment that resulted began in 1968 in ﬁve urban communities in New Jersey and
Pennsylvania: Trenton, Paterson, Passaic, and Jersey City in NJ, and Scranton, PA. and eventu-
ally became Ross’ dissertation research (“An Experimental Study of the Negative Income Tax”,
which cost more than $5 million–exceeding $30 million in today’s dollars). The idea behind
the experiment was to explore the behavioral eﬀects of negative income taxation, a concept ﬁrst
introduced by Milton Friedman and Robert Lampman, who was at the University of Wisconsin’s
poverty institute9 The experiment, which targeted roughly 1,300 male-headed households who had
at least one employable person, experimentally varied both the guaranteed level of income and the
negative tax rate (Ross 1970). The guaranteed level of income ranged from 50% to 125% of the
estimated poverty line income level for a family of four ($1650-$4125 in 1968 dollars) while the
negative income tax rate ranged from 30% to 70%.10 The experiment lasted three years. Families
7The success of the relay assembly experiments led to in-depth surveys (from 1928-1931) and one ﬁnal experiment
in the Hawthorne plant–the “bank wiring” experiment, designed by Mayo and others from 1931-1932. The
researchers began by examining the productivity of 14 men who assembled telephone terminals. They then moved
these men to a special test room, without introducing any other changes in work or pay conditions. Despite the
move to a separate experimental setting, the men’s output did not increase.
8This, and the subsequent subsections, draw from Harrison and List (2004), List (2006), and Levitt and List
(2009). There are many deﬁnitions of social experiments in the economics literature. Ferber and Hirsch (1982,
p.7) deﬁne a social experiment in economics as “.... a publicly funded study that incorporates a rigorous statistical
design and whose experimental aspects are applied over a period of time to one or more segments of a human
population, with the aim of evaluating the aggregate economic and social eﬀects of the experimental treatments.”
Greenberg and Shroder (2004) deﬁne a social experiment as having at least the following four features: (i) random
assignment, (ii) policy intervention, (iii) follow-up data collection, and (iv) evaluation.
9As the Editors pointed out, the basic idea of a negative income tax was a part of the liberal party platform in
the 1940s, and it is usually argued that it was designed by Juliet Rhys-Williams, an amazing advocate for women
in that period.
10The negative income tax rate works as follows. Assume that John is randomly inserted into the 100% guaranteed
income ($3300), 50% negative tax rate treatment. What this means is that when the policy binds, for each $1 that
John’s family earns on its own, they receive $0.50 less in federal beneﬁts. Thus, if John’s family earns $2000 in
year one, they would receive $1000 less in program beneﬁts, or $2300, resulting in a total income of $4300. In this
case, if in any year John’s family earns $6600 or more, program beneﬁts are zero.
8in both the control and treatment groups were asked to respond to questionnaires every three
months during this time span, with the questions exploring issues such as family labor supply,
consumption and expenditure patterns, general mobility, dependence on government, and social
integration.
The most interesting outcome for labor economists involved labor supply. Strong advocates
of the negative income tax program argued that the program would provide positive, or at least
no negative, work incentives. Many economists, however, were skeptical, hypothesizing that the
results would show some negative eﬀect on work eﬀort. Early experimental results discussed in
Ross (1970), argued that work eﬀort did not decline for the treatment groups. In fact, as Ross
(1970, p. 568) indicates “there is, in fact, a slight indication that the participants’ overall work
eﬀort increased during the initial test period.”
Since this initial exploration, other scholars have re-examined the experimental design and
data, coming to a less optimistic appraisal. An excellent elucidation is Ashenfelter (1990), who
notes that because of attrition it is not actually possible to simply tabulate the results. In this
sense, and from the experimenters point of view, the experiments were ﬂawed in part because the
design took little advantage of the inherent advantages of randomization. Of course, the ultimate
policy test is whether the income maintenance programs increased work incentives relative to the
existing welfare system, which as Moﬃtt (1981) notes at that time had large beneﬁt-reduction
rates that may have discouraged work. In certain cases, the new approach did outperform existing
incentive schemes, in others it did not.
More importantly for our purposes, the New Jersey income maintenance experiment is generally
considered to be the ﬁrst large-scale social experiment conducted in the U.S., for which Ross is
given credit (Greenberg et al. 1999, Greenberg and Shroder 2004).11 The contribution of Ross,
along with the excellent early summaries of the virtues of social experimentation (Orcutt and
Orcutt 1968), appears to have been instrumental in stimulating the explosion in social experiments
in the ensuing decades.12,13
11We emphasize large scale because there were a handful of other social experiments–such as the Perry Preschool
Project begun in 1962–that preceded the New Jersey Income Maintenance experiment (Greenberg et al. 1999),
and that are still being evaluated today (Heckman et al. 2009). A prevalent type of social experimentation in recent
years is the paired-audit experiments to identify and measure discrimination. These involve the use of “matched
pairs” of individuals, who are made to look as much alike as possible apart from the protected characteristics. These
pairs then confront the target subjects, which are employers, landlords, mortgage loan oﬃcers, or car salesmen.
The majority of audit studies conducted to date have been in the ﬁelds of employment discrimination and housing
discrimination (Riach and Rich 2002).
12The original negative income tax experiment led to three other early experiments on income maintenance,
which drew samples from rural areas of North Carolina and Iowa (1970-72); Seattle and Denver (1970-78); and
Gary, Indiana (1971-74). These experiments went beyond studying urban husband-wife couples that were studied
in the New Jersey income maintenance experiment. For instance, the North Carolina/Iowa study was conducted
by the Institute of Research on Poverty to explore behavior among the rural poor. Only one and two parent black
households were studied in the Gary, IN test. The Seattle-Denver study represented the most comprehensive,
including blacks, Chicanos, and whites who had either one or two parents in the household. By and large, the
evidence gathered in these studies reinforced the main result in the New Jersey study, but these new studies
highlighted additional insights that were important for policy making, such as in diﬀerences between male and
female labor force participation, unemployment duration, and welfare participation.
13An early social experiment in Europe was the study of Intensiﬁed Employment Services in Eskilstuna, Sweden.
In 1975, a small-town employment oﬃce received a personnel reinforcement for three months and split a group of
9Such large-scale social experiments have continued in the U.S., and have included employment
programs, electricity pricing, and housing allowances (see Hausman and Wise 1985, for a review).
While this early wave of social experiments tended to focus on testing new programs, more recent
social experiments tended to be “black box” in the sense that packages of services and incentives
were proﬀered, and the experiments were meant to test incremental changes to existing programs.14
This generation of social experiments had an important inﬂuence on policy, contributing, for
instance, to the passage of the Family Support Act of 1988, which overhauled the AFDC program.
Indeed, as Manski and Garﬁnkel (1992) note, in Title II, Section 203, 102 Stat. 2380, the Act even
made a speciﬁc recommendation on evaluation procedures: “a demonstration project conducted ...
shall use experimental and control groups that are composed of a random sample of participants
in the program.”
Much like the experimental contributions of the agricultural literature of the 1920s and 1930s,
the large-scale social experiments conducted in the twentieth century inﬂuenced the economics lit-
erature immensely. Since the initial income maintenance social experiment, there have been more
than 235 known completed social experiments (Greenberg and Shroder 2004), each exploring pub-
lic policies in health, housing, welfare, and the like. The early social experiments were voluntary
experiments typically designed to measure basic behavioral relationships, or deep structural pa-
rameters, which could be used to evaluate an entire spectrum of social policies. Optimists even
believed that the parameters could be used to evaluate policies that had not even been conducted.
As Heckman (1992) notes, this was met with deep skepticism along economists and non-economists
alike, and ambitions have since been much more modest.
As Manski and Garﬁnkel (1992) suggest, this second wave of social experiments had a method-
ological inﬂuence within academic circles, as it provided an arena for the 1980s debate between
experimental advocates and those favoring structural econometrics using naturally-occurring data.
Manski and Garﬁnkel (1992) provide an excellent resource that includes insights on the merits of
the arguments on both sides, and discusses some of the important methodological issues. High-
lighting some of the weaknesses of social experiments helps to clarify important distinctions we
draw between social experiments and the generation of ﬁeld experiments which has followed.
410 unemployed job seekers who had been registered at the oﬃce for at least three months into a treatment group
(n=216) and a control group (n=194). The control group received normal service and used the services of the oﬃce
for an average of 1.5 hours over the course of the experiment, while the treatment group used oﬃce services for an
average of 7.5 hours, allowing oﬃce personnel to work more intensely on the individual problems of the treatment
subjects. The ﬁndings were that the percent of workers with a job at the end of the experiment, unemployment
spells during the experiment, and earnings were all favorably inﬂuenced by the employment services studied. A
discussion of this study, as well as other European social experiments in labor market policy can be found in
Björklund and Regnér (1996) and the various Digests of Social Experiments due to Greenberg, and Shroder. Two
of the more famous examples are the Norwegian Training Experiment (Raaum and Torp 1993) and the Restart
Programme in the United Kingdom (White and Lakey 1992).
14For example, whereas over 80% of social experiments from 1962-74 tested new programs, since 1983 only
roughly 33% did so (Greenberg et al. 1999).
101.1.4 Potential Shortcomings of Social Experiments
One potential problem arising in social experiments is “randomization bias”, a situation wherein
the experimental sample is diﬀerent from the population of interest because of randomization. It
is commonly known in the ﬁeld of clinical drug trials that persuading patients to participate in
randomized studies is much harder than persuading them to participate in non-randomized studies
(Kramer and Shapiro 1984). The same problem applies to social experiments, as evidenced by the
diﬃculties that can be encountered when recruiting decentralized bureaucracies to administer the
random treatment (Hotz 1992).15
Doolittle and Traeger (1990) provide a description of the practical importance of randomization
bias when describing their experience in implementing the Job Training Partnership Act. Indeed,
in almost any social experiment related to job training programs, it is a concern that those most
likely to beneﬁt from the program select into the program. Moreover as Harrison and List (2004)
discuss, in social experiments, given the open nature of the political process, it is almost impossible
to hide the experimental objective from the person implementing the experiment or the subject,
opening up the possibility of such self-selection. As Heckman (1992) puts it, comparing social
experiments to agricultural experiments: “plots of ground do not respond to anticipated treatments
of fertilizer, nor can they excuse themselves from being treated.”
To see this more formally, we follow the notation above and assume that τi = yi1 − yi0 is the
treatment eﬀect for individual i. Figure 1 shows a hypothetical density of τi in the population,
a density assumed to have mean, τ∗. In this case, the parameter τ∗ is equivalent to the average
treatment eﬀect; this is the treatment eﬀect of interest if the analyst is pursuing an estimate of
the average eﬀect in this population.
[Figure 1: Simple Illustration of the Selection Problem]
The concern is that selection into the experiment is not random, but might occur with a
probability related to τ. Using this notion to formulate the selection rule leads to positive selection:
subjects with higher τ values are more likely to participate if oﬀered. In Figure 1, we denote the
cutoﬀ value of τi as τ+: people above τ+ participate, those below do not.
In this case, the treatment eﬀect on the treated is what is measured in the social experiment:
τTT. τTT is equal to E(τi|τi > τ+), which represents the estimate of the treatment eﬀect for those
who select to participate. A lack of recognition of selection causes the analyst to mis-measure the
treatment eﬀect for the population of interest. Figure 1 also shows the treatment eﬀect on the
untreated, τTU. This τTU is equal to E(τi|τi < τ+), which represents the unobserved estimate of
the treatment eﬀect for those who chose not to participate. Therefore, the population parameter
of interest, τ∗, is a mixture of these two eﬀects: τ∗ = Pr × τTT + (1 − Pr)× τTU, where Pr
represents the probability of τi > τ+. Even if one assumes that the population density of τi
15There is a growing body of evidence from laboratory settings on how individuals self-select into treatments
when allowed to do so. See Lazear et al. (2009) for a recent such study, and the discussion in Charness and Kuhn
(2010).
11among participants is isomorphic to the population density of inferential interest, such selection
frustrates proper inference. A related concern is whether the density of τi in the participant
population exactly overlaps with the population of interest.
A second issue stems from Heckman (1992), Heckman and Smith (1995), and Manski (1995),
who contend that participants in small-scale experiments may not be representative of individ-
uals who would participate in ongoing, full-scale programs. Such non-representativeness of the
experimental sample could occur because of a lack of information diﬀusion, the reluctance of some
individuals to subject themselves to random assignment, or resource constraints in full-scale pro-
grams that result in program administrators restricting participants to people meeting certain
criteria. As a result, making inference on how individuals would respond to the same intervention
were they to be scaled up is not straightforward.
A third set of concerns stem from the supply side of those implementing the social experi-
ment as it is scaled up. For example, the quality of those administering the intervention might
be very diﬀerent from the quality of personnel selected to take part in the original social experi-
ment. Moreover, the ability of administrative agencies to closely monitor those charged with the
actual implementation of the programme might also vary as programmes are scaled-up. These
concerns might also apply to ﬁeld experiments unless they are explicitly designed to allow for
such possibilities. In general, the role played by program implementers in determining program
outcomes remains poorly understood and is a rich area for future study both for ﬁeld experiments
and researchers in general.
A fourth concern that arises in social experiments is attrition bias. Attrition bias refers to
systematic diﬀerences between the treatment and control groups because of diﬀerential losses
of participants. As Hausman and Wise (1979) note, a characteristic of social experiments is
that individuals are surveyed before the experiment begins as well as during the experiment,
which in many cases is several years. This within-person experimental design permits added
power compared to a between-person experimental design–because of the importance of individual
eﬀects. But, there are potential problems, as they note (p. 455): “the inclusion of the time factor
in the experiment raises a problem which does not exist in classical experiments–attrition. Some
individuals decide that keeping the detailed records that the experiments require is not worth the
payment, some move, some are inducted into the military.”16
Beyond sampling and implementation shortcomings, social experiments also run the risk of
generating misleading inference out of sample due to the increased scrutiny induced by the ex-
periment. If experimental participants understand their behavior is being measured in terms of
certain outcomes, some of them might attempt to succeed along these outcomes. Such eﬀects have
been deemed “John Henry” eﬀects for the control sample because such participants work harder
to show their worth when they realize that they are part of the control group. More broadly,
some studies denote such eﬀects as “Hawthorne” eﬀects; if these Hawthorne eﬀects do not operate
16Problems of attrition are well known and detailed discussions can be found in Hausman and Wise (1979) and
the various chapters in Manski and Garﬁnkel (1992).
12equally on the treatment and control group, bias is induced.17
Another factor that might lead to incorrect inference in a social experiment is control group
members seeking available substitutes for treatment. This is denoted “substitution bias” in the
literature, a bias that can result in signiﬁcant understatement of the treatment eﬀect. Substitution
bias can occur if a new program being tested experimentally absorbs resources that would otherwise
be available to members of the control group or, instead, if as a result of serving some members of
a target group, the new program frees up resources available under other programs that can now
be used to better serve members of the control group. The practical importance of substitution
bias is provided in Puma et al. (1990) and Heckman and Smith (1995).
Although these concerns, as well as others not discussed here, need always to be accounted for,
social experiments continue to be an important and valuable tool for policy analysis, as evidenced
by two recent and notable large scale undertakings: Moving To Opportunity (Katz et al. 2001)
and PROGRESA (Schultz 2004), as well as the more recent social experiments documented in
Greenberg and Shroder (2004).
1.2 Field Experiments
Following from the ﬁrst two periods of experimentation discussed above, the third distinct period
of ﬁeld experimentation is the most recent surge of ﬁeld experiments in economics. Harrison and
List (2004), List (2006) and List and Reiley (2008) provide recent overviews of this literature.
The increased use of this approach reﬂects a long running trend in labor economics and applied
microeconomics more generally, to identify causal eﬀects. This is not surprising given that nearly
all of the central research questions in labor economics are plagued by econometric concerns related
to the simultaneous determination of individual decisions related to the accumulation of human
capital, self-selection into labor markets and careers. Furthermore, many of the key variables that
underlie behavior in labor markets–such as motivation or talent–are either simply unmeasured
or measured with error in standard surveys.
Field experiments form the most recent addition to the wave of empirical strategies to iden-
tify causal eﬀects that have entered mainstream empirical research in labor economics since the
mid 1980s. For example, these are based on ﬁxed eﬀects, diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences, instrumental
variables, regression discontinuities, and natural experiments. Comprehensive reviews of these
developments are provided in Angrist and Krueger (1999). At the same time as these research
strategies have developed, greater emphasis has been placed on econometric methods that are
robust to functional form and distributional assumptions. These include the development of semi-
parametric and non-parametric estimation techniques. Reviews of these developments are provided
in Moﬃtt (1999).
17Note that the development ﬁeld experiments that have arisen recently often have to confront this issue directly
when making inference from their studies–even though subjects might not know that they are randomized, a survey
is used to measure the outcomes so repeated interactions are a certainty. One paper that attempts to quantify the
eﬀects is due to Gine et al. (2007). In a similar spirit, Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2007) present evidence
from a randomized control trial on educational interventions in India. They also present evidence to distinguish
the eﬀects of the intervention from the mere eﬀects of being part of an observational study per se.
13We view the increased use of ﬁeld experiments to have its origins in the last decade in part
because of an acceleration of three long-standing trends in how applied economic research is
conducted: (i) the increased use of research designs to uncover credible causal eﬀects; (ii) the
increased propensity to engage in primary data collection; and (iii) the formation of ever closer
interactions with practitioners and policy makers more generally.
Similar to the experiments at the Hawthorne plant and social experiments, but unlike the ﬁrst-
generation agricultural studies, the most recent ﬁeld experiments typically apply randomization
to human subjects to obtain identiﬁcation. In contrast to social experiments, however, recent ﬁeld
experiments strive to carry out this randomization on naturally occurring populations in natu-
rally occurring settings, often without the research subjects being aware that they are part of an
experiment. As a consequence, these more recent studies tend to be carried out opportunistically,
and on a smaller scale than social experiments.18
This current generation of ﬁeld experiments oftentimes has more ambitious theoretical goals
than social experiments, which largely aim to speak to policy makers and identify whether a
package of measures leads to some desired change in outcomes. Modern ﬁeld experiments in many
cases are designed to test economic theory, collect facts useful for constructing a theory, and
organize primary data collection to make measurements of key parameters, assuming a theory is
correct. Field experiments can also help provide the necessary behavioral principles to permit
sharper inference from laboratory or naturally-occurring data. Alternatively, ﬁeld experiments
can help to determine whether lab or ﬁeld results should be reinterpreted, deﬁned more narrowly
than ﬁrst believed, or more general than the context in which they were measured. In other cases,
ﬁeld experiments might help to uncover the causes and underlying conditions necessary to produce
data patterns observed in the lab or the ﬁeld.
Since nature in most cases does not randomize agents into appropriate treatment and control
groups, the task of the ﬁeld experimental researcher is to develop markets, constructs, or experi-
mental designs wherein subjects are randomized into treatments of interest. The researcher faces
challenges diﬀerent from those that arise either in conducting laboratory experiments or relying
on naturally occurring variation. The ﬁeld experimenter does not exert the same degree of control
over real markets as the scientist does in the lab. Yet, unlike an empiricist who collects existing
data, the ﬁeld experimenter is in the data generating business, as opposed to solely engaging in
data collection or evaluation. Consequently, conducting successful ﬁeld experiments demands a
diﬀerent set of skills from the researcher: the ability to recognize opportunities for experimenta-
tion hidden amidst everyday phenomena, an understanding of experimental design and evaluation
methods, knowledge of economic theory to motivate the research, and the interpersonal skills to
manage what are often a complex set of relationships involving parties to an experiment.
18In this sense, ﬁeld experiments parallel the research approach that exploits “natural experiments” (Meyer
1995, Rosenzweig and Wolpin 2000, Angrist and Krueger 2001), the diﬀerence being that in a ﬁeld experiment the
researcher actually controls the randomization herself, whereas in the natural experiment approach the researcher
attempts to ﬁnd sources of variation in existing data that are “as good as randomly assigned.” In addition, the
close involvement of the researcher from the outset allows for primary data collection to perhaps directly help shed
light on the underlying mechanisms driving causal eﬀects.
141.2.1 What is a Field Experiment?
Harrison and List (2004) propose six factors that can be used to determine the ﬁeld context of
an experiment: the nature of the subject pool, the nature of the information that the subjects
bring to the task, the nature of the commodity, the nature of the task or trading rules applied,
the nature of the stakes, and the environment in which the subjects operate. Using these factors,
they discuss a broad classiﬁcation scheme that helps to organize one’s thoughts about the factors
that might be important when moving from non-experimental to experimental data.
They classify ﬁeld experiments into three categories: artefactual, framed, and natural. Figure 2
shows howthese three types of ﬁeld experiments compare and contrast with laboratory experiments
and approaches using naturally occurring non-experimental data. On the far left in Figure 2 are
laboratory experiments, which typically make use of randomization to identify a treatment eﬀect
of interest in the lab using a subject pool of students. In this Handbook, Charness and Kuhn
(2010) discuss extant laboratory studies in the area of labor economics.
[Figure 2: A Field Experiment Bridge]
The other end of the spectrum in Figure 2 includes empirical models that make necessary
identiﬁcation assumptions to identify treatment eﬀects from naturally-occurring data. For exam-
ple, identiﬁcation in simple natural experiments results from a diﬀerence in diﬀerence regression
model: Yit = Xitβ + τTit + ηit, where i indexes the unit of observation, t indexes years, Yit is the
outcome, Xit is a vector of controls, Tit is a binary treatment variable equal to one if unit i is
treated and zero otherwise, ηit = αi + λt + εit, and τ is measured by comparing the diﬀerence
in outcomes before and after for the treated group with the before and after outcomes for the
non treated group. A major identifying assumption in this case is that there are no time-varying,
unit-speciﬁc shocks to the outcome variable that are correlated with Tit, and that selection into
treatment is independent of temporary individual speciﬁc eﬀect.
Useful alternatives include the method of propensity score matching (PSM) developed in Rosen-
baum and Rubin (1983). Again, if both states of the world were observable, the average treatment
eﬀect, τ, would equal y1 − y0. However, given that only y1 or y0 is observed for each observation,
unless assignment into the treatment group is random, generally τ  = y1 − y0. The solution advo-
cated by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) is to ﬁnd a vector of covariates, Z, such that y1, y0 ⊥ T|Z,
Pr(T = 1|Z) ∈ (0,1), where ⊥ denotes independence. This assumption is called the “conditional
independence assumption” and intuitively means that given Z, the non-treated outcomes are what
the treated outcomes would have been had they not been treated. Or, likewise, that selection oc-
curs only on observables. If this condition holds, then treatment assignment is said to be ‘strongly
ignorable’ (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, p. 43). To estimate the average treatment eﬀect (on the
treated), only the weaker condition E[y0|T = 1,Z] = E[y0|T = 0,Z] = E[y0|Z]Pr(T = 1|Z) ∈
(0,1) is required. Thus, the treatment eﬀect is given by τ = E[y1−y0|Z], implying that conditional
on Z, assignment to the treatment group mimics a randomized experiment.19
19Several aspects of the approach are not discussed in this discussion. For example, for these conditions to
15Other more popular methods of estimating treatment eﬀects include the use of instrumen-
tal variables (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 2000) and structural modeling. Assumptions of these ap-
proaches are well documented and are not discussed further here (Angrist and Krueger 1999,
Blundell and Costas Dias 2002). Between the two extremes in Figure 2 are various types of ﬁeld
experiment. We now turn to a more patient discussion of these types.
1.2.2 A More Detailed Typology of Field Experiments
Following Harrison and List (2004), we summarize the key elements of each type of ﬁeld experiment
in Table 1. This also makes precise the diﬀerences between ﬁeld and laboratory experiments.
[Table 1: A Typology of Field Experiments]
Harrison and List (2004) argue that a ﬁrst useful departure from laboratory experiments using
student subjects is simply to use “non-standard” subjects, or experimental participants from the
market of interest. In Table 1 and Figure 2, these are denoted as “artefactual” ﬁeld experiments.
This type of ﬁeld experiment represents a potentially useful type of exploration outside of tra-
ditional laboratory studies because it aﬀords the researchers with the control of a standard lab
experiment but with the realism of a subject pool that are the natural actors from the market of
interest. In the past decade, artefactual ﬁeld experiments have been used in ﬁnancial applications
(Alevy et al. 2007, Cipriani and Guarino 2009), to test predictions of game theory (List et al.
2009), and in applications associated with labor economics (Cooper et al. 1999).20
Another example of the use of artefactual ﬁeld experiments is to explain or predict non-
experimental outcomes. An example of this usage is Barr and Serneels (2009), who correlate
behavior in a trust game experiment with wage outcomes of employees of Ghanian manufacturing
enterprises. They report that a one percent increase in reciprocity in these games is associated
with a ﬁfteen percent increase in wages. Another example is Attanasio et al. (2009) who combine
household data on social networks with a ﬁeld experiment conducted with the same households
in Colombia, to investigate who pools risk with whom when risk pooling arrangements are not
formally enforced. Combining non-experimental and experimental research methods in this way
by conducting an artefactual ﬁeld experiment among survey respondents provides an opportunity
to study the interplay of risk attitudes, pre-existing networks, and risk-sharing.
hold the appropriate conditioning set, Z, should be multi-dimensional. Second, upon estimation of the propensity
score, a matching algorithm must be deﬁned in order to estimate the missing counterfactual, y0, for each treated
observation. The average treatment eﬀect on the treated (TT) is given by,
τTT = E[E[y1|T = 1,p(Z)] − E[y0|T = 0,p(Z)]] = E[E[y1 − y0|p(Z)]],
where the outer expectation is over the distribution of Z|T = 1. These and other issues are discussed in List et al.
(2004).
20Harrison and List (2004) discuss in detail whether student subjects exhibit diﬀerent behaviors in laboratory
environments that individuals drawn from other subject pools. A parallel trend in laboratory settings has been the
use of ‘real-eﬀort’ experiments, as discussed in Charness and Kuhn (2010).
16Moving closer to how naturally-occurring data are generated, Harrison and List (2004) denote
a “framed ﬁeld experiment” as the same as an artefactual ﬁeld experiment, except that it incor-
porates important elements of the context of the naturally occurring environment with respect to
the commodity, task, stakes, and information set of the subjects. Yet, it is important to note that
framed ﬁeld experiments, like lab experiments and artefactual ﬁeld experiments, are conducted in
a manner that ensures subjects understand that they are taking part in an experiment, with their
behavior subsequently recorded and scrutinized. Framed ﬁeld experiments include the Hawthorne
plant experiments, the social experiments of the twentieth century, and two related experimental
approaches.
One related approach might be considered a cousin of social experiments: the collection of
studies done in developing countries that use randomization to identify causal eﬀects of interven-
tions in settings where naturally-occurring data are limited. The primary motivation for such
experiments is to inform public policy. These studies typically use experimental treatments more
bluntly than the controlled treatments discussed above, in that the designs often randomly intro-
duce a package of several interventions. On the other hand, this package of measures is directly
linked to a menu of actual public policy alternatives. A few recent notable examples of this type
of work are the studies such as Kremer et al. (2004) and Duﬂo et al. (2006).
Framed ﬁeld experiments have also been done with a greater eye towards testing economic
theory, for instance several framed ﬁeld experiments of this genre have been published in the
economics literature, ranging from further tests of auction theory (Lucking-Reiley 1999, Katkar
and Reiley 2006), tests of the theory of private provision of public goods (Bohm 1984, List 2004a),
tests that examine the relative predictive power of neoclassical theory versus prospect theory (List
2003, 2004b), tests that explore issues in cost/beneﬁt analysis and preference elicitation (List 2001,
2002a, Lusk and Fox 2003, Rozan et al. 2004, Ding et al. 2005), tests that explore competitive
market theory in the ﬁeld (List 2002b, 2004c, List and Price 2005), and tests of information
assimilation among professional ﬁnancial traders (Alevy et al. 2007).21
Unlike social experiments, this type of framed ﬁeld experiment does not need to worry about
many of the shortcomings discussed above. For example, since subjects are unaware that the
experiment is using randomization, any randomization bias should be eliminated. Also, these
experiments tend to be short-lived and therefore attrition bias is not of major importance. Also,
substitution bias should not be a primary concern in these types of studies. The cost of not having
these concerns is that rarely can the long run eﬀects of experimentally introduced interventions
be assessed. This might limit therefore limit the appropriateness of such ﬁeld experiments for
questions in labor economics in which there are long time lags between when actions are made
and outcomes realized.
As Levitt and List (2007a,b) discuss, the fact that subjects are in an environment in which
they are keenly aware that their behavior is being monitored, recorded, and subsequently scruti-
nized, might also cause generalizability to be compromised. Decades of research within psychology
21Of course, this is just a select sampling of the work of this sort, for a more comprehensive list please see
www.ﬁeldexperiments.com.
17highlight the power of the role obligations of being an experimental subject, the power of the ex-
perimenter herself, and the experimental situation (Orne 1962). This leads to our ﬁnal type of
ﬁeld experiment–“natural ﬁeld experiments,” which complete Table 1 and Figure 2.
Natural ﬁeld experiments are those experiments completed in cases where the environment
is such that the subjects naturally undertake these tasks and where the subjects do not know
that they are participants in an experiment. Therefore, they neither know that they are being
randomized into treatment nor that their behavior is subsequently scrutinized. Such an exercise
is important in that it represents an approach that combines the most attractive elements of the
lab and naturally-occurring data: randomization and realism. In addition, it is diﬃcult for people
to respond to treatments they do not necessarily know are unusual, and of course they cannot
excuse themselves from being treated. Hence, many of the limitations cited above are not an issue
when making inference from data generated by natural ﬁeld experiments. As we document in later
sections, natural ﬁeld experiments have already been used to answer a wide range of traditional
research questions in labor economics.
1.2.3 Simple Rules of Thumb for Experimentation
Scholars have produced a variety of rules of thumb to aid in experimental design. Following List et
al. (2009), we provide a framework to think through these issues. Suppose that a single treatment
T results in (conditional) outcomes Yi0 if T = 0 where Yi0|Xi ∼ N( 0,σ2
0) and Yi1 if T = 1 where
Yi1|Xi ∼ N( 1,σ2
1). Since the experiment has not yet been conducted, the experimenter must
form beliefs about the variances of outcomes across the treatment and control groups, which may,
for example, come from theory, prior empirical evidence, or a pilot experiment. The experimenter
also has to make a decision about the minimum detectable diﬀerence between mean control and
treatment outcomes,  1 − 0 = δ, that the experiment is meant to be able to detect. In essence, δ
is the minimum average treatment eﬀect, ¯ τ, that the experiment will be able to detect at a given
signiﬁcance level and power. Finally, we assume that the signiﬁcance of the treatment eﬀect will
be determined using a t-test.
The ﬁrst step in calculating optimal sample sizes requires specifying a null hypothesis and a
speciﬁc alternative hypothesis. Typically, the null hypothesis is that there is no treatment eﬀect,
i.e. that the eﬀect size is zero. The alternative hypothesis is that the eﬀect size takes on a speciﬁc
value (the minimum detectable eﬀect size). The idea behind the choice of optimal sample sizes in
this scenario is that the sample sizes have to be just large enough so that the experimenter: (i)
does not falsely reject the null hypothesis that the population treatment and control outcomes are
equal, i.e. commit a Type I error; and, (ii) does not falsely accept the null hypothesis when the
actual diﬀerence is equal to δ, i.e. commit a Type II error. More formally, if the observations for
control and treatment groups are independently drawn and H0 :  0 =  1 and H1 :  0  =  1, we
need the diﬀerence in sample means ¯ Y1 − ¯ Y0 (which are of course not yet observed) to satisfy the
following two conditions related to the probabilities of a Type I and Type II errors.
First, the probability α of committing a Type I error in a two-sided test, i.e. a signiﬁcance
18level of α, is given by,


















T and nT for T = {0,1} are the conditional variance of the outcome and the sample size
of the control and treatment groups. Second, the probability β of committing a Type II error, i.e.
a power of 1 − β, in a one-sided test, is given by,
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1 = σ2, i.e. var(τi) = 0, then the smallest sample sizes that










































where N = no + n1, πo + π1 = 1, π0 =
n0
no+n1.
If sample sizes are large enough so that the normal distribution is a good approximation
for the t-distribution, then the above equations provide a closed form solution for the optimal
sample sizes. If sample sizes are small, then n must be solved by using successive approximations.
Optimal sample sizes increase proportionally with the variance of outcomes, non-linearly with
the signiﬁcance level and the power, and decrease proportionally with the square of the minimum
detectable eﬀect. The relative distribution of subjects across treatment and control is proportional
to the standard deviation of the respective outcomes. This suggests that if the variance of outcomes
under treatment and control are fairly similar–namely, in those cases when there are expected to
be homogeneous treatment eﬀects–there should not be a large loss in eﬃciency from assigning
equal sample sizes to each.
In cases when the outcome variable is dichotomous, under the null hypothesis of no treatment
eﬀect,  0 =  1, one should always allocate subjects equally across treatments. Yet, if the null
19is of the form  1 = k 0, where k > 0, then the sample size arrangement is dictated by k in the
same manner as in the continuous case. If the cost of sampling subjects diﬀers across treatment
and control groups, then the ratio of the sample sizes is inversely proportional to the square root
of the relative costs. Interestingly, diﬀerences in sampling costs have exactly the same eﬀect on
relative sample sizes of treatment and control groups as diﬀerences in variances.
In those instances where the unit of randomization is diﬀerent from the unit of observation,
special considerations must be paid to the correlation in outcomes between units in the same
treated cluster. Speciﬁcally, the number of observations required is multiplied by 1 + (m − 1)ρ,
where ρ is the intracluster correlation coeﬃcient and m is the size of each cluster. The optimal
size of each cluster increases with the ratio of the within to between cluster standard deviation,
and decreases with the square root of the ratio of the cost of sampling a subject to the ﬁxed cost
of sampling from a new cluster. Since the optimal sample size is independent of the available
budget, the experimenter should ﬁrst determine how many subjects to sample in each cluster and
then sample from as many clusters as the budget permits (or until the optimal total sample size
is achieved).22
A ﬁnal class of results pertains to designs that include several levels of treatment, or more
generally when the treatment variable itself is continuous, but we assume homogeneous treatment
eﬀects. The primary goal of the experimental design in this case is to simply maximize the
variance of the treatment variable. For example, if the analyst is interested in estimating the
eﬀect of treatment and has strong priors that the treatment has a linear eﬀect, then the sample
should be equally divided on the endpoints of the feasible treatment range, with no intermediate
points sampled. Maximizing the variance of the treatment variable under an assumed quadratic,
cubic, quartic, etc., relationship produces unambiguous allocation rules as well: in the quadratic
case, for instance, the analyst should place half of the sample equally distributed on the endpoints
and the other half on the midpoint. More generally, optimal design requires that the number of
treatment cells used should be equal to the highest polynomial order of the anticipated treatment
eﬀect, plus one.
1.2.4 Further Considerations
In light of the diﬀerences between ﬁeld experimentation and other empirical methods–lab exper-
iments and using observational data–it is important to discuss some perceived diﬀerences and
potential obstacles associated with this research agenda. One shortcoming of ﬁeld experiments
is the relative diﬃculty of replication vis-à-vis lab experiments.23 As Fisher (1926) emphasized,
22Relatedly, there is a recent but steadily expanding literature in statistics and economics on how experimental
evidence on treatment eﬀect heterogeneity may be used to maximize gains from social programs. One example is
Dupas and Bhattacharya (2010) who study the problem of allocating a binary treatment among a target population
based on observables, to maximize the mean social welfare arising from an eventual outcome distribution, when a
budget constraint limits what fraction of the population can be treated.
23This is especially so if we compare ﬁeld experiments to laboratory experiments that utilize student subject
pools. Even by changing the subject pool slightly, as in artefactual ﬁeld experiments, replicability becomes an issue
as more still needs to be understood on the self-selection into experiments of such non-standard subjects (Charness
and Kuhn 2010).
20replication is an important advantage of the experimental methodology. The ability of other
researchers to reproduce quickly the experiment and therefore test whether the results can be
independently veriﬁed not only serves to generate a deeper collection of comparable data but also
provides incentives for the experimenter to collect and document data carefully.
There are at least three levels at which replication can operate. The ﬁrst and most narrow
of these involves taking the actual data generated by an experiment and reanalyzing the data to
conﬁrm the original ﬁndings. A second notion of replication is to run an experiment which follows
a similar protocol to the ﬁrst experiment to determine whether similar results can be generated
using new subjects. The third and most general conception of replication is to test the hypotheses
of the original study using a new research design.
Lab experiments and many artefactual and framed ﬁeld experiments lend themselves to replica-
tion on all three dimensions: it is relatively straightforward to reanalyze existing data, to run new
experiments following existing protocols, and (with some imagination) to design new experiments
testing the same hypotheses.
With natural ﬁeld experiments, the ﬁrst and third types of replication are easily done (i.e.
reanalyzing the original data or designing new experiments), but the second-type of replication
(i.e. re-running the original experiment, but on a new pool of subjects) is more diﬃcult. This
diﬃculty arises because by their very nature, many ﬁeld experiments are opportunistic and might
be diﬃcult to replicate because they require cooperation of outside entities or practitioners, or
detailed knowledge and the ability to manipulate a particular market.
Another consideration associated with ﬁeld experiments relates to ethical guidelines (Dunford
1990, Levitt and List 2009). The third parties that ﬁeld experimenters often need to work with
can be concerned by the need to randomize units of observation into treatments. The beneﬁts of
such an approach need to be conveyed, as well as a practical sense of how to achieve this. For
example, given resource constraints, practitioners are typically unable roll out interventions to
all intended recipients immediately. The ﬁeld experimenter can intervene to randomly assign the
order in which individuals are treated (or oﬀered treatment), not whether they eventually receive
the treatment or not.
With the onset of ﬁeld experiments, new issues related to informed consent naturally arise.
Ethical issues surrounding human experimentation is of utmost import. The topic of informed
consent for human experimentation were recognized as early as the nineteenth century (Vollmann
and Winau 1996), but the principal document to provide guidelines on research ethics was the
Nuremberg Code of 1947. The Code was a response to malfeasance of Nazi doctors, who performed
immoral acts of experimentation during the Second World War. The major feature of the Code
was that voluntary consent became a requirement in clinical research studies, where consent can
be voluntary only if subjects: (i) are physically able to provide consent; (ii) are free from coercion;
and, (iii) can comprehend the risks and beneﬁts involved in the experiment.
What is right for medical trials need not be appropriate for the social sciences. To thoughtlessly
adopt the Nuremberg Code whole cloth for ﬁeld experiments without considering the implications
would be misguided. In medical trials, it is sensible to have informed consent as the default because
21of the serious risk potential in most clinical studies. In contrast, the risks posed in some natural
ﬁeld experiments in economics are small or nonexistent, although such risks are almost certain
to become more heterogeneous across ﬁeld experiments as this research method becomes more
prevalent. Hence while there might be valid arguments for making informed consent the exception,
rather than the rule, in a ﬁeld experimental context, it is true to say that covert experimentation
remains hotly debated in the literature. For more detailed discussions, the interested reader should
see Dingwall (1980) and Punch (1986).
There are certain cases in which seeking informed consent directly interferes with the ability
to conduct the research (Homan 1991). For example, for years economists have been interested
in measuring and detecting discrimination in the marketplace. Labor market ﬁeld studies present
perhaps the deepest lot of work in the area of discrimination. The work in this area can be parsed
into two distinct categories, personal approaches and written applications.
Personal approaches include studies that have individuals either attend job interviews or apply
for employment over the telephone. In these studies, the researcher matches two testers that are
identical along all relevant employment characteristics except the comparative static of interest
(e.g., race, gender, age), and after appropriate training the testers approach potential employers
who have advertised a job opening. Researchers “train” the subjects simultaneously to ensure
that their behavior and approach to the job interview are similar.
Under the written application approach, which can be traced to Jowell and Prescott-Clarke
(1970), carefully prepared written job applications are sent to employers who have advertised
vacancies. The usual approach is to choose advertisements in daily newspapers within some
geographic area to test for discrimination. Akin to the personal approaches, great care is typically
taken to ensure that the applications are similar across several dimensions except the variable of
interest.
It strikes us as unusually diﬃcult to explore whether, and to what extent, race or gender
inﬂuence the jobs people receive, or the wages they secured, if one had to receive informed consent
from the discriminating employer. For such purposes, it makes sense to consider executing a
natural ﬁeld experiment. This does not suggest that in the pursuit of science, moral principles
should be ignored. Rather, in those cases Local Research Ethics Committees and Institutional
Review Boards (IRBs) in the U.S. serve an important role in weighing whether the research will
inﬂict harm, gauging the extent to which the research beneﬁts others, and determining whether
experimental subjects selected into the environment on their own volition and are treated justly
in the experiment.
1.2.5 Limits of Field Experiments
Clearly, labor economists rarely have the ability to randomize variables directly related to indi-
vidual decisions such as educational attainment, the choice to migrate, the minimum wage faced,
or retirement ages or beneﬁts. This might in part reﬂect why some active research areas in la-
bor economics have been relatively untouched by ﬁeld experiments, as described in more detail
22below. However, ﬁeld experiments allow the researcher scope to randomize key elements of the
economic environment faced that determine such outcomes. For example in the context of educa-
tional attainment, it is plausible to design ﬁeld experiments that create random variation over the
monetary costs of acquiring education, information on the potential returns to education, knowl-
edge of the potential costs and beneﬁts of education, or changes in the quality of inputs into the
educational production function. Given the early and close involvement of researchers and the fact
that primary data collection eﬀort is part of a ﬁeld experiment, there is always the potential to
mitigate measurement error and omitted variables problems that are prevalent in labor economics
(Angrist and Krueger 1997).
Social experiments and ﬁeld experiments are relatively easy for policy makers to understand.
When designed around the evaluation of a particular policy or intervention, it is more straight-
forward to conduct a cost beneﬁt analysis of the policy than would be possible through other
empirical methods. As discussed before, a concern of using social experiments relates to sample
attrition. While such attrition is less relevant in many ﬁeld experiments, it is important to be
clear that this often comes at the cost of ﬁeld experiments evaluating relatively short run impacts
of any given intervention. How outcomes evolve over time–in the absence of the close scrutiny of
the experimenter, or how interventions should be scaled up to other units and other implementers,
remain questions that ﬁeld experimenters will have to always confront directly. Along these lines,
we will showcase a number of ﬁeld experiments in which researchers have combined random vari-
ation they have engineered to identify reduced form causal eﬀects, with structural modeling to
make out of sample predictions.
A second broad category of concerns for ﬁeld experiments relate to sample selection. These
can take a number of forms relating to the non-random selection of individuals, organizations,
and interventions. At the individual level and in cases in which written consent is required, as
for social and laboratory experiments, the self selection of individuals into the ﬁeld experiment
needs to be accounted for. Relatedly, the timing of decisions over who is potentially eligible to
participate are critical, and potentially open to manipulation or renegotiation.
At the organizational level, there exists concerns related to whether we observe a non-random
selection of organizations or practitioners self-select to be subject to a ﬁeld experiments. Similar
concerns arise for social experiments often from political economy considerations.
Finally, at the intervention level, a concern is that practitioners with whom ﬁeld experimenters
typically need to work with, might only be willing to consider introducing interventions along
dimensions they a priori expect to have beneﬁcial eﬀects. On the one hand this begs the question
of why such practices have not been adopted already. On the other hand, one beneﬁt of ﬁeld
experimentation might be that through closer ties between researchers and practitioners, the
latter are prompted to think and learn about how they might change their behavior in privately
optimal ways, and can be assured they will be able to provide concrete evidence of any potential
beneﬁts of such changes.
A third category of concerns relate to how unusual is the intervention. Although many pa-
rameters can be experimentally varied, it is important to focus on those parameters that would
23naturally vary across economic environments, and to calibrate the magnitude of induced varia-
tions based on the range of parameter values actually observed in similar economic environments.
Introducing unusual types of variation, or variations of implausible or unusual magnitude, or those
that do not accord with theory, will be hard to make generalizations from and will not easily map
back to an underlying theory. At the very least, care needs to be taken to separately identify
whether responses to interventions reﬂect changes in equilibrium behavior that will persist in the
long run, or agent’s short run learning how to behave in new or unusual circumstances induced
by the experimenter.
Fourth, there can sometimes be concerns that the third parties researchers collaborate with,
might be under resource constraints that lead to the same set of implementers simultaneously or
sequentially dealing with treated and control populations. Such implementation might lead to
contamination eﬀects and some of the other biases discussed above in relation to social exper-
iments. This can lead to the use of within subject designs, where the researchers engineers an
exogenously timed change to the economic environment, rather than between subject designs. The
ﬁeld experiments we discuss in later sections utilize both approaches.
Taken together, most of these concerns can be summarized as relating to the ‘external validity’
of any ﬁeld experiment–namely the ability to extrapolate meaningfully outside of the speciﬁc
economic environment considered. This feature remains key to the worth of many ﬁeld experi-
ments. Field experiments almost inevitably face a trade-oﬀ between understanding the speciﬁcs of
a given context and the generalizabilty of their ﬁndings. This trade-oﬀ can be eased by implement-
ing a ﬁeld experiment that considers the sources of heterogenous eﬀects, or that combines reduced
form estimates based on exogenous variation with structural modelling to predict responses to
alternative interventions or to the same intervention in a slightly diﬀerent economic environment.
Finally, it is worth reiterating that although primary data collection is a key element of ﬁeld
experimentation, this raises the costs of entry and might limit the number of experimenters relative
to other purely lab based approaches. As will be apparent in the remainder of this chapter, there
remain many issues in labor economics in which ﬁeld experiments have yet to penetrate. In part
these limits might be due to lack of opportunities, in some cases it might be because the activities
under study are clandestine or illegal, although we will discuss carefully crafted ﬁeld experiments
to explore issues of racial discrimination for example. However, in some cases it is because the
nature of the research question is simply not amenable to ﬁeld experimentation. For example,
questions relating to the design of labor market institutions are likely to remain outside the realm
of ﬁeld experimentation. In these and other cases, the controlled environment of the laboratory is
the ideal starting point for economic research. Indeed, in this volume, Charness and Kuhn (2010)
discuss the large laboratory-based literature on multiple aspects of the design of labor markets–
such as market clearing mechanisms and contractual incompleteness. More generally, they discuss
in detail the relative merits of laboratory and ﬁeld experiments. We share their view that no one
research method dominates the other, and that in many scenarios using a combination of methods
is likely to be more informative.
241.3 Research in Labor Economics
An enormous range of research questions are addressed by labor economists today. While the core
issues studied by labor economists have always related to labor supply, labor demand, and the
organization of labor markets, to focus our discussion, we limit attention to a select few topics.
These reﬂect long-standing traditional areas of work in labor economics.24
First, since the seminal contributions of Gary Becker and Jacob Mincer, research in labor
economics, particularly related to labor supply, has placed much emphasis on understanding in-
dividual decision making with regards to the accumulation of human capital. This emphasis has
widened the traditional purview of labor economists to include all decision making processes that
aﬀect human capital accumulation. These decisions are as broad as those taken in the marriage
market, within the household, and those on the formation of speciﬁc forms of human capital such
as investments into crime. By emphasizing the role of individual decision making, subﬁelds in
labor related to the accumulation of human capital might be especially amenable to the use of
ﬁeld experiments.
Second, the empirical study of labor demand has been similarly revolutionized by the rapid in-
crease in the availability of panel data on individuals, the personnel records of ﬁrms, and matched
employer-employee data.25 This has driven and fed back into research on various aspects of labor
demand such as labor mobility, wage setting, rent sharing, and more generally, on the provision of
incentives within organizations. This set of questions are again motivated by understanding the
behavior of individuals and ﬁrms, there are rich possibilities to advance knowledge in related sub-
ﬁelds through the use of carefully crafted ﬁeld experiments. Field experiments oﬀer the potential
for researchers to lead data collection eﬀorts.
To cover these broad areas, we loosely organize the discussion so as to follow an individual as
they make important labor related decisions over their life cycle. Hence we discuss the role of ﬁeld
experiments in answering questions relating to early childhood interventions and the accumulation
of human capital in the form of education and skills. We then consider research questions related
to the demand and supply of labor, and labor market discrimination. We then move on to consider
research questions related to behavior within ﬁrms: how individuals are incentivized within ﬁrms,
and other aspects of the employment relationship. Finally, we end with a brief discussion of the
nascent literature on ﬁeld experiments related to household decision making.
Table 2 shows the number of published papers in selected subﬁelds of labor economics in the
decade prior to the last volume of the Handbook of Labor Economics (1990-99), and over the
last decade (2000-09). The table is based on all published papers in the leading general interest
journals of The American Economic Review, Econometrica, The Journal of Political Economy,
The Quarterly Journal of Economics and the Review of Economic Studies.26 We use the Jour-
24More detailed discussions of how the study of labor economics has evolved over time can be found in Freeman
(1987) and Taber and Weinberg (2008).
25To understand the magnitude of this change, we note that Staﬀord (1987) ﬁnds that among the 759 papers
published in six leading journals between 1965 and 1983, virtually none was based on microdata with individual
ﬁrms or establishments as the unit of analysis.
26The numbers do not include papers and proceedings volumes.
25nal of Economic Literature classiﬁcations to place journal articles into one subﬁeld within labor
economics.27
[Table 2: Published Research in Labor Economics by Decade]
Table 2 highlights a number of trends in published research in labor economics. First, the
number of labor economics papers published in the top-tier general interest journals has not
changed much over time. There were 278 published between 1990 and 1999, and 315 published
between 2000 and 2009. Some of this increase probably reﬂects an increased numbers of papers
in these journals as a whole, rather than changes in the relative importance of labor economics to
economists. Examining the data by subﬁeld, we do see changes in the composition of published
papers in labor. There are large increases in the number of papers relating to: (i) education and the
formation of human capital; (ii) ﬁrm behavior and personnel economics; (iii) household behavior;
(iv) crime. Some of these increases reﬂect the wider available of data described above, such as
personnel data from ﬁrms and matched employer-employee data sets, and primary data collected
on households. Field experiments–an important component of which is primary data collection–
are well placed to reinforce these trends. Indeed, below we discuss how ﬁeld experiments have
contributed to the ﬁrst three of these areas in which there has been an increase in labor economics
papers.
We observe a decline in papers on the organization of labor markets–an area in which not
many ﬁeld experiments have been conducted, in part because these questions are not well suited
to ﬁeld experimentation. Finally, the remaining subﬁelds on the demand and supply of labor
and on ageing and retirement remaining relatively stable over the last two decades, and here ﬁeld
experiments remain scarce, but there might be particularly high returns from such research designs
being utilized.
Second, the balance between theoretical and empirical work has remained relatively constant
over the two decades. In both time periods, there have been approximately double the number
of empirical as theoretical papers published in labor economics. We do not know whether for
other areas of economics approximately a third of published papers are theoretical, but as will be
emphasized throughout, labor economics has no shortage of theories that carefully designed ﬁeld
experiments can help determine the empirical relevance of. Within each subﬁeld there are nearly
always more empirical papers published than theoretical, with the exception of research into ﬁrm
behavior and personnel economics, a pattern that holds across both decades. In other subﬁelds,
the ratios of theory to empirical papers vary considerably. Some areas such on the demand for
education and formation of human capital have four to ﬁve times as many empirical papers, and
the subﬁeld of crime has been largely empirically driven.
27Earlier reviews of trends in published papers in labor economics include Staﬀord (1986), Manser (1999), and
Moﬃtt (1999).
261.3.1 How Have Labor Economists Used Field Experiments?
Table 3 presents evidence on the approach used by published papers in labor economics over the
last decade.28
[Table 3: Composition of Published Papers by Subﬁeld and Empirical Method]
Three factors stand out. First, ﬁeld experiments have been widely used in labor economics
over the past decade, with there being 25 published papers using this research methodology in
some form. For example, despite the surge in papers using laboratory experiments, over the last
decade more papers published in the top-tier journals have employed ﬁeld experiments. However,
the number of empirical papers employing ﬁeld experiments is still dwarfed by other empirical
methodologies–there are 25 papers employing ﬁeld experiments compared to 60 utilizing natural
experiments, and 129 using non-experimental methods.
Second, the use of ﬁeld experiments has thus far been concentrated to address research ques-
tions in a relatively small number of subﬁelds in labor economics. Of the 25 published ﬁeld
experiments, three framed ﬁeld experiments have been concerned with investments into education
early in the life cycle, three natural ﬁeld experiments have focused on the evaluation of speciﬁc
labor market programs, and ﬁve natural ﬁeld experiments have focused on incentives within ﬁrms.
In other subﬁelds, such as on the determinants of wages and labor market discrimination,
currently only one ﬁeld experiment has been published, in contrast to four laboratory experiments.
We view many research questions on discrimination in labor markets to be particularly amenable
to study using ﬁeld experiments. Hence this is one area in which ﬁeld experiments have been
relatively under supplied in. Finally, the subﬁeld of crime, which as documented in Table 2,
has grown due almost exclusively to empirical papers, remains completely untouched by ﬁeld
experiments.
The third major fact to emerge from Table 3 is that there is a large supply of theory in labor
economics, as previously noted in Table 2. Table 3 shows that this supply of theory is across
all the subﬁelds in labor economics. As we view carefully crafted ﬁeld experiments to be able to
potentially test between diﬀerent theories, it would seem as if many areas of study of labor–across
the life cycle from birth to retirement–are amenable to this method, and can give feedback on
directions for future theoretical advancements.
To develop this point further, the next Table provides a breakdown of how theory and evidence
have been combined in labor economics, broken by empirical method.
[Table 4: Testing Theory by Empirical Method]
28The total number of papers reported in Table 2 is not quite reﬂected in the totals recorded in Tables 3. This
is because in Table 3 we sometimes record a paper in more than one column if it utilizes a range of empirical
techniques. For example, the total number of non-theory papers by subﬁeld and method in Table 3 is greater than
total non-theory papers found in Table 2 (224>219) is because ﬁve papers used multiple methods and so were
counted twice.
27Two factors stand out. First, non-experimental papers are slightly more likely to use no theory
than ﬁeld experiments. Second, testing between more than one theory remains scarce, irrespective
of the empirical approach. Although not all empirical papers should necessarily test theory, it
is as important to establish facts on which future theory can be built. When testing between
theories, it is important to both establish the power of these tests, to provide refutability or
falsiﬁcation checks, and to present evidence of the internal validity of the results. Natural ﬁeld
experiments might have a comparative advantage along such dimensions. Given such settings
relate to real world behaviors, individuals are typically not restricted in how they respond to
a change in their economic environment, which opens up the possibility of detecting behavior
consistent with multiple theories.
Mirroring the discussion in Moﬃtt (1999), a second feature of on how best to use ﬁeld experi-
ments that we aim to emphasize throughout, is the need to combine the use of ﬁeld experiments
with other research methodologies. For example, they might be combined with structural estima-
tion, utilize a combination of evidence from the laboratory and the ﬁeld, or draw inspiration from
lab ﬁndings to establish plausible null and alternative hypotheses to be tested between.
Applying the full spectrum of approaches in trying to answer a single question can yield extra
insights. A ﬁrst example of such research relates to the importance of social preferences, that have
been documented in numerous lab and ﬁeld settings. To explore social preferences using a variety
of approaches, List (2006) conducts artefactual, framed, and natural ﬁeld experiments analyzing
gift exchange. The games have buyers making price oﬀers to sellers, and in return sellers select
the quality level of the good provided to the buyer. Higher quality goods are costlier for sellers
to produce than lower quality goods, but are more highly valued by buyers. The artefactual ﬁeld
experimental results mirror the typical ﬁndings with other subject pools: strong evidence for social
preferences was observed through a positive price and quality relationship. Similarly constructed
framed ﬁeld experiments provide similar insights. Yet, when the environment is moved to the
marketplace via a natural ﬁeld experiment, where dealers are unaware that their behavior is being
recorded as part of an experiment, little statistical relationship between price and quality emerges.
A second example comes from the series of ﬁeld experiments presented in List (2004d)–
from artefactual to framed to natural–in an actual marketplace to help distinguish between the
major theories of discrimination: animus and statistical discrimination. Using data gathered from
bilateral negotiations, he ﬁnds a strong tendency for minorities to receive initial and ﬁnal oﬀers
that are inferior to those received by majorities in a natural ﬁeld experiment. Yet, much like
the vast empirical literature documenting discrimination exists, these data in isolation cannot
pinpoint the nature of discrimination. Under certain plausible scenarios, the results are consonant
with at least three theories: (i) animus-based or taste-based discrimination, (ii) diﬀerences in
bargaining ability, and (iii) statistical discrimination. By designing allocation, bargaining, and
auction experiments, List (2004d) is able to construct an experiment wherein the various theories
provide opposing predictions. The results across the ﬁeld experimental domains consistently reveal
that the observed discrimination is not due to animus or bargaining diﬀerences, but represents
statistical discrimination.
281.4 Summary
We now move to describe, by various stages of the life cycle, how ﬁeld experiments have been
utilized in labor economics and the insights they have provided. Where appropriate, we discuss
how these results have complemented or contradicted evidence using alternative research methods,
and potential areas for future ﬁeld experiments. We begin with the individual at birth and the
accumulation of human capital before they enter the labor market. We then consider research
questions related to the demand and supply of labor, and labor market discrimination. We then
move on to consider research questions related to behavior within ﬁrms: how individuals are
incentivized within ﬁrms, and other aspects of the employment relationship. Finally, we end
with a brief discussion of the nascent literature on ﬁeld experiments related to household decision
making.
2 Human Capital
The literature associated with human capital acquisition prior to labor market entry is vast, and
there is not room here to do it justice. As in the sections that follow, we therefore focus our
discussion on a select few strands of this research and describe how ﬁeld experiments can and
have advanced knowledge within these strands. Even within this narrower branch of work, we
are limited to focusing on select studies of inputs into the educational production function, where
these inputs might be supplied by the school system, students, or their families.29
To see the issues, we follow Glewwe and Kremer’s (2006) presentation of a framework for the
education production function with the following reduced form representation,
S = f(C,H,Q,P), (6)
A = h(C,H,Q,P), (7)
where S is years of schooling, A is skills learned (achievement), C is a vector of child characteristics
(including “innate ability”), H is a vector of household characteristics, Q is a vector of school and
teacher characteristics (quality), and P is a vector of prices related to schooling. Q and P are
both functions of education policies (EP) and local community characteristics (L), which can be
substituted into equations (6) and (7) to yield the following reduced form,
S = f(C,H,L,EP), (8)
A = h(C,H,L,EP). (9)
Similar to Mincerian human capital earnings functions, this framework estimates the partial
equilibrium eﬀects of educational inputs and policies, rather than general equilibrium eﬀects that
29For related reviews of the literature, see the excellent work of Card (1999), and in this Handbook, the Chapter
by Fryer (2010).
29alter returns to education and thereby demand. Broadly, there are two approaches to estimating
the production function.
The ﬁrst focuses on measuring the eﬀect of direct inputs, such as per pupil expenditure, class
size, teacher quality and family background (i.e. estimating equations (6) and (7)). The second
examines the eﬀects of educational policies governing the structure of the school system (i.e.,
estimating equations (8) and (9)). In both cases, non-experimental and experimental estimates
have shed insights into the relationships in the education production function (for a literature
survey see Hanushek (1986)). To help place ﬁeld experiments in this area in a wider context, we
now turn to a non-exhaustive discussion of select work using both approaches, but not based on
ﬁeld experiments.
2.1 Measuring the Eﬀects of Direct Inputs
An early measurement study focusing on the eﬀect of direct inputs is the report due to Coleman et
al. (1966), who explored what fraction of the variation in student achievement could be explained
by direct inputs. The Coleman report found only a weak association between school inputs and
outputs. Subsequent regression based approaches largely replicated the ﬁndings in the Coleman
report. Yet, one remarkably consistent result did emerge from these early studies: students
situated in classrooms with a larger number of students outperformed children in smaller classes
on standardized tests. This result is robust to inclusion of several conditioning variables, such as
key demographic variables.
One aspect that this robust empirical ﬁnding highlights is the care that should be taken to
ensure reverse causality and omitted variable bias do not frustrate proper inference. Given that the
simple regression approach potentially suﬀers from biases due to endogeneity of policy placement,
omitted variables, and measurement error–i.e., it is almost always the case that some unobserved
element of the vectors C,H,Q,P or L will be correlated with both the outcome and the observed
variables of interest–researchers have sought out other means to explore the parameters of the
production function.
One such approach uses natural experiments. One neat example is the work of Angrist and
Lavy (1999), who use legal rules to estimate the eﬀect of class size on student performance.
Assume legal limits on class size prevent the number of students in a classroom from exceeding
25. Then consider a particular school that has cohorts ranging from 70-100. Thus, if a cohort
includes 100 children, we would have four classrooms of size 25, whereas if the cohort includes 76
children, we end up with 4 classrooms with 19 children occupying each. Angrist and Lavy (1999)
compare standardized test scores across students placed in diﬀerent sized classrooms and ﬁnd that
a ten-student reduction raises standardized test scores by about 0.2 to 0.3 standard deviations.
As Keane (2010) points out, this type of approach has similar drawbacks associated with the
simple regression framework in the Coleman report. For instance, incoming cohort sizes might not
be determined randomly because high performing schools attract more students. Likewise, cohort
size might be aﬀected by parents reacting to large class sizes by sending their kids elsewhere for
30schooling. Similar issues revolve around teacher assignment to small and large classrooms, which
might not be randomly determined.
In this way, the Angrist and Lavy (1999) estimates should be viewed as a ﬁrst step in under-
standing the importance of class size on student performance. The next step is to deepen our
understanding by exploring the robustness of these results. One approach is to look for more ob-
servational data, another is to use randomization directly–similar to the accidental randomization
of natural experiments, purposeful randomization can aid the scientiﬁc inquiry.
A central ﬁgure in using randomization in the area of education is WilliamMcCall, an education
psychologist at Columbia University who, at odds with his more philosophical contemporaries,
insisted on quantitative measures to test the validity of education programs. For his eﬀorts,
McCall is credited as an early proponent of using randomization rather than matching as a means
to exclude rival hypothesis, and his work continues to inﬂuence the ﬁeld experiments conducted
in education today.30
A landmark social experiment measuring the eﬀects of classroom size is the Tennessee STAR
experiment. In this intervention, more than 10,000 students were randomly assigned to classes of
diﬀerent sizes from kindergarten through third grade. Similar to the social experiments discussed
in the ﬁrst Section, the STAR experiment had both attrition bias and selection problems in
that some students changed from larger to smaller classrooms after the assignment had occurred.
Nevertheless, even after taking these problems into account, Krueger (1999) put together a detailed
analysis that suggests there are achievement gains from studying in smaller classes.
Combined, these two examples indicate that there very well might be a statistically meaningful
relationship between class sizes and academic achievement, but the broader literature has not
concluded that to be necessarily true. Scanning the entire set of estimates fromnatural experiments
and ﬁeld experiments one is left with mixed evidence on the eﬀects of class size at various tiers
of the education system (Angrist and Lavy 1999, Case and Deaton 1999, Hoxby 2000a, Kremer
2003, Krueger 2003, Hanushek 2007, Bandiera et al. 2010).
Lazear (2001) theorizes that class size is dependent upon the behaviorof students. As disruptive
students are a detriment to the learning of their entire class, he proposes that the optimal class
size is larger for better-behaved students. In his model, larger classes may be associated with
higher student achievement, and may in part explain the mixed results in previous studies. This
is one area where a natural ﬁeld experiment might be able to help. One can envision that a test
of Lazear’s (2001) theory is not diﬃcult if the researcher takes the data generation process in
her own hands: designing experimental treatments that interact class size with student behavior
would permit an estimation of parameters of interest for measures of both class size and peer
inputs into the educational production function.
The results from this literature, more generally, make it clear how one could move forward with
a research agenda based on ﬁeld experimentation. For instance, are there critical non-linearities
in the relationship between class sizes and academic performance, as suggested for university class
30Rockoﬀ (2009) presents an overview of a substantial, but overlooked, body of ﬁeld experiments class size that
developed prior to World War II.
31sizes in Bandiera et al. (2010)? One might argue that the eﬀects of smaller class sizes drop to zero
at some critical threshold due to lost peer eﬀects. What about the composition of classrooms?
Even though the eﬀects of peer composition are mixed (Hoxby 2000b, Zimmerman 2003, Angrist
and Lang 2004, Hoxby and Weingarth 2006, Lavy et al. 2008, De Giorgi et al. 2009, Duﬂo et al.
2009), it might be the case that gender balance plays a key role in the classroom.
Even if we were to ﬁnd strong evidence that class size matters for academic performance and
answer the questions posed above, equations (6) to (9) highlight other features that we must
be aware before pushing such estimates too far. What is necessary is proper measurement of
the estimates of the parameters of the production function, as well as an understanding of the
decision rules of school administrators and parents. The next step is to deepen our understanding
by exploring whether other more cost eﬀective approaches to improve student achievement exist,
say by understanding the optimal investment stream in students: at what age level are resources
most eﬀective in promote academic achievement?
One line of work that addresses this question is the set of social experiments that explore
achievement interventions before children enter school. Given that Fryer (2010) presents a lucid
description of such interventions, we only brieﬂy mention them here. The landmark social ex-
periment in this area is the Perry Preschool program, which involved 64 students in Michigan
who attended the Perry Preschool in 1962. Since then, dozens of other programs have arisen
that explore what works with early childhood intervention, including Head Start, the Abcedarian
Project, Educare, Tulsa’s universal pre-kindergarten program, and several others too numerous to
list (see Fryer’s Table 5).31
As Fryer (2010) notes, outcomes in these programs exhibit substantial variance. And, even in
those cases that were met with great success, the achievement gains faded through time. Indeed,
in many cases once school started the students in these programs gave back all academic gains
(Currie and Thomas 1995, 2000, Anderson, 2008). Another fact with the bulk of these programs
is that they exhibit much homogeneity, mostly following from the general design in the Perry
Preschool program. Much has been learned about early childhood development in the previous
several decades, and this presents the ﬁeld experimenter with a unique opportunity to make large
impacts on childrens’ lives. As Fryer (2010) notes, incorporating new insights from biology and
developmental psychology represent opportunities for future research.
Such estimates cause us to pause and ask whether resource expenditures aﬀect academic per-
formance at all. In this spirit, there is a large literature that explores how direct school inputs,
such as school expenditures, inﬂuence student performance. As a whole, the early literature found
only a weak relationship between overall school expenditures and student achievement, primarily
31There is evidence that the ﬁrst ﬁve years of life are critical for lifelong development. Hence resource poor or un-
stimulating environments early in life are likely to detrimentally impact children’s cognitive, motor, social-emotional
development, and their health status (Grantham-McGregor et al. 1991, Heckman and Masterov 2005, Engle et al.
2007, Grantham-McGregor et al. 2007). As adults, they are more likely to have high fertility rates and less likely
to provide adequate stimulation and resources for their own children, thus contributing to the intergenerational
transmission of poverty and economic inequality (Sen 1999). The current debate, to which social experiments
have contributed, focuses on understanding the types of intervention that might be eﬀective for the child and their
families, and cost-eﬀective from society’s viewpoint.
32because resources tend to be allocated ineﬃciently (see Hanushek 2006, and Glewwe and Kremer
2006 for a review of the recent literature). In response to these ﬁndings, a growing area of research
uses both natural experiments and ﬁeld experiments to examine a wide range of targeted invest-
ments in order to identify the eﬀects and compare the cost-eﬀectiveness of various interventions.
For example, experiments have been carefully designed to identify the returns (in terms of school-
ing or achievement) to inputs such as school supplies, additional teachers, remedial education, or
computer programs (Banerjee et al. 2001, Angrist and Lavy 2002, Kremer et al. 2002, Glewwe et
al. 2004, Glewwe et al. 2006, Banerjee 2007).
2.2 Teacher Quality
While the evidence on the eﬀect of per pupil expenditure, class size, and peer composition is
mixed, teacher quality has been found to be clearly important. Hanushek (2007) ﬁnds that the
diﬀerences between schools can be attributed primarily to teacher quality diﬀerences. Little of this
variation, however, can be explained by either teacher salaries or observable characteristics such
as education and experience (Rivkin et al. 2005, Hanushek 2006). Just as it is diﬃcult to identify
high quality teachers, little is known about how to improve teacher quality and performance.
Given the evidence that education and professional development are largely ineﬀective, there is a
growing interest in the use of performance-based incentives to improve teacher quality and eﬀort.
The design and implementation of such incentives raises several areas of future study that ob-
servational data and ﬁeld experiments can adequately ﬁll, including: (i) what are the performance
eﬀects on the incentivized tasks and how can incentives be designed to cost-eﬀectively maximize
these eﬀects; (ii) what are the eﬀects on non-incentivized tasks, and how can incentives be de-
signed to avoid diversion of eﬀort in multitasking; (iii) how do teachers (of diﬀerent quality) sort
into diﬀerent incentive and pay structures; and (iv) how does sorting aﬀect general equilibrium
teacher quality.
Evidence from non-experimental studies, natural experiments, and ﬁeld experiments suggests
that incentives can improve teacher performance (Lavy 2002, Glewwe et al. 2003, Figlio and Kenny
2006, Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2007, Lavy 2009, Duﬂo 2009). Clearly, tighter links can be
established between this literature and the larger labor literature on incentive design (Prendergast
1999) to which, as discussed below, ﬁeld experiments are also beginning to contribute.
More broadly, ﬁeld experiments exploring mechanism design issues, such as comparing piece
rate and tournament incentives, are rare. Also, these programs generally load incentives onto
a single performance measure such as teacher attendance or student test scores, raising concerns
that teachers might divert eﬀort away from non-incentivized tasks (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991).
Here, the evidence is mixed with some studies ﬁnding broad improvements in teacher eﬀort (Duﬂo
2009, Lavy 2009) and others ﬁnding evidence of narrow eﬀorts, such as teaching to the test, that
divert eﬀort from other tasks and do not improve long term student achievement (Kremer 2006,
Jacob 2005).
Similarly, teacher sorting into incentive and pay structures is largely unexplored. Lazear (2001)
33applies his analysis of performance pay and productivity in a company (discussed in further detail
below) to teacher incentives, suggesting that the eﬀects of incentives on sorting could be com-
parable to eﬀects on teacher eﬀort. A well-designed ﬁeld experiment could explore whether and
how teacher sorting on incentives occurs. In general, ﬁeld experiments that apply theories about
incentive design, sorting and selection from other areas of labor could make a large contribution
to the teacher incentives literature. Many of these issues arise in the later section when we discuss
the role of ﬁeld experiments in understanding behavior within ﬁrms.
Along with the school inputs, the primary inputs into the educational production function come
from students and their families. A large literature models the eﬀect of individual characteristics,
family background and parental resources on schooling and achievement (Cameron and Heckman
2001, Cameron and Taber 2004). While it is impossible to randomly assign characteristics to
individuals or to randomly assign children to families, quasi-experimental studies have exploited
variation due to adoption in order to separately identify genetic inputs (“nature”) from parental
inputs (“nurture”) (Plug and Vijverberg, 2003). Other studies focus on potential barriers to
individual investment in human capital production. These include high costs to education, perhaps
due to credit constraints or high discount rates, and low marginal returns to education due, for
example due to poor health or lack of human capital investment prior to entering school.
Estimates from non-experimental studies and natural experiments suggest that credit con-
straints are of limited importance in schooling decisions (Cameron and Taber 2004, Stanley 2003).
However, estimates from natural experiments and ﬁeld experiments of Conditional Cash Transfer
programs (CCTs) ﬁnd largely positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects, suggesting that (at least among the
population targeted by CCTs) reducing present costs of education can aﬀect schooling and human
capital investment decisions. Non-experimental studies, natural experiments and ﬁeld experiments
have also ﬁnd positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects from conditional cash transfer programs based on en-
rollment, attendance, and performance (Cornwell et al. 2006, Barrera-Osorio et al. 2008, Angrist
and Lavy 2009, Maxﬁeld et al. 2003, Kremer et al. 2009). Few of these experiments, however,
explore how conditional cash transfers can be most eﬀectively designed.
Berry (2009) develops a model of household education production in which parents’ ability to
motivate their children is dampened by moral hazard. He then designs incentives to test several
predictions of the model including the ability of parents to commit and the relative eﬃcacy of
incentives awarded to parents or to children based on the relative productivity of the two parties.
Similarly, Levitt et al. (2010) implement a ﬁeld experiment that compares both the incentive
recipient (parent or student) and the incentive mechanism (piece rate or lottery). They also
compare a yearlong broad-based incentive programthat motivates sustained eﬀort to an immediate
one-time incentive aimed solely at increasing eﬀort on a single standardized test. This design
allows the authors to test a model of family investment, responsiveness to incentive mechanisms,
and human capital returns from varying levels of eﬀort. Both of these ﬁeld experiments illustrate
researchers can design instruments that build on and test economic theory.
While conditional cash transfers aim to induce improvements in achievement by motivating
greater eﬀort and investment, a second strand of interventions attempts to directly improve abilities
34that can improve achievement. A growing of interest in this area focuses on investment in early
childhood. Researchers argue that improving the abilities of young children can have long run
returns on educational achievement, attainment and other outcomes such as employment, crime,
fertility and health (Cunha and Heckman 2008). Evidence from non-experimental studies, natural
experiments and ﬁeld experiments suggest that early education interventions can have signiﬁcant
eﬀects on lifetime outcomes (Currie and Thomas 2005, Currie 2001, Garces et al. 2002, Behrman
et al. 2004, Todd and Wolpin 2006, Ludwig and Miller 2007, Heckman et al. 2010).
Most of these studies require econometric techniques, such as matching, to correct for lack
of valid randomization. And all of them are limited to identifying the eﬀect of the intervention
as a whole. They are not able to explore, for example, the relative importance of educational
interventions compared to interventions that increase parental investments in early childhood.
Given the evidence that early childhood is a key period of development and the relatively sparse
body of empirical work, ﬁeld experiments could address open questions related to: (i) the short
and long run returns of the various inputs of the educational production function; (ii) to collect
primary data and design ﬁeld experiments to help decompose overall changes in outcomes from
any given intervention into those arising from the behavioral responses of children, parents and
teachers. Akin to the literature on public and private transfers to households (Albarran and
Attanasio 2003), this second strand of research can help shed light on whether altering some
inputs lead to other inputs in the educational production function to be crowded in or out.
A ﬁnal strand of the literature focuses on improving child health as a means of increasing school
attendance rates. Estimates from natural experiments and ﬁeld experiments ﬁnd that health
interventions have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on school attendance (Bleakley 2007, Bobonis
et al. 2004, Miguel and Kremer 2004). Miguel and Kremer (2004) expand beyond identiﬁcation of
individual returns to health interventions, modeling the positive externalities of deworming ignored
in previous estimations. They use a ﬁeld experiment randomized over schools to estimate positive
externalities on the health and school attendance of untreated children in treated schools and
schools neighboring treated schools. They also examine eﬀects on test performance and estimate
the health care and educational cost eﬀectiveness of the program. As the authors argue, studies
that ignore positive externalities in the comparison groups will underestimate the eﬀect of the
intervention by missing the external eﬀects of deworming and underestimating the direct eﬀect in
comparison with an inﬂated baseline, biasing treatment eﬀects towards zero. They point out that
this identiﬁcation problem is well recognized in the labor literature estimating the eﬀects of job
training programs on both participants and non-participants. The authors suggest an extension
of their study that randomizes treatment at various levels such as within schools, across schools,
and within clusters of schools.
2.3 Measuring the Eﬀects of Policies Governing the System
Recent studies of educational policy exploit natural experiments with randomized lotteries and
variation in school district density to estimate the eﬀects of school competition, school choice,
35school vouchers, school accountability and the presence of relatively autonomous public schools,
such as charter schools (Clark 2009, Cullen et al. 2006, Hoxby 2000, Jacob 2004, Rouse 1998,
Angrist et al. 2002, Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2009). While proponents of expanding school choice
argue that, as in other markets, choice and competition will improve overall school quality and
eﬃciency, the empirical studies ﬁnd somewhat mixed evidence on these educational policies.32
For example, non-experimental studies, natural experiments and ﬁeld experiments ﬁnding that
vouchers improve educational achievement include Peterson et al. (2003), Kruger and Zhu (2004),
Angrist et al. (2002, 2006). On the other hand, using randomized school lotteries, Cullen et
al. (2006) ﬁnd that school choice programs have little or no eﬀect on academic achievement,
and they suggest that this result may be due to parents making poor choices. Hastings and
Weinstein (2008) explore this hypothesis using both a natural experiment and a natural ﬁeld
experiment to examine how reducing information costs aﬀects parental choices. In the natural
experiment, parents listed their preferences for schools within a district both before and after
receiving information mandated by No Child Left Behind (NCLB). The natural ﬁeld experiment
randomized distribution of a simpliﬁed version of the NCLB information to parents who had also
received NCLB information and to parents who had received no information.
This design allows the authors to measure the eﬀect of each piece of information alone as well as
their interaction. They ﬁnd that information on school-level academic performance pushes parents
to choose higher scoring schools (with no diﬀerences across the types of information received).
Using IV estimation, they also argue that these choices lead to increased academic achievement.
Similarly, a growing body of research has begun to identify the right tail of the distribution
of treatment eﬀects among heterogeneous charter schools (Dobbie and Fryer 2009, Hoxby and
Murarka 2009, Angrist et al. 2010). These studies rely on randomized lotteries in oversubscribed
schools and can only identify the eﬀect of a school (or school system) as a whole. They have
reported suggestive evidence, however, on speciﬁc features that correlate with successful schools,
such as longer days, longer school years, highly academic environments and so on. Field experi-
ments could be used to complement this work by separately identifying the eﬀects of charter school
innovations, such as length of school day, school time, and general environmental conditions on
the educational production function.
The ﬁeld experiments discussed in this section highlight several important advantages of their
usage for labor economists. For example, they can address biases in previous empirical estimates,
including those from non-experimental studies. They are able build on empirical and theoretical
literature in from several ﬁelds, such as education, health, and labor. Finally, they can be used to
identify parameters beyond the direct return of an input into an individual educational production
function and explore mechanism design issues.
In the end, it is clear that empirical explorations into human capital acquisition prior to labor
market entry is invaluable, and that there are several approaches that can be used in concert to
32Several theoretical papers suggest that school vouchers will lead to overall welfare gains, increased stratiﬁcation,
and eﬃciency gains (Epple and Romano 1998, Ferreyra 2007, Nechyba 2000, Rouse 1998, Figlio and Rouse 2006,
Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006, Epple et al. 2006, Arcidiacono 2005).
36learn more about the important parameters of interest. We argue that in this area ﬁeld experi-
ments can usefully add to the knowledge gained from naturally-occurring data, and the many low
apples that are left to be picked gives us great conﬁdence that ﬁeld experiments will only grow in
importance to tackle particulars in the educational production function.
3 Labor Market Discrimination
Philosophers as far removed as Arcesilaus, Heraclitus, and Plato have scribed of injustice and
extolled upon the virtues of removing it for the betterment of society. Perhaps taking a lead from
these scholars, social scientists have studied extensively gender, race and age based discrimination
in the marketplace. In this section we explore the stage of the life cycle where individuals are
entering the labor market. We focus mainly on discrimination in labor markets and how ﬁeld
experiments can lend insights into this important social issue.
We begin with a statistical overview of the data patterns in labor market outcomes across
minority and majority agents. To make precise how ﬁeld experiments might be carefully designed,
we need to discuss theories for why such discrimination exists. The two major economic theories
of discrimination that we discuss are: (i) certain populations having a general “distaste” for mi-
norities (Becker 1957) or a general “social custom” of discrimination (Akerlof 1980); (ii) statistical
discrimination (Arrow 1972, Phelps 1972), which is third-degree price discrimination as deﬁned
by Pigou (1920)–marketers using observable characteristics to make statistical inferences about
productivity or reservation values of market agents.
Empirically testing formarketplace discrimination has takentwo quite distinct paths: regression-
based methods and ﬁeld experiments. The former technique typically tests for a statistical rela-
tionship between an outcome measure, such as wage or price, and a group membership indicator.
By and large, regression studies ﬁnd evidence of discrimination against minorities in the mar-
ketplace.33 Field experimental studies, which have arisen over the past 35 years, typically use
matched pairs of transactors to test for discrimination. Due to the control that ﬁeld studies oﬀer
the experimenter, they have become quite popular and have by now been carried out in at least ten
countries (Riach and Rich 2002). Across several heterogeneous labor markets, as well as product
markets as diverse as home insurance and new car sales, ﬁeld studies have made a strong case that
systematic discrimination against minorities is prevalent in modern societies.
While regression-based empirical studies have served to provide an empirical foundation that
indicates discrimination is prevalent in the marketplace, they have been less helpful in distin-
guishing the causes of discrimination. As Riach and Rich (2002) note, ﬁndings from ﬁeld studies
appear to be more consistent with the majority white populations having a general “distaste”
for minorities in the sense of Becker (1975) or a general “social custom” of discrimination in line
with Akerlof (1980); but statistical discrimination (Arrow 1972; Phelps 1972), or marketers using
observable characteristics to make statistical inference about productivity or reservation values of
33A comprehensive summary of the regression-based literature on discrimination are contained in Altonji and
Blank (1999) and Yinger (1998).
37market agents, for example, cannot be ruled out, ex ante or ex post.
Before one can even begin to discuss social policies to address discrimination, it is critical to
understand the causes of the underlying preferential treatment that certain groups receive. As has
been emphasized throughout, the potential for ﬁeld experiments to be explicitly designed to test
between theories, is a key advantage of this approach over other methodologies. In this section,
we provide a framework for how ﬁeld experiments can be used to advance our understanding of
not only the extent of discrimination in the marketplace but also the nature of discrimination
observed.
3.1 Data Patterns in Labor Markets
As Altonji and Blank (1999) noted, researchers have observed labor market diﬀerences across race
and gender lines for decades. Yet, the magnitude of market diﬀerences, and hence what a new
generation of ﬁeld experiments seek to explain, has changed substantially over time. For example,
there was convergence in the black/white wage gap during the 1960s and early 1970s, but such
convergence lost steam in the two decades afterwards. In addition, the Hispanic/white wage gap
has risen among both males and females in the 1980s and 1990s. Of course, the world has not
remained stagnant since the 1990s, and this section is meant to update the results in Altonji and
Blank (1999).
Table 5 presents the labor outcomes of whites, blacks, and Hispanics by gender in 2009. Table
5 includes a set of labor market outcomes by race and gender that labor economists have studied
for decades. The data are based on tabulations from the Current Population Survey (CPS) from
May 2009. Row 2 of Table 5 indicates that white men earn 13% (21%) more than white women
(black and Hispanic men) on an hourly basis. Black and Hispanic women earn less than minority
men and majority women.
[Table 5: Labor Market Outcomes by Race and Gender]
When one focuses on annual earnings, row 3 of Table 5, the diﬀerential between white men
continues: they earn more than 20% higher wages than minority men. Yet, for women the racial
diﬀerence becomes markedly higher–50% for white women to black and 30% for white women to
Hispanic. The diﬀerentials remain when we focus on full-time employees–rows 7 and 8 of Table
5. In general Table 5 tells a story that has been told often before: white men earn more money
for hours worked than other groups, and white women earn more than their female counterparts.
Figures 3 and 4 complement these wage data by showing for each gender, the time series of
annual median weekly income from 1969 to present for whites and blacks and 1986 to present for
Hispanics.34 These ﬁgures bring to light some interesting trends. Regardless of racial or ethnic
34Weekly earnings ﬁgures are taken from the Current Population Survey. They are for all employed people over
age 25 that reported weekly earnings above zero. Data before 1979 is taken from the May supplement of the CPS.
After 1979 data is taken from the CPS Annual Earnings File. Earnings from the May supplement for 1969-1972
were reported in ranges. The midpoint of each range was assumed to be the actual earnings for each individual.
38group, wage rates for women continue to grow faster than for men. Within each gender, though,
the 2000s did very little for racial or ethnic diﬀerentials. In fact, for both genders any local trend of
convergence is reversed by the mid-2000s. In part this could be a function of the well documented
rise in wage inequality during the second half of the 2000s.
[Figure 3: Median Weekly Earnings of Male Workers]
[Figure 4: Median Weekly Earnings of Female Workers.]
Another important set of data points on Table 5 is the extent to which whites face lower
unemployment rates. Figures 5 and 6 extend this information by showing, by gender, the time
series of unemployment rates for whites, blacks, and Hispanics. One interesting element is the
magnitude of unemployment changes for whites versus blacks and Hispanics. The mid-2000s saw
no change to this trend, with the impact of recessions falling harder on blacks and Hispanics
relative to whites. This trend does not seem to depend strongly on gender either, even though
neither gender nor any racial or ethnic group seems to be immune from being hit by the 2009/10
recession.
[Figure 5: Male Unemployment Rates (annual averages), Men Aged Over 20]
[Figure 6: Female Unemployment Rates (annual averages), Women Aged Over 20]
Wages and unemployment rates are a function of labor force participation rates as well. Figure
7 shows the time series of labor force participation. The convergence in participation rates from the
70s through 90s continued into the 2000s, although the pace of that convergence has slowed. Men
of every race/ethnicity have dropped out of the labor force at a very slow rate while Hispanic and
white females have increased participation. Interestingly, African American women have higher
labor force participation than white women.
[Figure 7: Labor Force Participation Rates, Aged Over 20]
In considering the causes for these labor market disparities, economists have explored whether
the workers themselves bring heterogeneous attributes to the workplace. To shed insights into this
issue, we provide Table 6, which shows educational diﬀerences, family diﬀerences, and regional
composition.
[Table 6: Composition of the Labor Force by Race and Gender]
Rows 2 through 6 in Table 6 shows that whites obtain more years of education than blacks and
Hispanics. Interestingly, white women are almost uniformly more educated then their ethnic/racial
counterparts. This result is also reﬂected in the years of experience variable. Rows 8 through 10
in Table 6 give a sense of the diﬀerent family choices (marriage and fertility) that are made by
whites, blacks, and Hispanics–another important input to wages, especially for women. Row 8
39shows that whites are more likely to be married (and perhaps enjoy the eﬃciencies of household
trade), but row 10 shows that white women are likely to have fewer children to spend time caring
for than black and Hispanic women. Rows 11 through 20 show the geographic breakdown of
each race/ethnic group. Local labor market opportunities are surely inﬂuential for wages and in
general, whites are from higher earning regions like New England and the Paciﬁc.
Overall, these data are in line with Altonji and Blank (1999), who ﬁnd that large educational
diﬀerences among these groups, with race and ethnicity mattering much more than gender. Of
course, what these education diﬀerences represent is diﬃcult to parse. On the one hand, they
might be mostly due to diﬀerent preferences. Alternatively, they might reﬂect behavior of agents
who expect to face discrimination later on in the labor market–referred to as “pre-market" dis-
crimination. As Altonji and Blank (1999) note, there is evidence that some minorities have been
denied market opportunities, perhaps leading to less than eﬃcient levels of schooling investment.
While the labor market outcomes disparities observed in Table 5 and Figures 3 to 7 might
represent diﬀerences mainly due to these individual investment choices, perhaps investment varies
because of preferences, comparative advantage, and the like. For example, another hypothesis put
forth is that such outcomes are at least partly due to discrimination on the labor market. The
remainder of this section brieﬂy discusses theories of discrimination and attempts to test these
theories, contrasting regression-based approaches to ﬁeld experiments.
3.2 Theories of Discrimination
We follow the literature and deﬁne labor market discrimination as a situation in which persons
who provide labor market services and who are equally productive in a physical or material sense
are treated unequally in a way that is related to an observable characteristic such as race, ethnicity,
or gender. By ‘unequal’ we mean these persons receive diﬀerent wages or face diﬀerent demands
for their services at a given wage.
We consider two main economic models: entrepreneurs are willing to forego proﬁts to cater
to their ‘taste’ for discrimination, as ﬁrst proposed by Becker (1957). The second model is ‘sta-
tistical’ discrimination: in an eﬀort to maximize proﬁts, ﬁrm owners discriminate based on a set
of observables because they have imperfect information. This could be as simple as employers
having imperfect information on the relative skills or productivity of minority versus majority
agents. The models in both of these literatures are deep, and rich with good intuition. We do not
have the space to do them justice, but strive simply to provide a sketch of each model to give the
reader a sense of how one can test between them. We urge the reader to see Altonji and Blank
(1999) for a more detailed presentation of these models and their implications.35
35As far as the law is concerned, both types of discrimination–taste based and statistical–are illegal. For
example, in credit markets, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (sec. 701, as amended in March 1976) states that it
“shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of the credit
transaction...on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or martial status, or age...” The law implies
that while it is allowed to diﬀerentiate among customers based on characteristics of the customer (e.g., credit
history) or the product that are linked to the expected return of the transaction, it is illegal to use the customer’s
membership in a group to distinguish among customers. In other words, ﬁrms should make decisions about the
403.2.1 Taste-Based Discrimination
In his doctoral dissertation, Becker (1957) modeled prejudice or bigotry as a ‘taste’ for discrimi-
nation among employers. Becker modeled employers as maximizing a utility function that is the
sum of proﬁts plus a disutility term from employing minorities,
U = PF(NNM + NM) − WNMNNM − WMNM − dNM, (10)
where P is product price, F is the production function, which takes on two arguments: the
number of employees that are non-minority NNM and minority NM. The second term is the wage
bill and the ﬁnal term is the disutility from employing minorities, dNM. For prejudiced employers,
the marginal cost of employment of a minority worker is WMNM + dNM. Accordingly, d is the
‘coeﬃcient of discrimination,’ or the level of distaste of the employer for employing a minority
worker. The higher d, the more likely the employer will hire non-minority workers, even if they
are less productive than minority workers.
The Becker model then shows that the wage premium for non-minority workers is determined
by the preferences of the least prejudiced employer who hires minority workers. Several extensions
to this model have been proposed in the literature, including the possibility that d is a function
of the job type, wage level, or the extent of segregation in the labor market. For example, Coate
and Loury (1993) develop a model that restricts all employers to have identical preferences, but
makes d a factor only when the employer hires minority workers for skilled jobs; an important
consideration in the model then becomes the ratio of minority and non-minority people working
in skilled jobs.
A logical conclusion of many of the studies in this area is that with certain assumptions–
in many cases free entry, constant returns to scale, segmenting, etc.–in the long run non-
discriminating employers will increase to the point that it is no longer necessary for minority
workers to work for prejudiced employers, eliminating any wage discrepancies between minority
and non-minority workers. This is a testable implication.
3.2.2 Statistical Discrimination
Arrow (1973) and Phelps (1972) discuss discrimination that is consistent with the notion of proﬁt-
maximization, or Pigou’s (1920) “third-degree price discrimination.” In this class of model, in
their pursuit of the most proﬁtable transactions, marketers use observable characteristics to make
statistical inference about reservation values of market agents. The underlying premise implicit
in this line of work is that employers have incomplete information and use observables to guide
their behavior. For example, if they believe that women might be more likely to take time out of
the labor force, employers with high adjustment costs might avoid those expected to have higher
attrition rates. Firms then have an incentive to use gender to ‘statistically discriminate’ among
customer as if they had no information regarding the customer’s race, sex, etc. This, for example, is true regardless
of whether race is or is not a good proxy for risk factors in the credit market (Ladd 1998).
41workers if gender is correlated with attrition.
Of course, employers can discriminate along second moments of observable distributions too.
Sobel and Takahashi (1983) develop a model along such lines, and their model is reconsidered in
List and Livingston (2010), which we closely follow here. In this framework, employers look at
second moments and use prior beliefs about the productivity of group members to inﬂuence hiring
and wage outcomes.
In the case where workers approach employers in an eﬀort to sell their labor services, the
employer proposes the wage (price) in each period. The worker can accept or reject the oﬀer.
If the oﬀer is rejected, the employer makes another oﬀer. If the oﬀer is rejected in the terminal
period, no exchange occurs. To keep the analysis simple and without losing focus on the critical
incentives, we consider a two-period model. The results can all be extended to an n-period model.
Consider the situation where the employer’s reservation value is public information and denoted
vb, where vb ∈ [0,1], and the employer knows only the distribution from which the worker’s
reservation valuation is drawn. An employer confronts a potential worker, who has reservation
value vs, which is drawn from a distribution F(v) on support [0,1]. It is assumed that this c.d.f.
is continuously diﬀerentiable, and that the resulting p.d.f. f(v) is positive for all vs ∈ [0,1]. The
employer discounts future payoﬀs by q, q ∈ [0,1]. Further assume that the worker discounts future
payoﬀs at the rate of p, p ∈ [0,1]. p and q can be thought of as the costs of bargaining and are
known by both players.
The bargaining process proceeds as follows: the employer proposes a price (wage) to the worker
in period 1. The worker can accept or reject the oﬀer. If the oﬀer is rejected, the employer proposes
a new price. It is assumed that the new proposal must be a wage (price) that is no lower than the
original oﬀer. The worker can accept or reject this proposition. If it is rejected, the game ends
and no transaction occurs.
Following a no-commitment equilibrium, the employer is assumed to make the period 1 oﬀer
at the beginning of period 1, and subsequently chooses the period 2 oﬀer using the information
gained from the worker’s rejection of the period 1 oﬀer. Let x1 be the employer’s oﬀer in period









if i = 0
if i = 1
if i = 2
(11)
A worker whose reservation value is vs will prefer accepting in period i to accepting in period
i + 1 if x1 − vs > p(xi+1 − vs), or if vs < Si. A worker’s most preferred time to accept is period i
if Si − 1 < v < Si, so F(Si) − F(Si−1) is the employer’s ex ante probability of hiring in the ith
period and (vb − xi)[F(Si) − F(Si−1)] is the employer’s ex ante undiscounted expected proﬁt in
period i.
The employer’s maximization problem can be stated in terms of his choice of the period 2
oﬀer, x2, and of S1, which implies a choice of x1, since S1 =
(x1−px2)
(1−p) . The employer’s optimal
42strategies are found via backwards induction, starting with his period 2 decision. If the period 1
oﬀer is rejected, then the employer knows vs ≥ S. The employer chooses an oﬀer x2 to maximize
his expected proﬁts. Let π(S) be this maximum value,
π(S) = max
x2
(vb − x2)[F(x2) − F(S)]
1 − F(S)
. (12)
Let x2(S) be the unique value of x2 that solves (12). The ﬁrst order condition of this problem,
which implicitly deﬁnes x2(S), implies that,
(vb − x2(S))f(x2(S)) = F(x2(S)) − F(S). (13)
Since the oﬀer x2(S) must be less than the employer’s valuation vb, the left-hand side of (13) is
positive, so the right-hand side must also be positive. For this to be the case, it must be true that,
vb > x2(S) > S. (14)
In other words, in equilibrium, the second period oﬀer must be greater than the ﬁrst period oﬀer,
and both oﬀers must be less than vb.
The no-commitment equilibrium is fully characterized by x2(S) and a ﬁrst period price,   x1,
that solves,
max








if such as S ∈ [0,1] exists
otherwise
(16)
Substituting in the constraint and the deﬁnition of π(S), the problem becomes,
max
0≤S≤1
vbF(S) − (1 − p)SF(S) − px2(S)F(S) + q(vb − x2(S))[F(x2(S)) − F(S)]. (17)
If   S solves (17), then   x1 = (1 − p)  S + px2(  S) and   x2 = x2(  S) are the no-commitment equilibrium
oﬀers. The ﬁrst-order condition of (17) implies,
(1 − q)vbf(S) − (1 − p)[F(S) − Sf(S)] + (q − p)x2(S)f(S) + px
′
2(S)F(S) = 0. (18)
3.2.3 Optimal Employer Behavior
Within this framework one can analyze diﬀerences in how an employer will behave when he
confronts members of the various groups. To obtain insights on the impact of changes in the
variance of the worker’s reservation value on both oﬀers that the employer may make, we consider
a simple example where the worker’s value is drawn from a uniform distribution. There are two
groups of potential workers. Members of group 1 draw their reservation value from a uniform
distribution with lower bound a1 and upper bound b1. Members of group 2 draw their value from
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so the variance of group 2’s distribution is larger than the variance of group 1’s distribution.
Without loss of generality, further assume that the bounds are such that the distributions have
equivalent means. Now, consider the employer’s equilibrium oﬀers, when confronting a worker
who is a member of group i, i = 1,2.
Solving through backwards induction, the employer ﬁrst calculates his period 2 oﬀer, as in














The solution of this problem is,




Hence, the period 2 decision is a function of S, which is chosen in period 1. The employer’s period
1 problem is to solve (17). Substituting in the distribution and the solution x2(S), the ﬁrst order










q(S − vb) = 0, (21)
which implies the solution,









making the optimal period 2 oﬀer,
  x2 =
1












and the optimal period 1 oﬀer,






















Note that the optimal oﬀers   x1 and   x2 are both increasing in ai, and therefore decreasing in
the variance of reservation values. Group 2’s reservation value is drawn from a distribution with a
larger variance, hence a1 > a2. In this example, then, the analysis shows that when the employer
believes he is dealing with a member of a group whose reservation value is widely distributed
(group 2), he will oﬀer to hire at a lower wage than he would if the worker were a member of a
group with a lower variance (group 1). This is true despite the fact that the ﬁrst moments of the
distributions are identical. This prediction provides one means to test the statistical discrimination
model against the taste-based discrimination model. We return to this notion below.
443.3 Empirical Tests
Scholars have concerned themselves primarily with the question “is there discrimination in market
X?” and much less time has been spent on answering the question “why do ﬁrms discriminate?”
As economists interested in public policy, however, we should be interested in not only the extent
of discrimination but also the source of discrimination. Conditional on the existence of discrimi-
nation, it is imperative to understand the source of discrimination, since one cannot begin to craft
social policies to address discrimination if its underlying causes are ill-understood. We now turn
to an overview of a select set of studies that measure discrimination.
3.3.1 Observational Data
One of the most important means to empirically test for marketplace discrimination in labor mar-
kets is to use regression-based methods. The focus using this approach has ranged from measuring
labor force participation to modeling wage determination. Within the line of work that explores
wages, the overarching theme is to decompose wage diﬀerentials, using an Oaxaca decomposi-
tion, between groups into what can be explained by observables and what cannot be explained by
observables. More speciﬁcally, consider a simple model that makes wages for minorities as follows,
WM = βMXM + eM, (25)
and wages for non-minority agents as,
WNM = βNMXNM + eNM, (26)
where W represent wages, X is a vector of individual speciﬁc observables that aﬀect wages, and
e is a classical error term. The wage diﬀerence between minority and non-minority agents can be
computed by diﬀerencing these equations as follows,
WM − WNM = [βMXM + eM] − [βNMXNM + eNM] = [XM − XNM]βM + [βM − βNM]XNM.
The ﬁrst term in the right most expression, [XM − XNM]βM, is the component of the wage
diﬀerence that is explained: it arises because of diﬀerences in the average characteristics of group
members, such as region of residence, experience, or education level. The second term, [βM −
βNM]XNM, is the part of the wage diﬀerence that is not explained by the regression model–the
diﬀerences in the response coeﬃcients of the regression, or the rate of return diﬀerences across
minorities and non-minorities. This last term encompasses diﬀerences in wages due to diﬀerences
in the returns to similar characteristics between groups. For example, returns to education may
diﬀer across minorities and non-minorities. The fraction of wage diﬀerence due to this second term
is typically called the ‘share’ of wage diﬀerences due to discrimination.
Before discussing some of the general results from various regression-based approaches, it is
important to qualify the results. First, the approach of assuming that the entire second component,
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to be true the wage equation must be well speciﬁed. If omitted variable bias exists, then the
response coeﬃcients will be biased. Second, this equation captures only discrimination in the labor
market as measured today. That is, even if no discrimination is found to exist in such a model
in today’s wages, that does not imply discrimination is unimportant. For example, if women are
constantly denied market opportunities for skilled jobs, they might not invest optimally to obtain
such positions. In the literature, such under investment is denoted as market discrimination before,
or ‘pre’ market discrimination. Clearly, it is diﬃcult to parse the eﬀects of years past with the
current eﬀects of discrimination, and this should be kept in mind when interpreting the empirical
results below–both those from the regression based model as well as from ﬁeld experiments.
The regression models can be applied to the data discussed above from the Current Population
Survey (CPS) from May 2009. Yet, given that Altonji and Blank (1999) summarize a series of
regression results from such wage equations that do not diﬀer markedly from ours, we simply
restate the main results. First, we ﬁnd white men receive signiﬁcantly higher wages than black
men, even after controlling for education, job experience, region of residence, and occupation.
Following the letter of the model, this is evidence of discrimination in the data.
Second, even after controlling for key factors, Hispanic men and minority female workers have
lower wages than their non-minority counterparts. Once again, if one sticks to the interpretation of
the model, this is suggestive evidence that discrimination exists between these groups. One should
highlight, however, that there are certain diﬃculties in using CPS data for such an exercise–such
as the problem of not having individual ability measures, such as cognitive and non-cognitive
abilities. Altonji and Blank (1999) extend the CPS results by modeling data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NSLY). In general, their results with NSLY data conﬁrm that an
improved speciﬁcation reduces the unexplained eﬀects for blacks and for women.
While this line of work is suggestive that discrimination exists in the labor market, due to
productivity unobservables the nature of discrimination is not discernible without rather strong
assumptions: are minority men receiving lower wages because of tastes or because of statistical
discrimination?
Some headway has been made in these regards recently in several clever studies. One such
study is the ingenuous paper of Goldin and Rouse (2000), who use audition notes from a series of
auditions among national orchestras in order to determine whether or not blind auditions–those in
which musicians auditioned behind a screen–help women relatively more than men. The authors
use a panel data set and identify discrimination by the change in hiring practices toward blind
auditions that occurred in the 1970s. Goldin and Rouse study the actual audition records obtained
from orchestra personnel managers and orchestra archives from eight major symphony orchestras
from the late 1950’s to 1995. These records contain lists of everyone auditioning (ﬁrst and last
name) with notation around the names of those who advance. There are three rounds of auditions
considered: preliminary, semiﬁnal, and ﬁnal. The gender of the participants is determined by their
name (96% of the records are distinctly masculine or feminine).
Eighty-four percent of all preliminary rounds were blind, seventy-eight percent of all semiﬁnal
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have personnel rosters that describe ﬁnal assignments (members of the orchestra). There is vari-
ation in hiring practices over time, so that within one orchestra, the same audition may be blind
or non-blind over time and across categories (preliminary, semiﬁnal, and ﬁnal). In addition, since
success is rare, the same musician sometimes auditions more than once.
In the authors’ data, 42 percent of individuals competed in more than one round and 24 percent
competed in more than one audition. Including musician ﬁxed-eﬀects, the authors identify the
eﬀect of a screen to hide gender from those individuals who auditioned both with and without a
screen. Without this “ability” control (individual ﬁxed-eﬀects) the data suggests that women are
worse oﬀ with blind auditions. However, controlling for individual ﬁxed eﬀects, the authors ﬁnd
that for women who make it to the ﬁnals, a blind audition increases their likelihood of winning by
33 percentage points.
In their main speciﬁcation, the authors ﬁnd that women are signiﬁcantly less likely to advance
from semiﬁnals when auditions are blind, but signiﬁcantly more likely to advance from preliminary
auditions and ﬁnal auditions when they audition behind a screen. Turning to the ﬁnal outcome
space–what is the eﬀect of the screen on the hiring of women?–the authors estimate that though
they are unable to obtain a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect (since the likelihood of winning an
audition is less than three percent), women are ﬁve percentage points more likely to be hired than
men when auditions are completely blind and there is no semiﬁnal round. There is no diﬀerence
between the likelihood that women are hired relative to men when there is a semiﬁnal round and
auditions are blind.
Ultimately, the eﬀects discussed give pause to reported ‘traditional’ orchestra practices. In
particular, “a strong presumption exists that discrimination has limited the employment of female
musicians.” Before the implementation of blind auditions, committees were instituted to overthrow
the biased hiring practices of conductors (who reportedly hired select males from a small set of
well known instructors). However, sex-based biases seemed to dominate hiring, even in the face
of “democratization.” As the authors demonstrate, the institution of blind hiring signiﬁcantly
increased the success rate of women in most auditions.
However, it is diﬃcult for the authors to parse whether or not the discrimination is taste-based
or statistical. The authors note that an orchestra is a team, which requires constant improvement
and study together. In this sense, female-speciﬁc absences–maternity leave–can impact the
quality of the orchestra signiﬁcantly and may motivate statistical discrimination against women.
Using their data, the authors note that the average female musician took 0.067 leaves of absence
per year, compared to the average males’ 0.061 leaves. The length of leave was negligibly diﬀerent
between genders. These statistics imply that taste-based discrimination, assuming no performance
diﬀerences between hired males and females, are at least in part the cause of the discrimination
against female musicians. Again, without the strong assumption that conditional on being hired,
women and men of the same audition caliber perform indistinguishably in their careers, it is
diﬃcult for this innovative work to parse the type of discrimination observed.
A second clever piece of work based on the regression approach is due to Altonji and Pierret
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time under a hypothesis of statistical discrimination based on race by employers. Notably, they
conclude that if ﬁrms do not statistically discriminate based on race (if they follow the law), but
race is negatively related to productivity, then: (i) the race gap will widen with experience, and,
(ii) adding a favorable variable that the hiring ﬁrm cannot observe will reduce the race diﬀerence
in the experience proﬁle. The authors ﬁnd that the data satisfy these predictions: the race gap
widens with experience and the addition of a “skill” variable reduces the race gap in experience
slopes. Thus, the authors conclude that employers “do not make full use of race as information.”
Fundamentally, the authors’ model studies the diﬀerential eﬀect on wages of “easy to observe”
s variables and “hard to observe” z variables that predict worker productivity. While s variables
such as schooling should have a smaller and smaller eﬀect on wage over time, since an employer’s
experience with the worker reveals far more important predictors of productivity, those variables
that are diﬃcult to observe such as skill have a relatively larger eﬀect on wages as time goes on.
This implies that the authors can identify whether or not the easily observable characteristic of
race is acting as an s variable, or if employers are ignoring it. If employers are ignoring race, but
race remains negatively correlated with productivity, then race acts as a z variable, appearing
more important–more predictive of wage–over time. Again, the authors ﬁnd support for the
latter case.
The authors estimate their model using NLSY 1979 data–a panel study of men and women
aged 14-21 in 1978 that have been surveyed annually since 1979. The data on white and black men
with eight or more years of education forms the basis of their empirical analysis. The authors use
AFQT (the Armed Forces Qualiﬁcation Test) scores as a variable that employers do not observe,
but that predicts productivity. In addition, the authors control for the ﬁrst job held by all subjects
in order to ensure that their results are not driven by the eﬀect that a high AFQT may have on a
worker’s access to jobs in which skill is observed, rather than “dead-end jobs” where skill is never
observed. Because the authors control for secular shifts in the wage structure, their identiﬁcation
of the interactions between time and observable (s) characteristics and unobservable or ignored
(z) characteristics comes from variation across age cohorts.
The authors ﬁnd that a one standard deviation shift in AFQT rises from having no eﬀect on
wages when experience is zero to increasing log wages by .0692 when experience is 10. This supports
the result that employers learn about productivity. The coeﬃcient on education interacted with
experience declines from 0.0005 to -0.0269 when the variable AFQT*experience is added. With an
intercept of 0.0832 with the addition, we can conclude that the eﬀect of an extra year of education
declines from 0.829 to 0.0595 over ten years. This suggests that employers statistically discriminate
on the basis of education because they have limited information about labor market entrants. In
short, the eﬀect of easy-to-observe variables like education dwindles as hard-to-observe variables
like ability become more available–as time goes on and the employer becomes more familiar
with the quality of the worker. The authors ﬁnd similar eﬀects with their other hard-to-observe
variables that correlate with productivity such as father’s education and sibling wage rate: as
experience increases, these variables become more and more predictive of higher wages (though
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The main analysis is on whether or not employers statistically discriminate based on race. If
ﬁrms use race as information–that is, as easily-observable predictors of performance similar to
education–then the eﬀect of race over time on wages should decline as hard-to-observe variables
like skill (predicted by the AFQT) become more transparent over time. If ﬁrms ignore race,
however, the initial (experience = 0) race gap should be small, and should widen with experience
if race is negatively related to productivity. Also, when race is ignored (a z variable) adding another
z variable like AFQT*experience will reduce the race gap in experience slopes. The authors note
that the eﬀect of a “black” dummy will not necessarily be zero even if ﬁrms do not statistically
discriminate on the basis of race, since race may be correlated with legally usable information
available to the employer but not to the econometrician.
Empirical analysis shows that the eﬀect of adding AFQT*experience decreases the race gap
in experience slopes (from -0.1500 to -0.0861); this is the opposite of what we would expect if
employers fully used race as a predictor of performance (as they do with schooling–recall, the
addition of AFQT*experience increases the amount by which the impact of education changes
over time). Using another prediction of their model, that the eﬀect of learning on the s variables
will equal the eﬀect of learning on the z variables times the relationship between the s and z
variables–that there are spillover eﬀects from learning–the authors are able to reject race as an
s variable but not able to reject race as a z variable.
A few points are of note. First, if the quantity of training is inﬂuenced by the employer’s beliefs
about a worker’s productivity, eﬀects of training cannot be separated from the eﬀects of statistical
discrimination with learning. In addition, if taste-based discrimination becomes more prevalent
at higher level positions, a widening of the race gap based on experience may be a reﬂection of
increased taste-based discrimination rather than employer learning. Finally, the authors model
the eﬀect of statistical discrimination on wages, but not on the extended hiring decision. Based
on these considerations, the authors note that any of their results on race-based discrimination
should be interpreted cautiously.
To summarize, Altonji and Pierret test for statistical discrimination in a very reasonable way:
they argue that if ﬁrms statistically discriminate, an observable characteristic such as race will
be very important in predicting wages early in the employment history–before productivity is
well observed–but becomes less important in predicting wages as time goes on and the worker
accumulates experience. In the data the opposite is true, suggesting that under the assumption
that the model is well speciﬁed ﬁrms attempt to ignore race in their hiring decisions, but that race
is correlated with productivity (which is revealed) and so it becomes more and more predictive of
wages as time goes on.
A third innovative regression-based study is due to Charles and Guryan (2008), who use state-
level variation in historical wage and survey data to empirically test the impacts of discrimination
on the labor market, focusing on taste for discrimination. The main theoretical result fromBecker’s
work explored by Charles and Guryan is the assertion that black workers are hired by the least
prejudiced employers in the market due to sorting in the labor market. Furthermore, they examine
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This sorting mechanism provides Charles and Guryan with two empirical regularities to verify
Becker’s work: (i) the level of prejudice observed by the employers displaying large amounts of
prejudice (in the upper tail of a distribution of prejudice) should not impact wages; (ii) holding
prejudice constant, wages should be lower with more blacks in the labor market.
Although they do not target the question of taste versus statistical based discrimination di-
rectly, they do include a variable for the skill diﬀerence between blacks and whites in regressions
run as robustness checks. This and other robustness checks do not alter the main results which
ﬁnd support for Becker’s theory of marginal prejudice aﬀecting wages: marginal and low percentile
prejudice levels negatively impact the black white wage gap while higher percentile and average
prejudice levels have no impact; also the percent of the population that is black has a negative
impact on the wage gap.
Charles and Guryan (2008) begin by empirically motivating the relationship between the black-
white wage gap and prejudice by displaying the correlation between wage data from the CPS and
white survey responses to questions concerning racial sentiments from the General Social Survey
(GSS). After displaying the positive wage gap to prejudice relationship, Charles and Guryan
review the theoretical ﬁndings to clarify the hypotheses of interest and then discuss the data.
The data being used for prejudice is a non-uniform (the same questions are not asked every year)
nationally representative survey with state-level data from 1972-2004. The survey questions used
in this analysis are those from white responders and are vetted to reﬂect prejudice as much as
possible (for example a question on whether “the government was obligated to help blacks” was
not used due to the possible response aimed at the government). The survey responses were used
to formulate a prejudice index relative to the responses given in 1977 and a prejudice distribution
and the data on prejudice is combined with CPS may monthly supplement from 1977 and 1978
and CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG) for analysis.
The empirical results come from a hedonic wage regression. The regressions are run at the state
level under the assumptions that employment markets are at the state level and interstate moves
are costly. Because the prejudice measure they have is at the state level, Charles and Guryan
take an additional step to allow for more reasonable standard errors than ones that would come
from a full regression with observations at the individual level. This additional step comprises
of removing the prejudice index but including a black dummy variable for each state (state-
black dummy interaction) in the ﬁrst stage wage hedonic, and then using the coeﬃcient from
this interaction term as the dependent variable in a second stage regression which includes the
prejudice index. Five main measures of the prejudice index are analyzed: average, marginal, 10th
percentile, median and 90th percentile. The marginal level of prejudice is calculated as the “pth
percentile of the prejudice distribution, where p is the percentage of the state workforce that is
black” and the prejudice distribution is calculated from the GSS data. Additionally, the fraction
of the population that is black in the state is included in the second stage.
The second stage regression results all support Becker’s theory. The ﬁrst result of a negative
impact on the black-white relative wages (negative means lower wages for blacks) attributed to
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of prejudice is included. The impact of the marginal prejudice measure is always negative and
signiﬁcant. This is also the case for the coeﬃcient on the measurement of the fraction of the
state population that is black (always negative and signiﬁcant). These ﬁrst results are taken as
indication that the average prejudice measures fail to explain the wage gap, while the marginal
and fraction of black have the assumed relationship from Becker’s work.
The additional prejudice measurements: 10th percentile, median and 90th percentile, provide
further support for Becker’s theory. When included together in a regression, both with and
without the percent of the state’s population that is black, the 10th percentile is the only variable
of signiﬁcance (it is negative). This result is taken as further support of Becker’s theory because of
the indication that higher measurements of prejudice do not aﬀect the wage gap (note that when
the proportion of the state’s population that is black is included, the 10th percentile increase in
both absolute magnitude and signiﬁcance).
Various robustness checks are completed such as the inclusion of variables to indicate skill as
mentioned above. Two skill measures are used: (i) separate reading and math variables which
measure the diﬀerence between black and white test scores at the state level from a National
Assessment of Educational Progress-Long Term Trend (NAEP-LTT) test, and, (ii) black-white
relative school quality measures used and Card and Krueger (1992) (for which they reduce the
sample to just southern states). In both cases the results are similar to when the skill proxies
are not included. Although this identiﬁcation strategy does not disentangle the impact of taste
and statistical based discrimination, the inclusion of skill level measures does suggest that this
is taste-based discrimination under the assumption that the skill measures accurately reﬂect the
diﬀerence in work-place abilities between races and that these diﬀerences in abilities are known by
the employers. In a best case scenario, identifying statistical discrimination would require some
measure of employee productivity by race and employment.
Further robustness checks investigate other possible endogeneity issues. An instrument of the
proportion black in the state workforce in 1920 was used to account for possible endogeneity issues
with the percent of the state’s current population that is black. No diﬀerence in results was found.
Finally, Charles and Guryan (2008) include a measure from the National Education Longitudinal
Survey of 1988 (NELS) to account for the fraction of co-workers that were of the same race. The
results again supported Becker’s theory that market sorting results in blacks being more segregated
towards lower prejudiced employers: the wage gap is larger when the co-workers are more mixed
when accounting for racial prejudice and the black proportion of the population.
The overall result is best restated directly from the last paragraph in the paper: “Our various
results suggest that racial prejudice among whites accounts for as much as one-fourth of the gap in
wages between blacks and whites...a present discounted loss in annual earnings for blacks between
$34,000 and $115,000, depending on the intensity of the prejudice of the marginal white in their
states.”
Similar to the above studies, making an assumption on the regression speciﬁcation, allows
Charles and Guryan (2008) to begin to parse the type of discrimination observed. As such, as all
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and its sources, but pinpointing exactly the extent that taste based and statistical discrimination
is the underlying motive, is only possible with additional assumptions.
3.3.2 Field Experiments
A complementary approach to measuring and disentangling the nature of discrimination is to
use ﬁeld experiments. Although a very recent study thoroughly catalogues a variety of ﬁeld
experiments that test fordiscrimination in the marketplace (Riach and Rich 2002), a brief summary
of the empirical results is worthwhile to provide a useful benchmark. Labor market ﬁeld studies
present perhaps the broadest line of work in the area of discrimination. The work in this area can
be parsed into two distinct categories: personal approaches and written applications.
Personal approaches include studies that have individuals either attend job interviews or apply
for employment over the telephone. In these studies, the researcher matches two testers who are
identical along all relevant employment characteristics except the comparative static of interest
(e.g., race, gender, age). Then, after appropriate training, the testers approach potential employers
who have advertised a job opening. Researchers “train” the subjects simultaneously to ensure that
their behavior and approach to the job interview are similar.
Under the written application approach, which can be traced to Jowell and Prescott-Clarke
(1970), carefully prepared written job applications are sent to employers who have advertised
vacancies. The usual approach is to choose advertisements in daily newspapers within some
geographic area to test for discrimination. Akin to the personal approaches, great care is typically
taken to ensure that the applications are similar across several dimensions except the variable of
interest.
It is fair to say that this set of studies, including both personal and written approaches, has
provided evidence that discrimination against minorities across gender, race, and age dimensions
exists in the labor market. But due to productivity unobservables, the nature or cause of discrim-
ination is not discernible. This point is made quite starkly in Heckman and Siegelman (1993, p.
224), who note that “audit studies are crucially dependent on an unstated hypothesis: that the
distributions of unobserved (by the testers) productivity characteristics of majority and minority
worker are identical.” They further note (p. 255): “From audit studies, one cannot distinguish
variability in unobservables from discrimination.” Accordingly, while these studies provide invalu-
able insights into documenting that discrimination exists, care should be taken in making inference
about the type of discrimination observed.
Much like the labor market regression studies discussed above, the literature examining dis-
crimination in product markets has yielded important insights. Again, rather than provide a broad
summary of the received results, we point the reader to Yinger (1998) and Riach and Rich (2002),
who provide nice reviews of the product market studies.36 We would be remiss, however, not to
36The interested reader should also see the recent special Symposium issue on Discrimination in Product, Credit,
and Labor Markets that appeared in the Journal of Economic Perspectives (Spring 1998).
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One often cited, recent study is the careful work due Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), who
utilize a natural ﬁeld experiment to determine whether or not blacks are discriminated against by
employers. By sending resumes with randomly assigned white- or black-sounding names to want-
ads advertised in Boston and Chicago newspapers, Bertrand and Mullainathan ﬁnd that white
names receive 50% more callbacks for an interview than black names. This racial gap is uniform
across occupation, industry, and employer size. Additionally, whites receive greater beneﬁts to a
higher-quality resume than blacks. Although Bertrand and Mullainathan are unable to test the
type of discrimination, whether taste-based or statistical, as it is uncertain what information the
employer is utilizing from the resumes, the authors use the results to suggest an alternate theory
be considered, such as one based on lexicographic searches.
To choose names that are distinctly white-sounding or black-sounding, Bertrand and Mul-
lainathan use name frequency data calculated from birth certiﬁcates of all babies born in Massa-
chusetts between 1974 and 1979. Distinctiveness of a name is calculated as having a suﬃciently
high ratio of frequency in one racial group to that of the other racial group. The 9 most distinct
male and 9 most distinct female names for each racial group, along with corresponding white-
or black-sounding last names, are used. To verify this method of distinction, a brief survey was
conducted in Chicago asking respondents to identify each name as “White”, “African-American”,
“Other”, or “Cannot Tell.” Names that were not readily identiﬁed as white or black were discarded.
The authors sampled resumes posted more than six months prior to the start of the experiment
on two job search websites to use as a basis for experimental resumes. The resumes sampled
were restricted to people seeking employment in sales, administrative support, clerical services,
and customer service in Boston and Chicago, and were purged of the original owner’s name and
address. To minimize similarities to actual job seekers, Chicago resumes are used in Boston and
Boston resumes are used in Chicago (after names of previous employers and schools are changed
appropriately). The quality of the resumes were sorted into two groups (high and low), with
high-quality resumes having some combination of more labor market experience; fewer gaps in
employment history; being more likely to have an e-mail address, certiﬁcation degree, or foreign
language skills; or been awarded honors of some kind. Education is not varied between high- and
low-quality resumes to ensure each resume qualiﬁes for the position oﬀered, and approximately
70% of all resumes included a college degree of some kind.
Fictitious addresses were created and randomly assigned to the resumes based on real streets
in Boston and Chicago. The authors selected up to three addresses in each 5-digit zip code in
both cities using the White Pages. Virtual phone lines with voice mailboxes were assigned to
applicants in each race/sex/city/resume quality cell to track callbacks. The outgoing message for
each line was recorded by someone of the appropriate race and gender, and did not include a name.
Additionally, four e-mail addresses were created for each city, and were applied almost exclusively
to the high-quality resumes.
The ﬁeld experiment was carried out between July 2001 and January 2002 in Boston and
between July 2001 and May 2002 in Chicago. In most cases, two each of the high- and low-quality
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wanted ad in the Sunday editions of The Boston Globe and The Chicago Tribune (excluding ads
asking applicants to call or appear in person to apply). The authors logged the name and contact
information for each qualifying employer, along with information on the position advertised and
any speciﬁc requirements applicants must have. Also recorded was whether or not the ad explicitly
stated that the employer is an “Equal Opportunity Employer.”
For each ad, one high-quality resume and one low-quality resume were randomly assigned a
black-sounding name (with the remaining two resumes receiving white-sounding names). Male
and female names were randomly assigned for sales jobs, while primarily female names were
used for administrative and clerical jobs to increase the rates of callbacks. Addresses were also
randomly assigned, and appropriate phone numbers were added before formatting the resumes
(with randomly chosen fonts, layout, and cover letters) and faxing or mailing them to the employer.
A total of 4,870 resumes were sent to over 1,300 employment ads. Of these, 2,446 were of high-
quality while 2,424 were of low-quality.
Results are measured by whether a given resume elicits a callback or an e-mail back for an
interview. Resumes with white-sounding names have a 9.65% chance of receiving a callback
compared to 6.45% for black-sounding names, a 3.2 percentage point diﬀerence. This diﬀerence
can only be attributed to name manipulation. According to these results, whites are 49% (50%)
more likely to receive a callback for an interview in Chicago (Boston). This gap exists for both
males and females, with a larger, though statistically insigniﬁcant, racial gap among males in sales
occupations. An additional year of workforce experience increases the likelihood of a callback by
approximately 0.4 percentage point, thus the return to a white name is equivalent to 8 additional
years of experience. High-quality resumes receive signiﬁcantly more callbacks for whites (11%
compared to 8.5%, p = 0.0557), while blacks only see a 0.51% increase (from 6.2% to 6.7%). Whites
are favored (deﬁned as more whites than blacks being called back for a speciﬁc job opening) by 8.4%
of employers, where blacks are favored by only 3.5% of employers, a very statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerence (p = 0.0000). The remaining 88% of employers treat both races equally, with 83% of
employers contacting none of the applicants.
A probit regression of the callback dummy on resume characteristics (college degree, years
experience, volunteer experience, military experience, e-mail address, employment holes, work in
school, honors, computer skills, special skills, fraction of high school dropouts in the neighborhood,
fraction of neighborhood attending college or more, fraction of neighborhood that is white, fraction
of neighborhood that is black, and log median per capital income) is created from a random
subsample of one-third of the resumes. The remaining resumes are ranked using the estimated
coeﬃcients by predicted callback. Under this classiﬁcation, blacks do signiﬁcantly beneﬁt from
high-quality resumes, but they beneﬁt less than whites (callback rates for high versus low are 1.6
for blacks and 1.89 for whites). The presence of an e-mail address, honors, or special skills have a
positive signiﬁcant eﬀect on the likelihood of a callback. Interestingly, computer skills negatively
predict callback and employment holes positively predict callback. Additionally, there is little
systematic relationship between job requirements and the racial gap in callback.
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probability of receiving a callback, and there is no evidence that blacks beneﬁt any more than
whites from living in a whiter, more educated zip code. There is, however, a marginally signiﬁcant
positive eﬀect of employer location on black callbacks.
Of all employers, 29% state that they are “Equal Opportunity Employers” and 11% are federal
contractors, however these two groups are associated with a larger racial gap in callback. The
positive white/black gap in callbacks was found in all occupation and industry categories except
for transportation and communication. No systematic relationship between occupation earnings
and the racial gap in callback was found.
Bertrand and Mullainathan did not design their study speciﬁcally test the two theories of
discrimination, statistical and taste-based, and do not believe that either of the two can fully
explain their ﬁndings. While both models explain the average racial gap, their results do not
support animus. There is no evidence of a larger racial gap among jobs that explicitly require
communication skills and jobs for which customer or co-worker contacts are more likely to be
higher, which would be expected by theory. Further, as blacks’ credentials increase the cost of
discrimination should increase, but this doesn’t explain why blacks get relatively lower returns to
a higher-quality resume. This, combined with the uniformity of the racial gap across occupations,
casts doubt on statistical discrimination theories as well.
The authors suggest that other models may do a better job than statistical or taste models at
explaining these particular ﬁndings. For example, a lexicographic search by employers may result
in resumes being rejected as soon as they see a black name, thus experience and skills are not
rewarded because they are never seen. This theory may explain the uniformity of the race gap if
this screening process is similar across jobs. The results could also follow from employers having
coarser stereotypes for blacks. In any case, Bertrand and Mullainathan acknowledge the need for
a theory beyond statistical discrimination and taste to explain their ﬁndings in full.
Another nice example of a natural ﬁeld experiment is due to Riach and Rich (2006), who extend
the literature by using carefully matched written applications made to advertised job vacancies in
England to test for sexual discrimination in hiring. They ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant discrimination
against men in the “female occupation” and against women in the “male occupation.” This is
important evidence to begin to uncover the underlying causes for labor market discrimination.
This study is also careful to point out that it is diﬃcult to parse the underlying motivation for
why such discrimination exists. Even without such evidence, however, the paper is powerful in
that it provides a glimpse of an important phenomenon in a signiﬁcant market, and provocatively
leads to questions that need to be addressed before strong policy advice can be given.
There are a number of other studies that examine discrimination and diﬀerential earnings in
labor markets based on sexual orientation (Arabshibani et al. 2005, Weichselbaumer 2003, Berg
and Lien 2002), but like these two natural ﬁeld experiments, they also have diﬃculties parsing the
type of discrimination observed.
One might then ask, if ﬁeld experiments have similar diﬃculties as regression based methods
in parsing the nature of discrimination, why bother with this approach. Our answer is that
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discrimination observed in markets.
As a starting point, consider List (2004), who made use of several settings in a naturally-
occurring marketplace (the sports card market) to show that a series of ﬁeld experiments can
parse the two forms of discrimination. More speciﬁcally, after ﬁrst demonstrating that dealers
treat “majority” (white men) and “minority” (older white men, nonwhite men and white women)
buyers and sellers in the marketplace diﬀerently, List provides evidence suggesting that sportscard
dealers knowingly statistically discriminate. By executing a variety of ﬁeld experiments, the
evidence provided parses statistical discrimination from taste based discrimination and an agent’s
ability to bargain when interacting with a dealer. The experiments conducted by List demonstrate
a framework for potentially parsing the two forms of discrimination which could be utilized and
moved forward to inform discrimination discussions in other markets.
The ﬁrst experiment discussed in List (2004) is similar to an audit study in that dealers are
approached by buyers from both majority and minority groups with an oﬀer of buying or selling
a sportscard (unlike most audit studies, the subjects do not know that they are part of a study
on discrimination, just that it’s an economic study). The results from this ﬁrst experiment are
highly suggestive that dealers base oﬀers on group membership: buyers in the minority groups
of white women and older white men received initial oﬀers that were 10-13% greater than white
male buyers when buying cards and minority groups received 30% lower initial oﬀers when selling
their cards.
Further, this initial framed ﬁeld experiment shows that the gap between minority and majority
subjects’ oﬀers remain from the initial to ﬁnal oﬀers for inexperienced subjects but to a large part
converges for subjects with experience. But, this convergence comes at a cost of time: subjects in
the minority group having to invest a signiﬁcantly larger portion of time to achieve better ﬁnal
oﬀers.
This result provides support for non-taste based discrimination due to the convergence of the
gap in oﬀers through bargaining, a result that would not hold under a theory of taste based
discrimination where the dealer would simply hold to one price. Finally, by surveying dealers in
addition to subjects that were buying and selling, List controls for dealer experience in the market-
place and ﬁnds a positive relationship between dealer experience and discrimination as measured
by the diﬀerence between a dealer’s average majority and average minority oﬀers. Suggesting
that statistical discrimination may be evident unless one believes that taste based discrimination
increases with experience as a dealer at sportscard shows.
Although this initial experiment can measure discrimination, more treatments are necessary to
parse statistical discrimination from alternative explanations. In total, List runs four experiments
in addition to the framed ﬁeld experiment described in the previous paragraph: (i) a dictator
game artefactual ﬁeld experiment with dealers as the dictator and four descriptions as the receiver:
white men, non-white men, white women and white mature men; (ii) two framed ﬁeld experiment
treatments that are bilateral exchange markets with dealers selling to agents with randomly drawn
reservations values, where in one market dealers know that the reservation value is random and in a
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(iv) a framed ﬁeld experimental game designed to determine dealers’ perceptions of the reservation
value distributions of sportscard market participants. Each additional experiment helps parse the
two forms of discrimination and the bargaining ability of the subjects and the results of all the
experiments are necessary for List to suggest that dealers knowingly statistically discriminate.
First, the relatively uniform oﬀers made to receivers across majority and minority groups in
the dictator game suggests that dealers do not display taste based discrimination, at least in
artefactual ﬁeld experiments. Second, through the bilateral exchange markets, three results are
found which each point towards statistical discrimination by testing hypotheses drawn directly
from the theories of taste based and statistical discrimination. First, experienced dealers are
found to lose less surplus than inexperienced dealers. Second, minority and majority buyers
perform similarly with the randomly set reservation prices but not in the treatment where dealers
think that reservation values are ‘homegrown values.’ Finally, experienced dealers perform worse
when it is ambiguous whether the reservation value is drawn randomly — suggesting that they
are utilizing inferences which are not performing well (i.e. their statistical discrimination rubric
fails due to the randomly set reservation value). These two additional experiments point toward
statistical discrimination.
Yet, it is only through the ﬁnal two experiments that suﬃcient evidence is provided for statisti-
cal discrimination through a discovery of a variation in reservation value distributions of sportscard
market participants and dealer knowledge of the variation. The results from the Vickery second
price auction are used for two purposes: (i) to determine whether the reservation value distri-
butions of the majority and minatory are indeed diﬀerent and (ii) to provide distributions to
determine the dealers’ abilities to accurately assign distributions in the ﬁnal experimental game.
The results from the Vickery auction do show that the reservation values for the minority group
have a larger variance than the reservation values for the majority group, suggesting that statisti-
cal discrimination could be utilized for proﬁt maximization–see the above model. Further, when
diﬀerent reservation value distributions are shown to dealers in the ﬁnal experiment, a majority
of all dealers are able to determine which distributions are from which groups and experienced
dealers are able to correctly assign distributions more often than inexperienced dealers.
Although List focuses on a market that every consumer does not necessarily approach, the
framework of multiple ﬁeld experiments to move towards identifying the form of statistical dis-
crimination is one that should be considered for use elsewhere. Most importantly, this study
highlights that a series of ﬁeld experiments can be used to uncover the causes and underlying
conditions necessary to produce data patterns observed in the lab or in uncontrolled ﬁeld data.
This study shows highlights that a deeper economic understanding is possible by taking ad-
vantage of the myriad settings in which economic phenomena present themselves. In this case,
ﬁeld experimentation in a small-scale ﬁeld setting is quite useful in developing a ﬁrst understand-
ing when observational data is limited or experimentation in more “important” markets is not
possible. Yet, it is important to extend this sort of analysis to more distant domains.
This is exactly what is oﬀered in Gneezy and List (2010), who explore the incidence of discrim-
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automobile repair market. This study uses a traditional audit study, but combines it with a speciﬁc
ﬁeld experimental treatment to allow the authors to parse the type of discrimination observed.
The audit portion of the study was standard: the assignment given to subjects is clear: ap-
proach body shop j to receive a price quote to ﬁx automobile i. The authors included subjects
from two distinct groups–disabled white males age 29-45 and non-disabled white males age 29-
45–who each visited six body shops. The disabled subjects in this experiment were all conﬁned to
a wheelchair and drove a specialized vehicle. All of the automobiles, which were personally owned
by our disabled subjects, had visible body problems. Importantly, both testers in any given pair
approached body shops with the identical car.
The authors ﬁnd that overall, the disabled received considerably higher average price quotes,
$1,425, than the non-disabled, $1,212. Inference as to why this disparate treatment exists, of
course, is an open issue. Several clues provide potential factors at work: (i) access–many body
shops are not easily approachable via wheelchairs; this considerably restricts the set of price oﬀers
the disabled can receive; and (ii) time–while the non-disabled can easily park and proceed to
the front desk, the process is much more complex for the disabled. First, he must ﬁnd a suitable
parking place: it is very uncommon to have designated places for the disabled in body shops. As
a result, the disabled must have special parking which permits the use of a wheelchair. Moreover,
it must be a space that will be unoccupied when he returns to pick up the repaired vehicle. After
ﬁnding an appropriate parking space, the disabled must commit much more eﬀort and time to
approach the service desk. An additional related problem which makes the expected search cost
higher for the disabled person is that in some cases it is necessary to leave the car for the day in
order to obtain a price quote. Using a taxi is much more complex for the disabled than for the
non-disabled.
To investigate the search cost explanation further, the authors obtained data on search eﬀort at
the tester level and perceived search eﬀort at the body shop level to examine if realizations of these
variables are consistent with the pattern of discrimination observed. From this survey, the authors
ﬁnd that the non-disabled typically consult far fewer body shops: on average, the non-disabled
visit 3.5 diﬀerent mechanics whereas the disabled visit only 1.67 mechanics, a diﬀerence that is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. Concerning the supply side, the authors asked body shops questions revolving
around body shop perceptions of the degree of search among the disabled and non-disabled. The
results are consonant with the consumer-side statements observed above: the disabled are believed
to approach 1.85 body shops for price quotes while the non-disabled are expected to approach 2.85,
a diﬀerence of more than 50 percent and one that is signiﬁcant. This evidence is consistent with
statistical discrimination based on mechanics’ beliefs about relative search costs and how they
map into reservation value distributions. Yet, the survey evidence alone is only suggestive and
further investigation is necessary to pinpoint the underlying mechanism at work.
For these purposes, the authors provide a sharper focus on the underlying reason for discrim-
ination by running a complementary ﬁeld experiment. In this experiment, the authors not only
replicated the initial results, with new testers and new vehicles in need of repair, but in another
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ting a few price quotes” when inquiring about the damage repair estimate. If diﬀerential search
costs cause discrimination, then the authors should observe the oﬀer discrepancies disappearing
in this treatment.
This is exactly the result they observe. Although in the replication treatment the disabled
continued to receive higher asks, when both agent types noted that they were “getting a few price
quotes,” the disabled agents were able to secure oﬀers that were not statistically distinguishable
from the oﬀers received by the non-disabled. We provide support of this insight in Figure 8,
which highlights the discrepancies observed when search is believed to be heterogeneous across
the disabled and non-disabled. In this case, the ﬁrst two bars show that the diﬀerences are nearly
20%. Yet when both agents clearly signal that this particular mechanic visit is just one part of
their entire search process, these disparities are attenuated and indeed change signs.
[Figure 8: Gneezy and List Disability Study]
While these two examples are not directly related to labor market outcomes, they display the
power of the ﬁeld experimental method to test important theories within labor economics, and
especially the theories of discrimination discussed earlier. In this regard, we believe that similar
treatments can be carried out in labor markets to explore wage diﬀerences, job oﬀer diﬀerences,
and other labor market outcomes.
4 Firms
In the third stage of the life cycle, most individuals work within ﬁrms or some other hierarchical
organization. In this section we describe how ﬁeld experiments have contributed to knowledge
on how workers and employees behave in such settings. Following the research areas described
in Tables 2 and 3, we frame our discussion on the following research themes: (i) the eﬀects on
monetary incentives on worker behavior; (ii) the interplay between monetary and non-monetary
incentives; (iii) aspects of the employment relationship, such as gift-exchange between employers
and employees, and the link between employer monitoring and employee shirking behavior.37,38
37The ﬁeld experiment approach shares many of the characteristics of the insider econometrics approach to
understand the causes and consequences of behavior within ﬁrm (Ichniowski and Shaw 2008). However a key
distinction is that ﬁeld experiments explicitly rely on exogenous variation created with the speciﬁc inﬂuence of
researchers in order to identify causal eﬀects. Clearly, not every intervention that a researcher could design and
implement is socially useful — there is little value added in implementing practices that ﬁrms are never otherwise
observed engaging in. However, this does not preclude the fact that carefully designed interventions can help
researchers to uncover causal relations and the mechanisms behind them.
38Our discussion focuses predominantly on natural ﬁeld experiments within ﬁrms. There also exists a separate
branch of artefactual ﬁeld experiments where subject pools are drawn from manufacturing workers (Barr and
Serneels 2007), ﬁshermen (Carpenter and Seki 2010) and employees in large ﬁrms (Charness and Villeval 2009).
594.1 Monetary Incentives
A core principle in economics is that incentives matter. The role of monetary incentives within
ﬁrms and organizations has been long studied in sociology and management literatures. With
the application of contract theory to behavior within ﬁrms (Hart and Holmstrom 1987) and the
development of personnel economics (Lazear 1995), such questions are now integrated within
mainstream labor economics. For economists, the basic questions have been: (i) how do workers
respond to a given set of incentives?; (ii) what are the optimal set of incentives an employer should
provide?39
An earlier generation of empirical studies exploited ﬁrm’s personnel data to measure the pro-
ductivity eﬀects of compensation schemes on individual workers. An econometric challenge facing
these studies is that observed incentive contracts might well be endogenous to ﬁrm’s performance
(Prendergast 1999, Chiappori and Salanie 2003). In other words, identifying causal eﬀects of in-
centives on behavior is confounded by the presence of unobservables, such as managerial practices,
that determine both which compensation schemes are chosen, and worker productivity. In earlier
research this concern has been addressed in between ﬁrm studies using instrumental variables
approaches (Groves et al. 1994). However, this concern applies even if such eﬀects are identiﬁed
from a within worker or within ﬁrm comparison as incentives change over time (Jones and Kato
1995, Ichniowski et al. 1997, Paarsch and Shearer 1999, 2000, Lazear 2000). A related concern is
that such changes in incentives might be reﬂective of a wider package of changes in management
practices. Hence, akin to social experiments, what is actually being evaluated is potentially the
sum total of many concomitant changes in the ﬁrm’s organization rather than an isolated change
in worker incentives all else equal. This is of particular concern given the view that there exist
complementarities between organizational practices so that ﬁrms are better oﬀ choosing a package
of practices rather than in isolation (Milgrom and Roberts 1990, Ichniowski et al. 1997). With
such multiple underlying changes, mapping the evidence, however cleanly identiﬁed is the change
in behavior, to any underlying theory is less clear cut.40
Field experiments introduce exogenously timed variation in incentive structures that are or-
thogonal to other management practices. This opens up the possibility to identify the causal
impact of monetary incentives on the behavior of individual workers, and on ﬁrm performance
as a whole. Combining personnel ﬁles from human resource departments within the ﬁrm, with
primary data collection that is inherent in ﬁeld experimentation, allows researchers to examine
39Many of the wider literature related to the research questions we touch upon, such as incentive pay and
teams, are discussed in greater detail in the Chapter on Human Resource Management by Bloom and Van Reenen
(2010), also in this Handbook. They summarize the evidence from across countries showing the increasing use of
performance pay over time. In the Chapter on Personnel Economics in this Volume by Oyer and Schaeﬀer (2010),
further issues related to incentive pay and ﬁrm hires is discussed at greater length.
40Due to these empirical challenges, it is not surprising that much of the early evidence testing theories in per-
sonnel economics originated from laboratory environments. For example, Bull et al. (1987) provide evidence from
the lab on the predictions of rank order tournament theory; Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) review the experimental
evidence on social preferences in workplace environments. The wider availability of personnel data and ever closer
links being forged between researchers and ﬁrms has allowed the literature in ﬁeld experiments within ﬁrms to
ﬂourish.
60the eﬀect of monetary incentives on a range of margins of worker behavior, capturing both the
intended and unintended consequences of incentive provision.
There are good theoretical reasons for collecting such extensive information on worker behaviors
when evaluating the response to incentives. For example, multi-tasking theory suggests that when
monetary incentives are provided based on a subset of tasks that the ﬁrm can directly measure
performance in, workers may reallocate their eﬀort away from other tasks they are engaged in,
their employer is aﬀected by, but their compensation is not based on (Holmstrom and Milgrom
1991). Similarly, if the provision of incentives alters the distribution of pay across workers in the
same tier of the ﬁrm hierarchy, this might alter worker’s behavior towards co-workers, say through
cooperation or sabotage (Lazear 1989). Finally, there might be ways in which workers can game
against any incentive scheme. All such unintended consequences of monetary incentives need to
be accounted for to both accurately understand how workers respond to incentives and to begin
to think through the optimal incentive design.41
Employers might not collect such information ex ante. Hence the need to engage in primary
data collection eﬀorts to complement the rich information available in ﬁrm’s personnel ﬁles. Field
experiments — that involve close cooperation between researchers and ﬁrm management — are well
placed to advance in this direction. Ultimately, as witnessed in some of the ﬁeld experiments
described below, this allows a closer mapping between the evidence and underlying theory, and to
draw implications for optimal incentive provision.
4.1.1 Theoretical Framework
To understand some of the theoretical questions and empirical challenges faced in this literature, it
is instructive to ﬁrst reconsider Lazear’s (2000) original analysis of the Safelite Glass Corporation,
a large auto-glass ﬁrm in which the primary task of worker’s at the bottom-tier of the ﬁrm’s
hierarchy is to install automobile windshields. Lazear used non-experimental methods to estimate
the productivity eﬀects of the ﬁrm moving from a compensation scheme in which workers were
paid and hourly wage scheme, to one in which they were paid a piece rate for each windshield
installed, with a minimum guarantee. This pioneering work brings to the fore many of the issues
that have inﬂuenced all the subsequent literature, and allows us to highlight the speciﬁc issues
that ﬁeld experiments help address.
The model is as follows. Worker’s utility depends on income Y and eﬀort e, U(Y,e) with
U1 > 0, U2 < 0.42 Worker’s output q depends on eﬀort and her ability, θ, so q = q(e,θ) with
output assumed to be observable and q1, q2 > 0. For any given output q0, there is a unique eﬀort
41Charness and Kuhn (2010) review the extensive evidence from laboratory settings on sabotage.
42There is a long-standing idea in psychology that rewards may hinder performance (Kruglanski 1978, Deci et
al. 1999). There is some evidence on this from laboratory settings where oﬀering small amounts of monetary
compensation is found to decrease eﬀort relative to paying nothing (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000), and where
explicit incentives sometimes result in worse compliance than incomplete labor contracts (Fehr and Falk 1999, Fehr
and Scmidt 2000). This might either be because small monetary incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation, an idea
formalized by Benabou and Tirole (2000), or because the individual is reluctant to signal his willingness to accept
low wages. We do not know of ﬁeld evidence that examines such non-monotonic eﬀects of monetary incentives on
eﬀort.
61level that achieves this, denoted e0(θ). It is then straightforward to see that ∂e
∂θ = −
q2
q1 < 0 so
that higher ability workers need exert less eﬀort to achieve a given output. If workers choose
not to work at any ﬁrm, their outside option from leisure is denoted U(0,0). Hence the lowest
ability worker that would accept employment at a ﬁrm with a required output level and wage W,
is denoted θ0 and is such that,
U(W,e0(θ0)) = U(0,0). (27)
All workers of higher ability earn rents from employment over leisure. Similarly, suppose a worker
of a given ability could take up employment at another ﬁrm oﬀering a wage-minimum eﬀort pair
(  W,  e). Hence with inter-ﬁrm competition there might exist an upper cutoﬀ in ability, θh, such
that,
U(W,e0(θh)) = U(  W(θh),  e(θh)), (28)
where workers of ability higher than θh prefer to take the alternative employment contract.
This framework makes clear that incentive structures will aﬀect two types of behavior, an
idea developed in more detail in Lazear (2005). First, there will be change in eﬀort e exerted by
individual workers in response to monetary incentives. This is referred to as the ‘incentive eﬀect’.
Second, the compensation scheme will induce a diﬀerential composition of workers within the ﬁrm
over time. Some workers will prefer to join this ﬁrm from other employers. These changes in
workforce composition can be thought of as the ‘selection eﬀect’ of monetary incentives.
The incentive eﬀect can be easily understood graphically. Figure 9 shows the relationship
between output, q, and compensation for the two schemes relevant for Lazear’s study: (i) a ﬁxed
hourly wage subject to a minimum output requirement q0, resulting in total compensation W; (ii)
a linear piece rate scheme bq −K with a minimum guarantee of W. As Figure 9 shows, for output
levels between q0 and q∗ the worker receives W under both compensation schemes, and for output
higher than q∗ earns strictly more under the piece rate scheme.43
[Figure 9: Compensation Before and After At Safelite]
On the incentive eﬀect, the model makes clear that moving from the ﬁxed hourly wage scheme
to the piece rate scheme does not cause the output of any individual to fall, and causes average
output to rise. Low ability workers, indicated with a solid indiﬀerence curve in Figure 9, remain
indiﬀerent between the two schemes and would produce output q0 at point A under both. Higher
ability workers, indicated with a dashed indiﬀerence curve in Figure 9, would prefer to increase
their eﬀort and move to point B. This is because the piece rate scheme allows higher ability workers
to raise their utility through increased compensation that more than oﬀsets any increase in their
eﬀort. As a result, the dispersion in worker eﬀort and output rises as long as there is at least one
worker that chooses to produce more than q∗.44
43Firms typically provide workers some insurance by allowing their output to occasionally fall below the required
minimum q∗, but a worker that consistently fails to meet this performance threshold is likely to be ﬁred or assigned
to another task.
44Whether workers exert more or less eﬀort in response to a higher piece rate b of course depends on the balance
62On the selection eﬀect, under plausible conditions, the average ability of workers rises with the
move to piece rates. This is because low ability individuals remain indiﬀerent between working
for this ﬁrm under either incentive scheme. If they were willing to work for the ﬁrm under the
ﬁxed wage scheme, they should remain willing to do so under piece rates all else equal. On the
other hand, high ability workers might be attracted to this form from other ﬁrms that for example,
have higher minimum output standards or pay piece rates but at a lower rate b. In short, theory
predicts that there should be no change in the number of low ability workers who are willing to
work at the ﬁrm, but that piece rates attract high ability workers so the right tail of the ability
distribution in the ﬁrm should thicken.
As described in more detail below, existing ﬁeld experiments have focused on identifying the
incentive eﬀects, and the research designs used have been less amenable pin down these types of
selection eﬀect. Yet it is important to emphasize the need for future research to provide credible
research designs to uncover both eﬀects.45
In Lazear’s study, he documents the total eﬀect of the change in monetary incentives to workers
was around a 44%increase in worker productivity, deﬁned to be the number of windshields installed
by the worker per eight hour day. Around half the increase was due to incentive eﬀects, namely a
change in eﬀort of the same worker as he moved from a ﬁxed hourly wage to a piece rate scheme.
However, the other half was entirely due to the selection eﬀect, namely productivity changes due
to endogenous changes in the composition of workers in response to change in monetary incentives.
A legacy of Lazear’s study is to show that both motives likely underlie why ﬁrms choose to alter
their output based incentive structures in the ﬁrst place. A carefully crafted ﬁeld experiment that
begins to measure whether and how the compensation policies of a given ﬁrm have such spillover
eﬀects on other ﬁrms that compete for similar workers, would open up a rich research agenda tieing
together the study of within-ﬁrm compensation policies on equilibrium wage-setting behavior in
labor markets.46
Linking to the Design of Field Experiments
The model provides a series of implications that have impinged on the ﬁrst generation of ﬁeld
experiments over the last decade. First, given worker heterogeneity, changes in compensation
scheme will nearly always aﬀect average eﬀort and output, as well as the dispersion of eﬀort and
of income and substitution eﬀects. Evidence from the lab and ﬁeld in Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) suggested
that the relationship between piece rates and eﬀort was U-shaped with low piece rates eliciting less eﬀort than a
zero piece rate. One explanation would be that small levels of ﬁnancial compensation crowd out workers’ intrinsic
motivation to exert eﬀort.
45Laboratory experiments have begun to explore in more detail the selection eﬀects of incentives (Dohmen and
Falk 2006, Cadsby et al. 2007, Vandegrift et al. 2007, Niederle and Vesterlund 2007, Eriksson et al. 2008). These
studies are described in more detail in Charness and Kuhn (2010).
46This links together with recent development in structural estimation of search and matching models in labor
markets. For example, Cahuc et al. (2006) develop and estimate an equilibrium model with strategic wage
bargaining and on-the-job search. An important innovation on their paper is that when an employed worker
receives an outside job oﬀer, a three-player bargaining process is started between the worker, her/his initial employer
and the employer which made the outside oﬀer. They use the model to examine wage determination in France
using matched employer-employee data from 1993 to 2000. They ﬁnd that inter-ﬁrm competition is quantitatively
important for wage determination, and raising wages above reservation levels.
63output. Given the linkage between performance and pay, this inevitably results in changes in the
distribution of earnings across workers at the same tier of the ﬁrm hierarchy. Hence linking pay
to performance might have unintended negative consequences on worker and ﬁrm performance as
a result of such increased earnings inequality. This might manifest itself in the form of workers
reducing cooperation with co-workers (Baron and Pfeﬀer 1994, Bewley 1999, Lazear 1989), work-
ers sabotaging the performance of others, or workers being directly worse oﬀ in utility terms, all
else equal, as a result of them being structurally averse to pay inequality (Fehr and Schmidt 1999,
Charness and Rabin 2002). Field experiments are particularly adept at detecting and quantifying
such unintended consequences because researchers are engaged in primary data collection, and the
ﬁrm would have no incentive to collect such information ex ante as part of its personnel ﬁles, espe-
cially in pay for performance type compensation schemes have not been previously implemented.
Some of the ﬁeld experiments described below have collected qualitative evidence from workers to
explore these channels, in additional to using personnel ﬁles to measure the direct productivity
eﬀects of incentives.
Second, given the selection eﬀect of monetary incentives, there is inevitably a change in workers’
peer group over time. The composition of peers, or their social ties with each other, play no role
in the standard neoclassical model in which worker preferences are only deﬁned over their own
income and eﬀort. There are good reasons to probe this assumption in the ﬁeld. First, if peer
eﬀects determine workplace behavior because they alter the marginal return to worker’s eﬀort, then
understanding how workers respond to changes in monetary incentives requires an understanding
of the mechanisms underlying such peer eﬀects. Second, extending the neoclassical model to take
into account such peer eﬀects or social concerns, as has been down in Kandel and Lazear (1992),
Lazear (1989), Rotemberg (1994) and Fershtman et al. (2003), has implications for many aspects
of ﬁrm behavior including the optimal design of incentives. Such concerns are a recurring them in
the series of natural ﬁeld experiments conducted by Bandiera et al. that are described below.
Third, the model highlights that under ﬁxed hourly wage schemes, there should not be much
heterogeneity in workers output or eﬀort, despite workers being heterogeneous in ability. This does
not ﬁt the evidence very well. For example, in Lazear’s study there was considerable dispersion in
worker productivity even under the ﬁxed hourly wage scheme. To better explain behavior in ﬁxed
wage settings, theory suggests workers might respond to other forms of non-monetary or implicit
incentives, such as gift-exchange motives where workers exert more eﬀort in response to employers
paying higher than market clearing wages, the ability to shirk (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984, Macleod
and Malcolmson 1989), or promotion prospects and career concerns (Dewatripont et al. 1999).
Such mechanisms might also predict how workers sort across ﬁrms (Stiglitz 1975). Some of these
aspects are highlighted by the ﬁeld experiments discussed below on the employment relationship.
Fourth, the model implies that low ability workers should not leave the ﬁrm with the move to
piece rates. If they were willing to work for the ﬁrm under the ﬁxed wage scheme, they should
remain willing to do so under piece rates all else equal. On the other hand, given output diﬀerences
among workers under price rates, management can more easily identify low ability workers when
pay is tied to their performance. Over a longer time period, this might lead to them being ﬁred.
64This type of selection eﬀect caused by employer learning the true ability of workers, has not been
studied by ﬁeld experiments.47
Finally, given worker heterogeneity, the ﬁrst best for the ﬁrm would be to set a worker speciﬁc
piece rate, bi. This would be chosen to equate the marginal beneﬁt of eﬀort to its marginal
cost. However, we generally observe ﬁrms being constrained to oﬀer bottom-tier workers the same
compensation scheme. This may be because of legal, technological or informational constraints
(Lazear 1989, Bewley 1999, Encinosa et al. 1997, Fehr et al. 2004). To overcome this, one
hypothesis is that ﬁrms can get closer to this ﬁrst best by linking managers’ pay to the ﬁrm’s
performance. Managers then have greater incentives to target their eﬀort to speciﬁc workers, and
from the worker’s point of view it is then as if they face an individual speciﬁc incentive scheme.
This idea is developed in the natural ﬁeld experiment by Bandiera et al. (2007) described below,
which then links managerial incentives to pay inequality among workers.
4.1.2 Evidence From the Field
In the decade following the wave of studies using personnel data and insider econometrics to
understand responses to monetary incentives (Ichniowski and Shaw 2008), ﬁeld experiments have
begun to exploiting exogenous and randomly timed variation in compensation pay to both reinforce
these existing results using non-experimental methods, as well as providing new insights.
Among the ﬁrst of these studies was Shearer’s (2004) natural ﬁeld experiment, designed to
estimate the productivity gains moving from a piece rate to a ﬁxed wage scheme for tree planters
in British Columbia, Canada. In contrast to Lazear (2000), this setting is one in which tree planters
are usually paid a piece rate with no guaranteed minimum, and ﬁxed wages are rarely used ex ante.
Workers were randomly assigned at the start of a work day, to plant under one of the incentive
schemes. Hence a within worker comparison can be exploited to estimate the incentive eﬀects. To
reduce the likelihood of this comparison confounding other eﬀects unrelated to the compensation
schemes in place, work took place on ﬁelds of similar conditions, and there was a constant length
of the work day. The incentive eﬀect estimate is then based on a total of 120 observations on
daily worker productivity, 60 under each scheme. The relatively small sample size — nine male
workers were randomly selected from the ﬁrm — reﬂects the diﬃculty researchers initially faced in
real world settings in convincing ﬁrms to randomly assign individuals to alternative compensation
schemes. As more ﬁeld experiments are conducted, some of these constraints are being eased.
For example, some of the ﬁeld experiments described below are based on data on hundreds of
workers.48
Shearer’s ﬁeld experiment reveals the incentive eﬀect of having a piece rate rather than a
47A related concern has been on the existence of rachet eﬀects in response to pay for performance (Gibbons
1987), whereby workers deliberately underperform to keep the piece rate high. Such ratchet concerns have been
documented in ﬁrms where productivity shocks are uncommon such as shoe making (Freeman and Kleiner 2005)
and bricklaying (Roy 1952). Cooper at al. (1999) present evidence from an artefactual ﬁeld experiment on Chinese
students and managers on such ratchet concerns, that might be of particular concern in planned economies.
48The small sample size used in Shearer (2004) also reﬂects the nature of tree planting ﬁrms. They typically
employ less than 100 planters.
65ﬁxed wage compensation schemes to be a 20% productivity increase. The magnitude of this
is comparable to Lazear’s (2000) ﬁndings — moving from a ﬁxed wage scheme — based on non-
experimental data, although this is wholly by chance There is no reason a priori to expect the
behavioral response of workers to these two incentive schemes to be of the same magnitude given
the very diﬀerent types of worker involved, nature of the production function, and that the piece
rate b was not the same across settings. In line with theory, Shearer ﬁnds the standard deviation
of output across workers was higher under piece rates. Overall, it was found that unit costs under
piece rates were around 13% lower than under ﬁxed wages.
To shed more light on how workers would have responded in a slightly diﬀerent environment
and to alternative compensation schemes, Shearer then develops and estimates a structural model.
In terms of altering the economic environment, the structural model is used to shed slight on what
would have been the productivity gains if management was imperfectly informed about planting
conditions. This yields comparable estimates of the productivity gains of moving to pierce rates.
To shed light on alternative compensation schemes, Shearer explores how workers would have
responded to an eﬃciency wage scheme. The eﬃciency wage that would induce eﬀort levels equal
to those observed under ﬁxed wages in the ﬁeld experiment,is calculated and its implied unit costs
are compared with those achieved under piece rates. This exercise suggests that ﬁxed wages would
lead to a 2.7% increase in unit costs relative to piece rates.
Shearer (2004) uses a close to best practice methodology in combining estimates from a ﬁeld
experiment with structural modelling within the same setting. This combination, following from
discussions in Heckman and Smith (1995) and Keane and Wolpin (1997), ﬁrst identiﬁes the exis-
tence and magnitude of important causal eﬀects using reduced form evidence. To then move away
from such black-box ﬁndings, the researcher then uses structural modelling to posit an underlying
behavioral mechanism behind the eﬀects, assess the sensitivity of the estimates to slight alterations
in the economic environment, and to make headway in understanding the optimal compensation
structure. Of course, the validity of the structural model can itself be tested by exploring whether
it predicts the responses observed to the exogenous variation engineered by the ﬁeld experiment.
Another example of how ﬁeld experiments can and should learn from other methodologies is at
the heart of the natural ﬁeld experiment of Hossain and List (2009). They use theoretical insights
on framing eﬀects from behavioral economics that have previously found empirical support in
laboratory experiments (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Thaler 1980, Samuelson and Zeckhauser
1988, Ellingsen and Johannesson 2008), to see if in the ﬁeld, framing manipulations aﬀect worker
responses to bonus incentives. Their setting is a high tech Chinese ﬁrm producing consumer
electronics, where workers are organized into both individual and team production. They ﬁnd that
bonuses framed as both ‘losses’ and ‘gains’ increase productivity, for both individuals and teams.
Teams respond more to bonuses posed as losses than as comparable bonuses posed as gains. The
comparable eﬀects for individuals are of the same sign but are not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
to each other. Team productivity is enhanced by 1% purely due to the framing manipulation.
Neither the framing nor the incentive eﬀect lose their importance over the six month study period.
Nor are there any detrimental eﬀects on the quality of work as measured by product defect rates.
66On a practical note, the results highlight that conditional on bonuses being provided, framing
matters for matters, and as framing can be adjusted almost costlessly, there are simply ways in
which ﬁrms can further enhance productivity responses to monetary incentives. Theoretically,
these results from the ﬁeld provide an example of the prevalence of loss aversion in a natural labor
market setting. As such the results provide external validity to laboratory evidence, and should be
seen to provide a strong argument in favor of ﬁeld and laboratory experiments being complements,
not substitutes.
4.2 Non-Monetary Incentives
Organizations use a variety of non-pecuniary based incentives to motivate their employees. We
discuss three forms of non-monetary incentive: status goods, feedback, and social incentives.49
Under status incentive schemes, employees are given some positional good, such as an ‘employee
of the month’ job title. The notion that individuals crave status has been long studied (Veblen
1934, Friedman and Savage 1948, Duesenberry 1949, Frank 1985) and more recently formalized
in the context of organizations providing status incentives in Moldavanu et al. (2007) and Besley
and Ghatak (2008). They emphasize that for status incentives to be eﬀective, the positional good
must be valued by employees, it must be scarce, and its allocation rule rewards the deserving.
Recent evidence on these eﬀects have been found in laboratory settings (Ball et. al 2001,
Brown et al. 2007) but few ﬁeld experiments in which researchers have worked closely with a ﬁrm
to exogenously vary such status rewards. One exception is Greenberg (1988), who reports results
from a ﬁeld experiment based on 198 employees in the underwriting department of a large insurance
company. These employees were randomly assigned on a temporary basis to the oﬃces of either
higher, lower, or equal-status co-workers while their own oﬃces were being refurbished. Relative
to those workers reassigned to equal-status oﬃces, those reassigned to higher status oﬃces raised
their performance, and those reassigned to higher status oﬃces lowered their performance. The
size of these performance changes were directly related to the magnitude of the status changes
encountered. The results are interpreted as providing real world evidence on equity theory for
non-monetary rewards.
In the future, we envisage ﬁeld experiments being designed that randomly vary the ﬁrst two
margins on eﬀective status incentives described above: how valued the positional good is, and its
scarcity. In contrast, a ﬁeld experiment that randomly allocated such positional goods might not
be as informative, unless it was clearly related to some reallocation that would have occurred in
any case, such as in Greenberg’s clever study described above. Otherwise, such random allocations
would not be representative of the kinds of allocation rule employers actually use, and so cloud
the interpretation of any such results.50
49This list is not meant to be exhaustive. We focus on these because ﬁeld experiments have provided insights
on these margins to a greater extent than for other types of non-monetary incentive such as those discussed in
Francois (2000), Dixit (2001), Prendergast (2001), Benabou and Tirole (2003), Seabright (2003), Delfgaauw and
Dur (2004), Akerlof and Kranton (2005), and Besley and Ghatak (2005).
50There are ﬁeld experiments on charitable giving that have exogenously varied the visibility of donations to
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While there is a long tradition in psychology on feedback eﬀects (Thorndike 1913), economists
have only recently begun to investigate its causes and consequences. Much of this research has
focused on the theory of optimal feedback provision as mid-term reviews (Lizzeri et al. 2002,
Ederer 2008). Theory indicates that feedback on past performance can aﬀect current performance
either directly if past and current performances are substitutes or complements in the agent’s
utility function, labelled a preference eﬀect, or indirectly by revealing information on the marginal
return to current eﬀort, labelled a signaling eﬀect.51 The direct preference eﬀect is relevant if, for
instance, agents are compensated according to a performance target or ﬁxed bonus scheme, so that
being informed of high levels of past performance induces the agent to reduce her current eﬀort
relative to her past eﬀort, and still meet her overall performance target. The indirect signaling
eﬀect is relevant if, for instance, the agent’s marginal return to eﬀort depends on her ability and
this would be unknown if feedback were not provided.52
Both these mechanisms imply the eﬀect of feedback is heterogeneous across individuals and
it might increase or reduce current eﬀort, so the socially optimal provision of feedback remains
ambiguous. Research in psychology also suggests feedback eﬀects are heterogeneous and may
crowd in or crowd out intrinsic motivation (Butler 1987, Deci et al. 2001). Consistent with
such heterogeneous eﬀects, the organizational behavior literature ﬁnds that performance feedback
within ﬁrms is far from ubiquitous (Meyer et al. 1965, Beer 1987, Gibbs 1991).53
While there is a growing empirical literature on the eﬀect of feedback in laboratory settings
(Erikkson et al. 2008), and in natural experiments (Bandiera et al. 2009, Azhmat and Irriberri
2009, Blanes-i-Vidal and Nossol 2009), evidence from ﬁeld settings remains scarce. Bandiera et
al. (2009) provide one such analysis, in which the focus is on the provision of feedback to teams.
This study is described in detail below.54
assess whether such status concerns or prestige motives drive giving behavior Soetevent (2005), something that has
been found to be the case in laboratory settings of public goods games (Andreoni and Petrie 2004, Rege and Telle
2004). Echoing some of the results below on gift-exchange in the ﬁeld and the lab, Soetevent (2005) ﬁnds evidence
that for some times of charitable cause, contributions increase when they can be socially recognized, but that this
eﬀect diminishes over time.
51The organizational behavior and psychology literatures have also emphasized the signaling eﬀects of feedback,
as well as other related comparative statics such as how individuals change strategies in response to feedback
(Vollmeyer and Rheinberg 2005), and the speciﬁc type of information that should be conveyed in feedback (Butler
1987, Cameron and Pierce 1994).
52Two strands of the economics literature have explored aspects of the signaling eﬀect of feedback. The ﬁrst
strand focuses on whether individuals update their priors in response to feedback consistent with Bayes’ rule (Slovic
and Lichtenstein 1971). The second strand focuses on whether agents react more to positive than negative feedback
because of self serving biases such as conﬁrmatory bias (Rabin and Schrag 1999), or overconﬁdence (Malmendier
and Tate 2002, van den Steen 2004).
53On the heterogeneous eﬀects of feedback, the meta-analysis of Kluger and DeNisi (1996) covering 131 studies
in psychology with 13,000 subjects ﬁnds that two thirds of studies report positive feedback eﬀects. On the optimal
provision of feedback, when the agent knows her ability so that there is no indirect signaling eﬀect of feedback,
whether feedback should be optimally provided or not is sensitive to the speciﬁcation of the agent’s cost of eﬀort
function (Lizzeri et al. 2002, Aoyagi 2007). More general results have been derived when agents learn their ability
through feedback and ability is complementary to eﬀort (Ederer 2008).
54A separate branch of the literature has focused on the strategic manipulation of feedback by the principal
(Malcolmson 1984, Gibbs 1991, Aoyagi 2007), of which there is anecdotal evidence from the ﬁeld (Longlecker et al.
1987) and laboratory (Ederer and Fehr 2007). Evidence from ﬁeld experiments on feedback remains scarce.
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presence and identity of co-workers — namely social relations in the workplace. The idea that there
exists an interplay between social relations and monetary incentives in the workplace goes back to
the old Hawthorne studies mentioned earlier and have been long considered in the organizational
and business sociology literatures (Mayo 1933, Barnard 1938, Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939,
Roy 1952, Williams and O’Reilly 1998). Such concerns have begun to be incorporated in economic
theory (Kandel and Lazear 1992, Rotemberg 1994, Prendergast and Topel 1996), and credible
evidence on their existence, magnitude and underlying mechanisms have begun to emerge in a
nascent literature using non-experimental methods in combination with personnel data (Mas and
Moretti 2009, Bandiera et al. 2010).
In a series of natural ﬁeld experiments, Bandiera et al. provide evidence on the eﬀect of
incentives on individual and ﬁrm performance within the same ﬁrm. These ﬁeld experiments
engineer exogenously timed variation in the incentive structures faced by workers in the ﬁrm. The
common thread running through these studies is to provide evidence on the interplay between
monetary and non-monetary incentives in the workplace. The speciﬁc form of non-monetary
incentive considered are those arising from social relations in the workplace, so that workers
behavior, and response to monetary incentives, might diﬀer depending on the nature of the social
ties they have with co-workers, their superiors, and their subordinates. Given that this form of
non-monetary incentive is what ﬁeld experiments have predominantly focused on, we ﬁrst develop a
framework that makes precise how such incentives can be incorporated into an otherwise standard
model, and then map this framework to the empirical evidence from the ﬁeld.
4.2.1 Theoretical Framework
Suppose worker i’s payoﬀ depends on three components. First, she derives some beneﬁt from ex-
erting eﬀort ei towards a productive task. This beneﬁt, B(ei,.), reﬂects in part how her eﬀort maps
into income through the monetary compensation scheme. To cover a wide range of compensation
schemes including absolute performance evaluation incentive schemes such as piece rates, relative
performance evaluation schemes such as rank order tournaments, or team incentives, these beneﬁts
will in general also depend on co-workers’ eﬀort, e−i. Second, the worker faces a convex cost of
eﬀort, C(θi,ei), where workers are of heterogeneous ability, θi. Finally, we assume worker i places
some weight on the utility of co-worker j, πij. In turn, such social preferences πij might depend
on the existence or strength of the social tie between individuals i and j. This third component
of the worker’s payoﬀ function generates social incentives.55 Workers simultaneously choose their
55Social preferences can be thought of as a reduced form representation of a number of models. They depict
behavior consistent with reciprocity or altruism (Fehr and Schmidt 1999), or the evolutionary equilibrium of a
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game in which workers learn which strategies to play (Levine and Pesendorfer 2002,
Sethi and Somanathan 1999). In the ﬁeld experiment reported in Bandiera et al. (2005), they attempt to distinguish
between models in which workers’ preferences display altruism towards others, and models in which workers behave
as if they are altruistic because, for instance, they play trigger strategies to enforce implicit collusive agreements.
69eﬀorts to maximize their total payoﬀ,
max
ei
Bi(ei,e−i) − C(θi,ei) +
 
j =i
πij[Bj(ej,e−j) − Cj(θj,ej)]. (29)













The monetary compensation scheme determines the marginal beneﬁt of eﬀort,
∂Bi(.)
∂ei ≥ 0. As the
worker has social incentives, she takes account of the fact that on the margin, her eﬀort also aﬀects
the beneﬁts that accrue to others,
∂Bj(.)
∂ei ≶ 0. As mentioned above, the precise sign of this social
interaction depends on the nature of peer eﬀects between workers that are socially connected, and
the monetary compensation scheme in place.
The theoretical predictions of such models generate a wide range of behavioral responses.
For example, working alongside friends might make work more enjoyable, generate contagious
enthusiasm among friends, provide positive role models, or generate incentives to compete to be
the best in the network of friends. All such mechanisms, that eﬀectively increase the net beneﬁts
of eﬀort, imply workers exert more eﬀort in the presence of their friends relative to themselves
when they work in the absence of their friends. Alternatively, working with friends might create
contagious malaise, or lead to low eﬀort norms within friends or co-workers more generally. All
such mechanisms, that eﬀectively decrease the net beneﬁts of eﬀort, imply workers exert less eﬀort
in the presence of their friends. Finally, the presence of friends might have heterogeneous eﬀects
across workers in that some exert more eﬀort in the presence of their friends relative to when they
work solely with non-friends, and others exert less eﬀort. For example, friends or co-workers may
conform to a common norm (Bernheim 1994), or workers might be averse to pay inequality within
their network (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Charness and Rabin 2002). In either case, relative to when
they work only with non-friends — (i) low ability workers exert more eﬀort in the presence of their
friends, and; (ii) high ability workers exert less eﬀort in the presence of their friends. These aspects
are highlighted by the ﬁeld experiments discussed below on non-monetary incentives.
The ﬁeld experiments in Bandiera et al. are designed to engineer exogenous variation in the
incentives faced by workers to identify
∂Bi(.)
∂ei , corresponding to a similar reduced form parameter
as in Lazear (2000) and Shearer (2004). They then combine this variation with primary data
collected on social networks and plausibly exogenous variation in the assignment of friends as
co-workers over time, to identify social incentives as embodied in
∂Bj(.)
∂ei . In these experiments, the
authors examine the eﬀects of social incentives both within and across tiers of the ﬁrm hierarchy.
Namely in some studies i and j are co-workers engaged in the same tasks, and in other studies
the pair correspond to a manager and her subordinate. Moreover, they study cases in which: (i)
56The model would be complicated if there were also knowledge spillovers such that eﬀort exerted by worker
i reduced the cost of eﬀort of worker j. While such knowledge spillovers have been found in workplace settings
(Moretti 2004, Ichniowski et al. 1997) we abstract from them here.
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∂Bj(.)
∂ei < 0, as in the case of relative incentive schemes; (ii) where
it beneﬁts them
∂Bj(.)
∂ei > 0, as in the case of team incentives, and; (iii) where it has no eﬀect
∂Bj(.)
∂ei = 0, as in the case of a piece rate scheme. We now summarize the main insights from these
natural ﬁeld experiments.
4.2.2 Evidence from the Field
Social Incentives Among Bottom Tier Workers
The ﬁrm studied in Bandiera et al. is a leading UK producer of soft fruit. Managerial staﬀ
belongs to three classes. The ﬁrst class consists of a single general manager whom we refer to as
the Chief Operating Oﬃcer (COO), the second comprises ten ﬁeld managers, and the bottom-tier
of the ﬁrm hierarchy consists of workers whose main task is to pick fruit. Field managers are
responsible for ﬁeld logistics, most importantly to assign workers to rows of fruit within the ﬁeld
and to monitor workers. Managerial eﬀort can therefore be targeted to individual workers and
is complementary to worker’s eﬀort. The main task of the COO is to decide which workers are
selected to pick fruit each day, and which are assigned to non-picking tasks. The ﬁeld experiments
described below together provide insights on behavior at each tier of the ﬁrm’s hierarchy.
In each natural ﬁeld experiment, the researchers worked closely with the CEO of the ﬁrm to
engineer exogenously timed changes in monetary incentives to workers or managers. The same
workers and managers are observed under both incentive schemes and therefore it is possible
to control for time invariant sources of heterogeneity across workers, such as their ability, and
across managers, such as their management style.57 The most important remaining empirical
concern is that the estimates of such changes might still reﬂect naturally occurring time trends in
productivity. This is addressed using a battery of tests in each paper. In addition, the time span
of study allows the authors to check in each case whether the behavioral response to incentives is
long-lasting, or whether they reﬂect Hawthorne eﬀects, as discussed earlier, whereby individuals
respond in the short run to any change in their workplace environment. Being able to use ﬁeld
experiments to estimate short and long run responses to changes in management practice is a
theme we will return to below when we present ﬁeld experimental evidence on gift-exchange in
ﬁrms, and contrast the evidence from the ﬁeld and the laboratory.58
In each natural ﬁeld experiment, the authors collected primary data on the social networks of
each individual worker. With such a precise mapping of the structure of friendship networks in
the ﬁrm, personnel data providing workers productivity over time, and the ﬁeld experiment on
monetary incentives, the authors are able to shed light on the interplay between monetary and
57Hence this empirical strategy is informed by the evidence that individual ‘styles’ of managers aﬀect ﬁrm
performance over and above ﬁrm level characteristics themselves (Bertrand and Schoar 2003, Malmendier and Tate
2004).
58Bandiera et al. study the behavior of nearly all the workers in the ﬁrm for each ﬁeld experiment. However,
given the experiment takes place in one ﬁrm, to avoid contamination eﬀects across treated and control groups, all
workers were simultaneously shifted from one incentive scheme to the other. In contrast, Shearer (2004) exogenously
varied the incentive scheme workers were in on each day. In non-experimental studies such as Lazear (2000) on
individual pay and Hamilton et al. (2003) on team pay, workers might have had some say on which compensation
scheme they would be paid under.
71social incentives in this setting.
Finally, they have daily information on the pool of workers available to pick fruit. This allows
them to precisely identify the eﬀect of monetary incentives on the selection of workers from this
pool. The entire pool of workers is observed in this context because individuals are hired seasonally
from Eastern Europe, and they live on the farm for the duration of their stay. This margin of
selection — driven by the COO’s demand for workers — from the ﬁrm’s internal labor market proves
to be an important margin of response to some changes in incentives, particularly in relation to
changes in managerial incentives. Still, these ﬁeld experiments, like Shearer (2004), are silent on
the selection eﬀect highlighted by Lazear (2000) in relation to workers choice of which ﬁrm to
supply their labor to.
Another obvious similarity between Shearer (2004) and Bandiera et al. is that they study
agricultural environments in which worker productivity is easy to measure, comparable across
workers at the same moment in time, and comparable within a worker over time. The fact that
worker productivity is measured electronically with little measurement error, also makes analysis
of the impact of the ﬁeld experiment on the distribution of productivity, again as highlighted
by Lazear (2000), particularly amenable to quantile regression methods for example. However,
it remains true that settings in which worker’s output is hard to measure, verify or compare,
that might represent the bulk of tasks in the modern service based economy, remain relatively
unexplored in ﬁeld experiments.
In Bandiera et al. (2005) the natural ﬁeld experiment exogenously changes the monetary
incentives to the bottom-tier workers whose primary task to pick fruit. The study compares the
behavior of these workers under a relative incentive scheme to a piece rate scheme. The comparison
is revealing because under relative incentives individual eﬀort imposes a negative externality on co-
workers’ pay whereas under piece rates individual eﬀort has no eﬀect on others’ pay. The diﬀerence
in workers’ performance under the two schemes, if any, then provides evidence on whether and to
what extent workers internalize the externality they impose on their colleagues. To see this, the
framework above is tailored to this speciﬁc ﬁeld experiment as follows.
Consider a group of N workers, each worker i exerts eﬀort ei ≥ 0 which determines her
productivity. The cost of eﬀort is assumed to be
θie2
i
2 . Under relative incentives the beneﬁt from








The relative scheme has the key characteristics that an increase in worker i’s eﬀort — (i) increases
her pay; (ii) increases average eﬀort and hence imposes a negative externality by reducing the pay
of co-workers. The eﬀort choice under relative incentives then depends on whether workers have
social incentives and therefore internalize this externality. Assuming worker i places the same

























Assuming worker i chooses her eﬀort taking the eﬀort of others as given, the Nash equilibrium












































The equilibrium eﬀort level solves the ﬁrst order condition,
B
′ (bei)b = θiei. (34)
As worker i’s eﬀort does not aﬀect her co-workers’ pay, her optimal choice of eﬀort is independent
of πi. To compare eﬀort choices under the two schemes, evaluate (34) at b = 1
e so that for a given
e, the pay per unit of eﬀort is the same under both incentive schemes. The ﬁrst order condition








so the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst order conditions (32) and (35) can be ascribed to two sources.
The ﬁrst is the externality worker i imposes on others under relative incentives, the magnitude
of which depends on πi. When πi > 0 worker i’s productivity is lower under relative incentives
compared to piece rates. Second, by exerting more eﬀort, each worker lowers the pay she receives





i ei) term, also
reduces productivity under relative incentives but is negligible in large groups.
The main results from Bandiera et al. (2005) are then as follows. First, the reduced form
estimates suggest that the exogenously timed switch from relative incentives to piece rates had a
signiﬁcant and permanent impact on worker productivity. For the average worker, productivity
increased by at least 50% moving from relative incentives to piece rates. As in the earlier literature,
both the mean and dispersion of productivity signiﬁcantly increase with the move to piece rates.
The productivity gains achieved under piece rates are not found to be at the expense of a lower
quality of picking.
The authors then assess whether this productivity change is consistent with the standard
assumption that workers ignore the externality they impose on others under the relative scheme
(πi = 0), or whether they fully internalize it (πi = 1). To do this they use the structural model
above, imposing a functional form assumption on B(.) and a production function linking eﬀort
to observed output, to calibrate the ﬁrst order conditions of the workers’ maximization problem
to compute an estimate of each worker’s cost parameter, θi, under each incentive scheme and
behavioral assumption. Since worker’s ability is innate, they ought to ﬁnd the same implied
distributions of costs across workers under both incentive schemes if the underlying behavioral
assumption is correct.
73Calibration of the ﬁrst order conditions for worker’s eﬀorts reveals that the observed change
in productivity is too large to be consistent with the assumption that workers ignore the negative
externality they impose on others. At the same time, the observed change in productivity is also
too small to be consistent with the assumption that workers maximize the welfare of the group
and fully internalize the negative externality. The authors then uncover the distribution of social
weights πi across workers that would explain the productivity increases. To do so they assume
the true cost of eﬀort θi of each worker is that derived under piece rates, and then substitute into
the ﬁrst order condition (32). They ﬁnd the data is consistent with the average worker placing a
weight of π =.65 on the beneﬁts accruing to all other co-workers, assuming they place a weight of
one on their own beneﬁts.
Further analysis combines the experimental variation induced by the change in incentive
scheme, with non-experimental variation of the assignment of workers to work alongside their
friends on some days but not on other days. The ﬁeld experiment method allows the collection
of primary data on social networks of each worker on the farm. This reveals that under relative
incentives workers internalize the externality more when the share of their personal friends in the
group is larger and this eﬀect is stronger in smaller groups. In line with the interpretation that
social preferences explain the diﬀerence in productivity across the two schemes, the relationship
among workers does not aﬀect productivity under piece rates. Finally, they ﬁnd that productivity
under relative incentives was signiﬁcantly lower only when workers were able to monitor each
other. Given that monitoring is necessary to enforce collusion while it does not aﬀect altruism,
they take this ﬁnding to support the hypothesis that workers are able to sustain implicit collu-
sive agreements when relative incentives are in place. Hence, building on a large body of evidence
from laboratory settings, this evidence from the ﬁeld suggests workers behave as if they have social
preferences but do not, in structural form, have social preferences that make them unconditionally
altruistic towards others.
The results beg the question of why, given the large gains to productivity and proﬁts, of
the move to piece rates, were relative incentives ever employed in the ﬁrst place. The farm
management suggested the relative scheme was mainly adopted to diﬀerence out common shocks
that are a key determinant of workers productivity in this setting. While this is in line with
the predictions of incentive theory, the superiority of relative incentives relies on the assumption
that workers ignore the externality their eﬀort imposes on others.59 This assumption on worker
behavior is not supported by this ﬁeld experiment. Relative incentives led to lower productivity
because workers internalized the negative externality to some extent. The results of this natural
ﬁeld experiment then speak directly to Lazear’s (1989) observation on how rarely workers are
compensated according to rank-order tournaments, and point to new and interesting directions
for theory to develop on the optimal provision of incentives under more robust assumptions on
worker preferences.
59See Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and Stokey (1983), and Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983). Relative performance
evaluation may also be preferred to piece rates as it lowers informational rents to high types (Bhaskar 2002), and
reduces incentives of workers to exert eﬀort in inﬂuence activity (Milgrom 1988).
74Social Incentives Among Managers
While the evidence from ﬁeld experiments discussed thus far has focused on the monetary
incentives provided to bottom-tier workers, Rosen’s (1982) magniﬁcation principle implies the
incentives provided higher up in the ﬁrm hierarchy can have larger eﬀects on ﬁrms performance.
Bandiera et al. (2007) present evidence from a ﬁeld experiment in the same setting as previously
described to explore this issue.
They examine the eﬀects of providing bonuses to managers based on the average productivity
of their subordinates. They extend the framework above to highlight that, as in most ﬁrms, in
their context managers can aﬀect worker productivity through two channels — (i) they can take
actions that aﬀect the productivity of existing workers, and, (ii) they can aﬀect the identity of the
workers selected into employment. A simple theoretical framework indicates that, when workers
are of heterogeneous ability and managers’ and workers’ eﬀort are complements, the introduction
of managerial performance pay makes managers target their eﬀort towards the most able workers.
This is labeled a “targeting eﬀect” of managerial incentives. In addition, the introduction of
managerial performance pay makes managers select the most able workers into employment. This
is labeled this a “selection eﬀect” of managerial incentives.
As in Lazear’s framework, such targeting and selection eﬀects inﬂuence both the mean and the
dispersion of workers’ productivity. Mean productivity unambiguously raises as managers target
the most able workers and ﬁre the least able. The eﬀect on the dispersion is however ambiguous.
On the one hand, targeting the most able workers exacerbates the natural diﬀerences in ability
and leads to an increase in dispersion. On the other hand, if only more able and hence more
similar workers are selected into employment in the ﬁrst place, the dispersion of productivity may
fall, depending on the underlying distribution of ability across workers.
They key ﬁndings from Bandiera et al. (2007) are at follows. First, the introduction of man-
agerial performance pay increases both the average productivity and the dispersion of productivity
among lower-tier workers. The average productivity increases by 21 percent and the coeﬃcient of
variation increases by 38 percent.
Second, the increase in the mean and dispersion of productivity is due to both targeting
and selection eﬀects. The analysis of individual productivity data reveals that the most able
workers experience a signiﬁcant increase in productivity while the productivity of other workers
is not aﬀected or even decreases. This suggests that the targeting eﬀect is at play — after the
introduction of performance pay, managers target their eﬀort towards more able workers. The
individual data also provides evidence of a selection eﬀect. More able workers, namely those who
had the highest productivity when managers were paid ﬁxed wages, are more likely to be selected
into the workforce when managers are paid performance bonuses. Least able workers are employed
less often and workers at the bottom of the productivity distribution are ﬁred.60
60The results from this natural ﬁeld experiment has implications for environments outside the workplace. For
example, the provision of teacher incentives based on the average performance of students may have important con-
sequences for the distribution of test scores among students, and the composition of students, and possibly teachers,
admitted into schools. For example, Burgess et al. (2005) ﬁnd that the introduction of school accountability based
on test pass rates improved the performance of students in the middle of the ability distribution, at the expense
75Third, the selection and targeting eﬀect reinforce each other, as workers who experience the
highest increase in productivity are also more likely to be selected into employment. The intro-
duction of managerial performance pay thus exacerbates earnings inequality due to underlying
diﬀerences in ability both because the most able workers experience a larger increase in produc-
tivity and because they are selected into employment more often.
Finally, they evaluate the relative importance of the targeting and selection eﬀects through a
series of thought experiments. They ﬁnd that at least half of the 21 percent increase in average
productivity is driven by the selection of more productive workers. In contrast, the change in
dispersion is nearly entirely due to managers targeting the most able workers after the introduction
of performance pay. Namely, the dispersion of productivity would have increased by almost the
same amount had the selection of workers remained unchanged. The reason is that the distribution
of ability across workers is such that even when the least able workers are ﬁred, the marginal worker
selected to pick is still of relatively low ability. Hence there remains considerable heterogeneity in
productivity among selected workers.
These ﬁndings shed some light on why ﬁrms provide performance related pay to managers
in the ﬁrst place. While such incentive schemes are obviously designed to increase unobservable
managerial eﬀort, these results suggest another more subtle reason for their use. This stems from
the general observation that ﬁrms are typically constrained to oﬀer bottom-tier workers the same
compensation scheme. This may be because of legal, technological or informational constraints
(Lazear 1989, Bewley 1999, Encinosa et al. 1997, Fehr et al. 2004). To the extent that bottom-
tier workers are of heterogeneous ability, however, oﬀering the same compensation scheme to all
of them will be sub-optimal. When managers’ pay is linked to ﬁrm’s performance, their interests
become more aligned with those of the ﬁrm and they have greater incentives to target their eﬀort to
speciﬁc workers in order to oﬀset the ineﬃciency that arises because of the common compensation
scheme. From the worker’s point of view it is then as if they face an individual speciﬁc incentive
scheme. This opens a broad research agenda to examine whether ﬁrms are indeed more likely to
oﬀer managers performance pay in settings where lower tier workers are of heterogeneous ability,
managers are able to target their eﬀort towards speciﬁc workers, and workers are oﬀered the same
compensation scheme.
The ﬁndings from this ﬁeld experiment also highlight the interplay between the provision
of managerial incentives and the earnings inequality among lower-tier workers. Such a linkage
exists whenever managers can target their eﬀorts towards some workers and away from others,
and managers choose which individuals are selected into the workforce. Hence there might be
an important interplay between managerial incentives and earnings inequality among workers
highlights a possible link between two important trends in labor markets over the past twenty years
that have previously been unconnected in the economics literature — the rising use of managerial
of both high achieving and low achieving students. Similarly, Hanushek and Raymond (2004) and Reback (2005)
provide evidence on the distributional consequences on student achievement under the No Child Left Behind policy.
Finally, Jacob (2002) and Figlio and Getzer (2002) provide evidence on the selection eﬀect. They show that the
introduction of accountability schemes lead to an increase in grade retention and special educational placement in
Chicago and Florida public schools, respectively.
76performance pay, and the rising earnings inequality among observationally similar workers.61
In Bandiera et al. (2009), the authors use the same introduction of managerial bonuses to
understand whether managers favor workers they are socially connected to. In general, social
connections between managers and workers can help or harm ﬁrm performance. On the one hand,
social connections may be beneﬁcial to ﬁrm performance if they allow managers to provide non-
monetary incentives to workers, or help reduce informational asymmetries within the ﬁrm. On the
other hand, managers may display favoritism towards workers they are socially connected with,
to the detriment of other workers and overall ﬁrm performance.62
In this experiment, as managerial compensation becomes more closely tied to ﬁrm performance,
we would expect managers to utilize social connections to a greater extent if indeed, such connec-
tions are beneﬁcial for ﬁrm performance. On the other hand, if social connection are bad for the
ﬁrm, we might expect managers to reallocate their eﬀort across workers in response to managerial
incentives, towards high ability workers, and away from workers they are socially connected to.
To be precise, if the managers’ behavior towards connected workers changes once their interests
are more closely aligned with the ﬁrm’s, their previous behavior under ﬁxed wages could have not
been maximizing the ﬁrm’s average productivity.
To measure social connections the authors use a survey they designed to exploit three sources
of similarity between managers and workers — whether they are of the same nationality, whether
they live in close proximity to each other on the farm, and whether they arrived at a similar time
on the farm. The underlying assumption is that individuals are more likely to befriend others if
they are of the same nationality, if they are neighbors, or if they share early experiences in a new
workplace.63
The main ﬁndings are as follows. First, when managers are paid ﬁxed wages, the productivity
of a given worker is 9% higher when he is socially connected to his manager, relative to when
he is not. As workers are paid piece rates, this translates into the same proportionate change in
earnings. Second, when managers are paid performance bonuses that tie their pay to the average
productivity of workers they manage, being socially connected to the manager has no eﬀect on
workers’ productivity.
Third, the introduction of managerial performance pay signiﬁcantly decreases the productivity
of low ability workers when they are connected to their manager relative to when they were
61Residual, or within-group wage inequality, is a sizeable contributor of the growth in overall wage inequality in
the US. This has been argued to have increased throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Juhn et al., 1993), and into the
1990s (Acemoglu, 2002, and Autor et al., 2005).
62Both the positive and negative eﬀects of social connections have been stressed in the organizational behavior
and sociology literatures. Examples of such work includes that on the eﬀect of manager-subordinate similarity on
subjective outcomes such as performance evaluations, role ambiguity, and job satisfaction (Tsui and O’Reilly 1989,
Thomas 1990, Wesolowski and Mossholder 1997), and on how social networks within the ﬁrm inﬂuence within ﬁrm
promotions (Podolny and Baron 1997).
63Lazear (1989), Kandel and Lazear (1992), and Rotemberg (1994) develop models incorporating social concerns
into the analysis of behavior within ﬁrms. While they emphasize that individuals have social concerns for others at
the same tier of the ﬁrm hierarchy, their analysis is equally applicable across tiers of the hierarchy. Bewley (1999)
oﬀers extensive evidence from interviews with managers arguing that concerns over fair outcomes for workers and
the morale of employees are important determinants of their behavior.
77connected to their manager and she was paid a ﬁxed wage. The introduction of managerial
performance pay increases the productivity of high ability workers, especially when they are not
connected to their managers. These ﬁndings indicate that when managers face low powered
incentives, they favor the workers they are socially connected to, regardless of the workers’ ability.
In contrast, when they face high powered incentives, managers favor high ability workers regardless
of the workers’ connection status.
Fourth, an increase in the level of social connections between managers and workers has a
detrimental eﬀect on the ﬁrms’ average productivity when managers are paid ﬁxed wages and
has no eﬀect when managers are paid performance bonuses. In this setting, social connections
are therefore detrimental for the ﬁrm because their existence distorts the allocation of managerial
eﬀort in favor of lower ability workers.
This natural ﬁeld experiment paper contributes to the growing empirical evidence on the
interplay between social networks and individual and ﬁrm performance. In particular, the design
allows the authors to identify not only whether social connections matter within the ﬁrm, but
also exploit the exogenous variation in incentives to understand whether they are to the beneﬁt
or detriment of the ﬁrm.
Feedback
In a ﬁnal natural ﬁeld experiment from this setting, Bandiera et al. (2010) present evidence to
evaluate the eﬀect of performance feedback and monetary prize tournaments, when the workforce
is organized in teams. Hence in this set-up workers eﬀort imposes a positive externality on their
team members,
∂Bj(.)
∂ei > 0. They compare the eﬀects of these form of non-monetary and monetary
incentives relative to when teams are paid piece rates, and analyze their eﬀect on two outcomes:
how workers sort into teams and team productivity.
This ﬁeld experiment provides important contributions to the literature along three margins.
First, despite the pervasiveness of teams in the workplace, ﬁeld evidence on team incentives is
scarce.64 The existing evidence from individual reward schemes provides limited guidance because
the margins along which individuals and teams can respond to incentives diﬀer. Speciﬁcally, in
addition to changes in individual eﬀort, changes in team incentives can lead to changes in team
composition. To the extent that workers eﬀort depends on the identity of their team members be-
cause of social incentives, changes in team composition can aﬀect the productivity of the individual
teams and of the ﬁrm as a whole.65
Second, tournaments are widely used to provide incentives across diverse organizations such as
salespeople competing for bonuses, managers competing for promotions, and politicians competing
64More than 70% of major US ﬁrms use some form of team based rewards (Ledford et al 1995). Lazear and
Shaw (2007) cite evidence that between 1987 and 1996, the share of large ﬁrms that have more than a ﬁfth of
their employees in problem solving teams rose from 37 to 66%. The percentage of large ﬁrms with workers in
self-managed teams rose from 27 to 78% over the same period. In academia, Wuchty et al (2007) document the
increased use of team production in research across disciplines.
65There is only a small literature on selection into teams in laboratory settings (Weber 2006, Charness and Yang
2008), although there is a far more extensive lab-based literature on team production, as reviewed in Charness and
Kuhn (2010).
78for vote shares (Bull et al. 1987, Baker et al. 1988). While several studies have tested whether
the response to variation in tournament structure is consistent with theoretical predictions, ﬁeld
evidence on the comparison of monetary prize tournaments against alternative monetary and
non-monetary incentive mechanisms is scarce.66
Third, whenever tournaments are in place, workers inevitably receive some information on their
relative performance. This information might have direct eﬀects on productivity if individuals have
concerns for their relative position or status (Moldavanu et al. 2007, Besley and Ghatak 2008),
inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Charness and Rabin 2002) or conformity (Bernheim
1994). The ﬁeld experiment allows the authors to de-couple the eﬀect of feedback from the eﬀect
of monetary prize tournaments. As the provision of feedback is almost costless, measuring its
contribution to the overall tournament eﬀect can lead to considerable cost savings if most of the
positive eﬀect of tournaments on productivity is actually due to worker responses to feedback.67
In the experiment, at the beginning of the season, teams were paid piece rates based on their
aggregate productivity. Halfway through the season teams were additionally provided feedback by
posting daily histograms of each team’s productivity. This feedback makes precise the absolute
productivity of each team, and their ranking relative to all other teams. Halfway through the
remaining part of the season a monetary prize for the most productive team each week was
introduced, in addition to the provision of feedback, and conditional on teams being paid according
to piece rates.
When workers ﬁrst arrive to the farm they are assigned to a team by the general manager for
their ﬁrst week. Thereafter workers are free to choose their own team members at a team exchange
that takes place every week. A team is formed only if all its members agree. Hence in this setting
workers have two choice variables: how much eﬀort to exert into picking, and team composition.
The ﬁeld experiment is again closely tied to an underlying model. This makes precise two key
forces that drive team formation: workers’ ability and social connections. As individual earnings
are increasing in the ability of team members, workers have incentives to assortatively match by
ability. On the other hand, workers might prefer to form teams with friends because this might
limit free-riding within teams (Alchian and Demsetz 1972, Holmstrom 1982, Kandel and Lazear
1992), and because they enjoy non-pecuniary beneﬁts from interacting with co-workers they are
socially connected to (Rosen 1986, Hamilton et al. 2003).68 To the extent that workers are not
66The empirical literature on tournament theory comprises two distinct branches. The ﬁrst tests whether a
particular compensation scheme has a tournament structure. Two speciﬁc predictions have been explored — (i) the
wage spread should be positively related to the number of workers at the lower job level; (ii) the wage structure
should be convex as in Rosen (1986). These tests typically use data from the market for CEOs (Gibbons and
Murphy 1990, Erikkson 1999, Bognanno 2001). The second branch of the literature tests whether individual
behavior changes with tournament features in a way consistent with theory, using data either from experimental
settings (Bull et al 1987, Nalbantian and Schotter 1997, Erikkson et al 2008, Freeman and Gelber 2008), personnel
data (Knoeber and Thurman 1994, Erikkson 1999, Bognanno 2001), or sports (Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1990).
There are few existing ﬁeld studies — on either individuals or teams — exploring tournament incentives to other
incentive schemes such as piece rates or feedback.
67Evidence from the laboratory has tended to focus on feedback to individuals (Freeman and Gelber 2008). One
exception is Sausgruber (2008) who provides experimental evidence on the eﬀects on team performance when told
about the performance of one other team, holding team composition constant.
68In line with this, Rotemberg (1994) develops a model showing how altruism between co-workers may endoge-
79socially connected to colleagues of similar ability, a trade-oﬀ emerges. The theoretical framework
then makes precise how the introduction of feedback and prizes aﬀect this trade-oﬀ.
The key empirical results from the ﬁeld experiment are as follows. First, the introduction of
feedback and of monetary prizes leads to signiﬁcant changes in team composition. Relative to the
piece rate regime, the share of team members connected by social ties is lower and team members’
ability levels are more similar under the feedback and tournament regimes.
Second, the feedback and tournament schemes have opposite eﬀects on average productivity.
Relative to the piece rate regime, the introduction of feedback signiﬁcantly reduces average team
productivity by 14%. The further introduction of a monetary prize tournament, conditional on
the provision of feedback, signiﬁcantly increases productivity by 24%. As made precise in the
theoretical framework, the reduction in average productivity when feedback is provided is consis-
tent with workers being better oﬀ sorting into teams on the basis of ability rather than friendship
as feedback increases the strength of incentives faced, and the ﬁrm being worse oﬀ because it
no longer harnesses the ability of socially connected workers to ameliorate free-riding within the
team. Hence the endogenous formation of teams under feedback reduces the ﬁrm’s productivity
overall. In contrast, the tournament incentives are suﬃciently high-powered so the increase in
worker’s eﬀort more than oﬀsets any increase in free-riding within teams. Hence the ﬁrm’s overall
productivity rises.
Third, the dispersion of productivity increases under both regimes because both eﬀects are
heterogeneous as indicated by the theoretical framework. Quantile regression results show that
the introduction of feedback reduces the productivity of teams at the bottom of the conditional
productivity distribution compared to piece rates, while it has no eﬀect on teams above the 40th
percentile. In contrast, the introduction of prizes increases the productivity of teams at the top of
the conditional productivity distribution compared to piece rates, while it has no eﬀect on teams
below the 30th percentile.
Fourth, focusing on the teams that remain intact after each change in incentives, the authors
evaluate the eﬀect of feedback and prizes on eﬀort, holding constant team composition. They
ﬁnd that while the eﬀect of feedback on team productivity is positive the magnitude appears
small. This emphasizes that the documented negative eﬀect of feedback is primarily due to the
endogenous changes in team composition caused by the provision of feedback, rather than changes
in behavior of the same team. In contrast the additional introduction of monetary prizes increases
team productivity by 25% for teams that choose to remain intact. Hence the provision of monetary
prizes aﬀects ﬁrm performance through both the endogenous changes in team composition and
changes in behavior within the same team.
Finally, the authors present qualitative evidence from a worker survey they conducted. As
highlighted at the start of this section, this type of primary data collection that is inherent in ﬁeld
nously form in the workplace to facilitate cooperation among workers engaged in team production. Empirically,
Hamilton et al. (2003) provide non-experimental evidence from the introduction of team production in a garment
ﬁrm. They ﬁnd the most able workers sorted ﬁrst into teams despite a loss in earnings in many cases, suggesting
non-pecuniary beneﬁts associated with teamwork.
80experiments, allows the authors to shed light on other margins of behavior between workers that
might be aﬀected by the monetary and non-monetary incentives provided, but that the ﬁrm does
not collect data on ex ante. This survey data reveals that relative to the piece rate regime, during
the tournament regime signiﬁcantly fewer workers report pushing their team members to work
hard or giving team members instructions. This is consistent with workers being better matched
by ability and having fewer social connections with their team members under the tournament
regime, so that peer pressure within the team becomes less eﬀective.
By exploring changes in behavior on a range of dimensions, this evidence from the ﬁeld high-
lights new directions for research in understanding how agents react to monetary and non-monetary
incentives in workplaces characterized by team production where teams form endogenously.
4.3 The Employment Relationship
The neoclassical label market model emphasizes workers behave opportunistically. For example,
in the model sketched above from Lazear (2000), when workers compensation is not tied to their
performance, as under a ﬁxed hourly wage scheme, all workers exert the minimum eﬀort required
to achieve the minimum output requirement, q0. There is thus no variation in workers in their
output or pay. We now explore the insights ﬁeld experiments have provided on the existence and
nature of such opportunistic behavior in real world settings. We do so through examples related
to gift exchange in shirking.
4.3.1 Gift Exchange
The standard labor market model assumes in equilibrium ﬁrms pay market clearing wages and
workers provide minimum eﬀort. This prediction does not receive uniform support empirically.
There are numerous cases where employers are observed paying above the market equilibrium wage
(Akerlof 1982), and where workers exert more than the minimum eﬀort level, as we have already
discussed in relation to Lazear (2000) and in many other studies on employee performance under
ﬁxed wages. This has led to the development of the gift-exchange model which is based on the
assumption of their being a positive association between wages and worker eﬀort (Akerlof 1982,
Akerlof and Yellen 1988, 1990). In this class of model, employers oﬀer higher than market clearing
wages, and workers are viewed to positively reciprocate by providing higher than the minimum
required eﬀort.
Clearly such theories are hard to test using non-experimental data: there might be a host of
unobservable factors that create a correlation wages and worker eﬀort. Hence, there has been a
large body of evidence established in laboratory settings on gift-exchange in ﬁrm settings, which
began with Fehr et al. (1993). In this original study, the constructed a labor market equilibrium
with excess labor supply so that the equilibrium wage was low. Employees also had no pecuniary
incentive to raise the quality of their work above the minimum required level, so the best response
of employers was to pay the low equilibrium wage. Contrary to the prediction, the majority of
employers attempted to induce employees to invest greater eﬀort by oﬀering them higher than
81market-clearing wages. On average, this high wage was reciprocated by greater employee eﬀort.
Overall, it was proﬁtable for employers to oﬀer high wage contracts.
Gneezy and List (2006) use a natural ﬁeld experiment then look for evidence of gift-exchange
in similar real world environments in which equilibrium wages are low and workers earnings are
not tied to their performance. In moving from the lab to the ﬁeld, one important comparative
static to evaluate is how behavior changes with the duration of the task. In other words, are
the types of positive reciprocity observed by workers in the lab, a long run phenomena. The
psychology literature provides two reasons why the duration of tasks might matter. First, there is
the distinction between hot and cold decision making (Loewenstein and Schkade 1999, Loewenstein
2005). Second, there can be adaption of behavior over time (Gilbert et al. 1998).
Two subject pools were utilized for the ﬁeld experiments. In each a between subject design
was used. The ﬁrst ﬁeld experiment recruited undergraduate students to participate in an eﬀort to
computerize the holdings of a small library at the university. The task was to enter data regarding
the books into a computer database. In the no-Gift treatment, individuals were oﬀered a ﬂat wage
of $12 per hour. In the Gift treatment, once the task was explained to participants, they were
surprisingly paid $20 per hour rather then $12 per hour as advertised. In total 19 workers were
hired for six hours each; 10 were randomly assigned to the no-Gift treatment. The second ﬁeld
experiment was part of a door to door fundraising drive to support a university research center.
Fundraising solicitors were recruited. All solicitors were told they would be paid $10 per hour,
and those in the Gift treatment were surprisingly told they would actually receive $20 per hour.
In total 23 solicitors were employed over two days, with 10 being randomly assigned to the no-Gift
treatment.69
The main results are as follows. First, in line with earlier evidence from laboratory settings,
there are signs of signiﬁcant gift exchange in the ﬁrst few hours of the task, as measured both by
eﬀort in the library task and money raised in the fundraising task. For example, in the library
task, eﬀort is around 25% higher for those in the Gift treatment.
Second, there are signiﬁcant falls in eﬀort over time. After a few hours, there are no longer any
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in eﬀort between the no-Gift and Gift treatments in either task. Figure 10
illustrates clearly how any positive reciprocity by workers is a short run phenomena in these two
settings. Overall, the results suggest that with the same budget, the employer would have been
better oﬀ just paying the market clearing wage as in the no-Gift treatments.
[Figure 10: Gift Exchange in the Field]
While the results go against the standard gift-exchange explanation of the positive association
of wages and eﬀort, they are in line with survey evidence on wage rigidity.70 For example Bewley
69. In all such experiments, it is important to design the set-up to be able to distinguish gift-exchange from the
alternative explanation of why their should be a positive relationship between wages and eﬀort — eﬃciency wages.
This hypothesis postulates employers pay above market-clearing wages to motivate workers to increase their eﬀort
level so as to avoid being ﬁred, which reduces employer monitoring (Katz 1986). Hence in both ﬁeld exeriments
subjects were made aware that this was a one-time recruitment opportunity.
70Clearly this debate on the existence of positive reciprocity in the ﬁeld remains in need of further study. Charness
and Kuhn (2010) describe more of the related evidence from the laboratory and other ﬁeld settings.
82(1999) considers why wages are downwardly rigid during a recession. He reports that managers
are worried that wage cuts might result in decreases in morale that would subsequently result in
poor worker performance when the economy recovered, if not immediately. This highlights the
importance of fairness considerations in cases of negative reciprocity. With respect to positive
reciprocity, as in this ﬁeld setting, Bewley’s evidence is less conclusive. He argues that morale
is less important when considering wage increases, but ﬁnds that one main consideration when
determining raises is the eﬀect on employee turnover once the recession ends. Bewley’s work
suggests that there appears to be little connection between increasing pay and productivity, except
to the extent that higher wages make it possible to attract, and retain, higher quality workers.
This ties back to the earlier discussion of Lazear (2000) and the subsequent work on monetary
incentives in ﬁrms, where it is thought there are qualitatively large selection eﬀects of incentives
driven by changes in workforce composition. Again, more evidence on these channels related to
employee turnover are required to test more precisely a fuller set of theoretical predictions.
4.3.2 Shirking
Field experiments had also provided insights on research questions related to employee shirking
behaviors. The standard economic framework emphasizes employees are rational shirkers: they will
slack when the marginal beneﬁts of doing so outweigh the marginal costs. Firms respond to such
behaviors by choosing compensation and monitoring policies to reduce shirking. as emphasized
above, this view that workers will behave so opportunistically when the marginal returns on their
eﬀort are low, is often contradicted by empirical evidence and predictions on behavior in such
settings from the psychological and sociological literatures (Pfeﬀer 1996, Kreps 1997, Baron and
Kreps 1999). While we have earlier studied the role of compensation schemes and wage setting
behavior to raise employee eﬀort, we now focus on the eﬀect employer monitoring has on worker
behavior.
If employees are rational cheats then, conditional on a given incentive pay arrangement, a
reduction in monitoring will lead to an increase in shirking. The most powerful sanction available
to employers is typically dismissal. Thus, an increase in shirking resulting from reduced monitoring
should be greatest among individuals for whom the ongoing employment relationship is least
valuable.
As with most of the research questions posed in this chapter, establishing credible empirical
evidence to support the theory is not straightforward. In this case there are two concerns that
have plagued the non-experimental literature. First, shirking behavior is by its nature hard to
detect. Moreover, the ability of the econometrician to detect shirkers might itself be endogenously
related to the employer’s monitoring practices. Second, there might be unobserved factors, such
as other hiring policies, that cause there to be a correlation between monitoring and shirking.
A carefully designed natural ﬁeld experiment of Nagin et al. (2002) addresses both challenges.
The setting was a telephone solicitation company, with employees dispersed across 16 call centers.
At each call center, telephone solicitors were paid according to the same piece rate incentive
83scheme, one in which salary increased with the number of successful solicitations. This piece rate,
together with imperfect information on the outcome of pledges, created incentives for employees
to falsely claim that they had solicited a donation.
To curb opportunistic behavior, the employer monitored for false donations by calling back a
fraction of those who had responded positively to a solicitation. Employees were informed when
hired that their activities would be checked by “callbacks” made by management. The results of
each week’s callbacks were communicated to both employees and their immediate supervisors, and
the bad calls were deducted from each individual’s weekly incentive pay. Stronger sanctions for
bad calls were not generally imposed on employees because the number of bad calls was understood
to be a noisy indicator of cheating. For example, donors might sometimes change their mind after
agreeing to pledge money.71
To see if the costs of implementing this monitoring system could be reduced, the ﬁrms company
conducted a controlled ﬁeld experiment. This experiment was “double blind” in the sense that
neither the employees nor their immediate supervisors were aware of departures from “business
as usual.” In the experiment, the employer varied the fraction of bad calls that were reported
back to employees and supervisors at each call center. To more precisely estimate the true rate
of ﬁctitious pledges, the ﬁrm simultaneously increasing the true callback rate from 10% to 25% of
pledges. By working closely with the ﬁrm, the researchers were able to collect primary survey data
on employee attitudes toward the job, their expected job tenure, and the perceived diﬃculty of
ﬁnding another, comparable job. These relate closely to the underlying theory of rational shirking
behavior. This information is used to test whether those for whom the job was most valuable were
also the employees least likely to engage in opportunistic behavior.
The main results are as follows. First, a signiﬁcant fraction of employees behave according to
the predictions of the rational cheater model. In particular, employees respond to a reduction in
the perceived cost of opportunistic behavior by increasing the rate at which they shirk. Using the
survey data collected, the authors ﬁnd the employees who responded to reductions in monitoring
tended to be those who perceived the employer as being unfair and uncaring. On the other hand,
there is no evidence that individuals with good outside options increased shirking by more than
other workers when the rate of monitoring declined. Second, a substantial proportion of employees
do not appear to respond at all to manipulations in the monitoring rate. As with responses to
monetary and non-monetary incentives documented above, there is considerable heterogeneity in
how workers respond to employer monitoring. This underlying heterogeneity highlights the need
to balance the need to reduce the shirking behavior of some workers inclined to rationally cheat,
against those that are unlikely to do so under normal circumstances.
71Olken (2007 ) presents evidence from a natural ﬁeld experiment in on the eﬀects of top-down monitoring relative
to grassroots participation on reducing corruption on road projects organized by village committees in Indonesia.
Top-down monitoring via government audits is found to be the far more eﬀective means of reducing corruption.
844.4 Moving Forward
Economists have only recently begun to exploit ﬁeld experiments in ﬁrms. This nascent literature
has already highlighted the strengths of this methodology in being closely linked to testing alter-
native theories of individual behavior, of utilizing ﬁeld experiments and structural modelling to
make inference on the optimal design of incentive schemes, and to collect primary data to check
for non-expected responses on other margins such as the quality of work, or to probe speciﬁc tests
of the theory. We conclude by highlighting a few key areas for future work to consider.
First, the set of ﬁeld experiments discussed have focused primarily, although not exclusively,
on job tasks in which productivity is easy to observe, measure, compare across workers and time,
and the quality of work performed is relatively easily monitored by management and assignable to
individuals. Yet many jobs in the economy, or at higher tiers of ﬁrms’ hierarchies, do not share such
characteristics and more research is required in such settings where performance is evaluated more
subjectively, and might therefore be subject to inﬂuence activities (Milgrom 1988), or favoritism
(Prendergast and Topel 1996). As primary data collection is part of the ﬁeld experimenter’s
arsenal, this approach might especially help to shed light on these types of evaluations and incentive
structures.
Second, most ﬁeld experiments have been implemented to evaluate the eﬀects of one time
changes in management practices. Standard theory suggests history does not matter and that
these eﬀects should be equal and opposite to changing incentives the other way. This would be
relatively straightforward to test, conditional on being able to control for natural time eﬀects on
behavior. A rejection of the standard model might then imply there can be persistent eﬀects of
short run changes in management practice. Such eﬀects might operate through habit formation or
reference point eﬀects for example, that have been found using non-experimental data from real
world settings (Mas 2006).
Third, given the progression of ﬁeld experiments exploring the eﬀects of incentives on bottom-
tier workers, and then to managers in the middle tier of the ﬁrm hierarchy, it is natural to ask
whether ﬁeld experiments might in the future extend to understanding executive pay. The last
two decades have seen a surge in the popularity of performance pay for individuals in executive
and managerial positions, from CEOs down to middle and lower management (Hall and Liebman
1998, Hall and Murphy 2003, Oyer and Schaefer 2004). However as yet there remains mostly an
unwillingness of organizations to experiment in relation to such high stakes positions.72
Broader methodological issues remain to be borne in mind with regards to ﬁeld experiments
in ﬁrms. First, there are concerns over whether the set of ﬁrms and organizations that allow ﬁeld
experiments to be conducted within them, are selected in some way. For example, those ﬁrms
that are most likely to gain from changes in management practices might be most amenable to
ﬁeld experiments on these dimensions. Given the potential for such non-random selection, ﬁeld
72A similar set of issues arise for ﬁeld experiments in public economics. In particular, understanding why indi-
viduals give to fundraisers or chartiable causes. Large scale ﬁeld experiments have so far focused on how to induce
memebrs of the public or those with aﬃnity to the fundraising organization to give. However a disproportionate
amount of funds raised come from a few very wealthy donors. No ﬁeld experiments have been run on them.
85experiments ought to be designed to precisely measure diﬀerential eﬀects, and less weight given
to the levels eﬀects.
Second, this body of ﬁeld experiments oﬀers an intriguing insight into whether ﬁrms choose
their management practices optimally. Certainly, Shearer’s (2004) study highlights why the ﬁrm
was using piece rates and not ﬁxed wages. For the ﬁrm studied in Bandiera et al., in each case
the ﬁrm followed up on the results of the ﬁeld experiment by maintaining the incentives that
were introduced. However we have to be careful that while ﬁeld experiments have focused on the
eﬀects of carefully engineered interventions on productivity, the ﬁrm chooses practices to maximize
discounted proﬁts. Productivity increases need to translate in proﬁt increases. An example of this
is in the study by Freeman and Klein (2005) on a US shoe manufacturer, who ﬁnd that the move
from piece rates to hourly wages reduced productivity, but increased the quality of work to such
an extent that proﬁts rose overall. Clearly, there remains scope for experimentation within ﬁrms
to help them learn the optimal behaviors, and for this to have a large impact economy-wide, and
perhaps go some way to explaining large productivity diﬀerences across otherwise observationally
similar ﬁrms.
5 Households
Much of an individuals life cycle is spent in some form of partnership or family union. Despite
widespread social changes in family structure in Western economies, families and multi-member
households remain a key building block of society. Understanding how households make decisions
has implications for many of the choices we have already touched upon, such as educational choices
for children, labor market participation and labor supply. Shedding light on the household decision
making processes also has profound implications for understanding whether and how policies such
as income transfers and the regulation of marriage and divorce marriage markets, shape these
outcomes.
The benchmark model of household behavior has been the unitary model, pioneered by Samuel-
son (1956) and Becker (1981). While this generates a rich set of predictions for price and income
eﬀects on household behaviors, it remains silent on how conﬂicts between spouses are resolved.
Modelling household decision making as the outcome of a bargaining process provides a natural
way in which to introduce conﬂicts (Manser and Brown 1980, McElroy and Horney 1981, Chiap-
pori 1988). Hence, where these approaches diﬀer is in whether households maximize according to
a common or dictatorial set of preferences–the unitary approach–or whether they seek to maxi-
mize a weighted sum of household member preferences–the basis of the bargaining approach. On
the other hand, a key feature of both modelling frameworks is that households are assumed to
make eﬃcient decisions.
Households might reasonably be expected to reach eﬃcient outcomes because they have re-
peated and long term interactions, in strategic environments characterized by perfect informa-
tion, and have the ability to communicate costlessly. Nevertheless, a more recent strand of the
86literature has developed that takes seriously the idea that either household members behave non-
cooperatively within marriage (Ulph 1988, Chen and Woolley 2001), have private information or
an inability to communicate perfectly (Pahl 1983, Ligon 1998, Goldstein and Udry 1999, Boozer
and Goldstein 2003, Dubois and Ligon 2004), or cannot make binding agreements (Lundberg and
Pollak 2003, Basu 2006, Mazzocco 2004, 2007, Rasul 2008). In each case, household decisions can
then be ineﬃcient.
There are two long-standing strands of the empirical literature on household decision making
that stem from these views of the world. First, there have been a number of attempts to uncover
whether households bargain eﬃciently, as is implied by both the unitary and collective choice
models. Many of these tests take the form of examining patterns of household demand and
consumption (Browning and Chiappori 1998) or testing for the equality of the marginal product
of labor of household members across economic activities (Udry 1996, Akresh 2005). A ﬁrst
generation of ﬁeld experiments on households has begun to shed light on this issue.73
Second, there us an older strand of the literature that uses non-experimental approaches to
test for the assumption on whether households pool income, consistent with the predictions of the
unitary framework, or whether the identity of the income earner matters for outcomes (Thomas
1990, 1994, Hoddinott and Haddad 1995, Duﬂo 2003, Duﬂo and Udry 2004, Rangel 2006). Rather
surprisingly given the roots of ﬁeld experiments in the social experiments of the 1970s, relatively
fewer ﬁeld experiments have been conducted to help test the speciﬁc predictions of either unitary
or collective bargaining frameworks.
A parallel stream of literature relates to the use of social experiments to evaluate conditional
cash transfer programs, that was touched upon earlier. Two notable studies that have used data
from the PROGRESA intervention in rural Mexico are Attanasio et al. (2006) and Todd and
Wolpin (2008). These both combine the experimental variation in PROGRESA transfers across
randomly assigned villages with structural estimation of household’s dynamic behavior to shed
light on outcomes under alternative policy designs.
5.1 Eﬃciency
Ashraf (2009) presents evidence from a framed ﬁeld experiment to understand how information and
communication aﬀect household ﬁnancial decisions. The experiment was conducted with a sample
of current or former clients of a rural bank in the Philippines. The main decision each subject
had to make was over whether to spend or save income received during the experiment. More
precisely, subjects had to choose how to allocate 200 pesos received between: (i) direct deposits
73Tests based on demand patterns exploit the fact that utility maximization by a single consumer subject to a
linear budget constraint implies Slutsky symmetry, namely the restriction of symmetry on the matrix of compen-
sated price responses. This prediction is typically rejected in household data (Deaton 1990, Browning and Meghir
1991, Banks et al. 1997, Browning and Chiappori 1998). Browning and Chiappori (1998) derive the counterpart
to the Slutsky matrix for multi-member households solely under the assumption of eﬃcient within-household deci-
sion making, consistent with Nash bargaining models. They show the assumption of eﬃciency generates testable
restrictions on household demand functions, and distinguishing the collective model from both the unitary and the
entirely unrestricted case.
87into their own or a joint account; (ii) committed consumption using redeemable gift certiﬁcates.
Each subject was randomly assigned, with his or her spouse, to one of three treatments that varied
the privacy of information spouses had, and the ability of spouses to communicate with each other.
149 married couples are involved in the experiment.74
In the ﬁrst treatment, subjects are separated from their spouses at the outset of the experiment.
This treatment is referred to as ‘private information without pre-play communication’. Under this
treatment spouses have no information on whether and how much income is received by the spouse,
what decisions they have made, or the outcomes obtained. In the second treatment spouses learn
each others’ payoﬀs and choice sets. In this treatment, referred to as ‘public information without
pre-play communication’, spouses make simultaneous decisions and so cannot communicate nor
observe each others decisions ex ante. In the ﬁnal treatment the procedure is as in the previous
treatment except that spouses are able to communicate before making their decisions, and their
decisions are observable to each other. This is referred to as the ‘public treatment’.
Clearly, in the absence of a ﬁeld experiment, trying to uncover and exploit plausibly exogenous
sources of variation in the information available to spouses or their ability to communicate is
diﬃcult, and likely to be correlated to factors that aﬀect outcomes directly. Hence this research
design allows economists to more carefully scrutinize causal changes in behavior along dimensions
that are theoretically important, yet empirically almost impossible to measure in the absence of
a ﬁeld experiment. However, as with the other settings considered throughout, ﬁeld experiments
conducted with households raise important issues that need to be taken into consideration when
interpreting results.
First, in common with laboratory experiments, behavior in framed ﬁeld experiments might not
mimic behavior in the real world. Ashraf (2009) addresses this concern by running the experiment
in conjunction with a rural bank that all participants were familiar with, and by designing treat-
ments that capture real world diﬀerences in communication and information across households in
this setting. Second, households are engaged in repeated interactions outside of the context of the
ﬁeld experiment. Hence behavior within an experiment can be undone, or potentially reinforced,
by behavior outside of the experiment. To try and address this issue, Ashraf provides payoﬀs in
the form of person-speciﬁc gift certiﬁcates. Both methodological issues need to be considered in
all ﬁeld experiments with households.
Ashraf’s (2009) results shed light on the interplay between information, communication and
gender in household decision making. Relative to ﬁeld experiments in other settings, when the
experimenter is engaged in primary data collection with households it is of even greater importance
to understand societal norms of behavior within marriage. For example, in the Philippines, women
74As in any framed ﬁeld experiment or laboratory experiment, subjects need to be recruited. Framed ﬁeld
experiments that aim to replicate natural settings — say by working in conjunction with local organizations —
might provide data from which to assess whether participants diﬀer from those that choose not to participate.
As discussed earlier, the nature of self-selection into experiments is a phenomenon that is only beginning to be
understood (Lazear et al. 2009). Equally important, given the relatively small samples sizes inherent to many
framed ﬁeld experiments, it is crucial to be clear on how large a sample would be required to detect statistically
diﬀerent observable characteristics between participants and non-participants.
88are typically in charge of the ﬁnancial management of the household, making key decisions on
budgeting and allocation. Understanding the context in which the experiment takes place is
crucial for designing treatments that reﬂect real world trade-oﬀs subjects face, and to closely align
experimental designs with a theoretical framework. Of course, the cost of this precision in any
given context is the limited ability, all else equal, to extrapolate ﬁndings to households operating
under very diﬀerent norms.
The three main results are as follows. First, men are found to be more likely to deposit
money into their own account under the private treatments, and are more likely to commit it
to consumption under the public treatment. Second, the diﬀerences in behavior by gender are
subtle. A subset of women — those whose husbands normally control household savings decisions
— behave in the same way as men whose wives normally control household savings decisions.
Third, communication between spouses at the time of decision making induces the majority of
men to place the income into their spouses account rather than consume it or put it into their own
account. To understand these results, Ashraf discusses a framework of income monitoring within
the household where observability of income and communication at the time ﬁnancial decision
making, signiﬁcantly change the monitors ability to enforce contracts. The results can then be
understood as spouses responding strategically to changes in information and communication and
contract enforceability. They suggests a speciﬁc channel through which asymmetric information
can create ineﬃcient outcomes in ﬁnancial decision making, by providing incentives to hide one’s
additional income from one’s spouse.75
5.2 Moving Forward
Labor economists have sought to explain a far richer set of research questions than just those
related to behavior within households. Foremost among these other issues has been the research
into the causes and consequences of the formation and dissolution of households. Field experiments
have recently begun to help explore issues related to the formation of households or partnerships
in the ﬁrst place. Two examples are Fisman et al. (2006) and Fisman et al. (2008) who conduct
a framed ﬁeld experiment to measure diﬀerential preferences in dating across genders and races,
respectively. To do so, both studies analyze individual choices of subjects in an experimental speed
dating game.76
On diﬀerential preferences across genders, Fisman et al. (2006) ﬁnd that women place greater
weight on the intelligence and the race of partner, while men respond more to physical attrac-
tiveness. Moreover, men do not value women’s intelligence or ambition when it exceeds their
own.
On racial preferences, Fisman et al. (2008) ﬁnd that there is a strong asymmetry in racial
75This strand of ﬁeld experiments is growing For example, Robinson (2008) presents evidence from a framed ﬁeld
experiment on 142 households in Kenya to test whether intra-household risk sharing arrangements are eﬃcient,
and if not, whether limited commitment caused by contractual incompleteness partially explains behavior.
76Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) provide a recent overview of the most pressing issues that are being addressed
in research in the economics of the family.
89preferences across genders: women of all races exhibit strong same race preferences, while men —
of all races — do not. Second, subjects’ background inﬂuences their racial preferences: subjects that
come from locations that are measured to be more racially intolerant, using data from the General
Social Survey and World Values Surveys, reveal stronger preferences for same race preferences.
This is despite the subject pool being drawn from individuals that currently reside away from
home, and attend a top US university. Third, those exposed to other races in early life — as
measured by the fraction of individuals of a given race in the zip code where the subject grew
up–are less willing to date someone from this race, suggesting that familiarity might reduce racial
tolerance. Finally, physically more attractive individuals are less sensitive to the race of potential
partners in the experiment.
This experimental approach provides a nice complement to other non-experimental studies
applying structural methods to estimate similar preference parameters in the context of online
dating services (Hitsch et al. 2010). Given the growth in availability of online data in economic
research, perhaps in the near future we will witness research methods combining ﬁeld experiments
with interventions akin to audit studies that were previously discussed in relation to the economics
of discrimination.
As yet though, on many aspects of the formation and dissolution of families, few research
designs have credibly exploited experimental sources of variation from which to identify causal
eﬀects. The nature of questions involved might mean these sets of research questions remain
outside the domain of ﬁeld experiments.
6 Concluding Remarks
Given that complexities of markets severely constrain the ability of traditional economic tools to
examine behavioral relationships, it is not surprising that economists have increasingly turned to
experimental methods. Within this recent trend is a relatively new approach–ﬁeld experiments–
which have dramatically risen in popularity over the past several years. Since ﬁeld experiments
will likely continue to grow in popularity as scholars continue to take advantage of the settings
where economic phenomena present themselves, we view this study as an opportunity to step back
and discuss a few of the areas within labor economics wherein ﬁeld experiments have contributed
to our economic understanding. Our central task is to highlight what we view to be the central
advantages of the ﬁeld experimental approach: (i) using economic theory to design the null and
alternative hypotheses; (ii) engineering exogenous variation in real world economic environments
to establish causal relations and learn the mechanisms behind them; and (iii) engaging in primary
data collection and often working closely with practitioners.
A second goal of this study is to draw attention to a methodological contribution of ﬁeld
experiments: complementing other empirical approaches and allowing an exploration of the gen-
eralizability of behaviors across settings, such as lab and ﬁeld behavior. When taking account
of the stock of evidence, it becomes clear how ﬁeld experiments can play an important role in
90the discovery process by allowing one to make stronger inference than can be achieved from lab
or uncontrolled data alone. In this way, the various empirical approaches should be thought of
as strong complements–much like theory and empirical modeling–and combining insights from
each of the methodologies will permit economists to develop a deeper understanding of our science.
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117Table 1: A Typology of Field Experiments







In the Field XX X X
Real Incentives XX X X
Real Task or Information XX X X
Aware of experiment XX X
Appropriate people XX X X X
Researcher Intervenes XX X X
Exogenous change Xli Year of Publication: 2000-09
Table 2: Published Research in Labor Economics by Decade
Year of Pub cation: 1990-99
Theory Empirics Total Theory Empirics Total
Subfield
Demand for education/formation of human capital: 7 2 93 6 1 04 65 6
The demand and supply of labour:  10 58 68 20 53 73
Organisation of labour markets 28 59 87 20 48 68
Firm behaviour/personnel economics 26 23 49 33 28 61
Household economics 8 2 02 8 1 22 73 9
Aging and Retirement 066 066
Crime 2 2 4 1 11 12
Total 81 197 278 96 219 315
Notes:  The table is based on all published papers in the leading general interest journals of the American Economic Review, Econometrica,  the Journal of Political Economy, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, and the Review of Economic 
Studies. The numbers do not include papers and proceedings volumes. We use the Journal of Economic Literature classifications to place journal articles into one subfields within labor economics. l t / h















Demand for education/formation of human capital:
Early childhood interventions on human capital accumulation 23 3 1 0 0 0
(RCT) conditional cash transfer programs 12 1 1 1 0 0
Educational production function 36 9 0 3 0 0
Educational Spillovers 13 2 0 0 0 0
Returns to education 38 3 0 0 0 0
The demand and supply of labour: 
Wage and tax sensitivities 67 1 1 0 0 0
Determinants of wages/discrimination 12 28 4 1 0 0 4
Segmented labour markets 01 2 0 0 0 0
Demand for labour / skills 23 0 0 0 0 1
Organisation of Labour Markets
Unions, minimum wages and other labour market institutions 17 3 0 0 0 1
Labour market programs 01 3 3 0 0 0
Public sector labour markets 00 0 0 0 0 0
Occupational choice/ intergenerational mobility/ labour market segmentation 79 0 0 0 0 2
Immigration 06 2 0 0 0 0
Unemployment 12 13 3 0 0 0 0
Firm Behavior/ Personnel Economics
Employee and executive incentives 16 4 4 5 0 0 2
The employment relationship / gift exchange The emp oymen  relationship   gift exc ange 1 10 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 0 0 1 0
Peer effects 12 2 0 0 0 0
Workplace organisation 15 4 0 2 0 0 0
Household Economics
Family size 13 2 0 0 0 0
Marital bargaining 20 0 0 1 0 0
The marriage market  64 3 1 0 0 0
Child Labour 22 0 0 0 0 0
Household Labour Supply 02 1 0 0 0 0
Female Participation 13 5 0 0 0 0
Retirement
Decision to retirement 02 1 1 0 1 0
Health and retirement 01 0 0 0 0 0
Crime
Crime 15 6 0 0 0 0
Total: 96 129 60 18 5 2 10
Notes:  The table is based on all published papers in the leading general interest journals of the American Economic Review, Econometrica,  the Journal of Political Economy, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, and the Review of 
Economic Studies. The numbers do not include papers and proceedings volumes. We use the Journal of Economic Literature classifications to place journal articles into one subfields within labor economics. 0 9 4 1 4
Table 4: Testing Theory by Empirical Method, Published Papers 2000-9













Pure Theory Theory 96 0 0 0 0 0 0
Theory and 
Evidence
Test one theory 06 1 5 4 0 0 1
Test between theories 01 0 6 5 1 1 5
Pure Evidenc Pure Evidence e Pure Emprics Pure Emprics 0 58 58 49 49 9 4 1 4
96 129 60 18 5 2 10
Notes:  The table is based on all published papers in the leading general interest journals of the American Economic Review, Econometrica,  the Journal of Political Economy, the Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, and the Review of Economic Studies. The numbers do not include papers and proceedings volumes. We use the Journal of Economic Literature classifications to place journal articles into one 
subfields within labor economics. m Figure 1:  Simple Illustration of the Selection Proble
Figure 2:  A Field Experiment Bridge ggFigure 3:  Median weekly earnings of male workers. Year 2000 dollars. Source: Bureau 
of Labor Statistics
Figure 4: Median weekly earnings of female workers. Year 2000 dollars. Source: Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.
Figure 5: Male unemployment rates (annual averages) for men over 20. Source: Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.Figure 6: Female unemployment rates (annual averages) for women over 20. Source: Bureau of 
Labor Statistics.
Figure 7: Labor force participation rates, 20 years and older. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Figure 8: Complementary Experiment I Summary
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Figure 9:  Compensation Before and After At Safelite
Figure 10:  Gift Exchange and the Duration of Tasks
q* q q0
bq‐K